avakesh

Full time Torah Study: Is it for everyone?

Full time Torah Study: Is it for everyone?

 

Torah study is unquestionably a pillar of Judaism. Can one engage in study of other disciplines that Torah? The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D 145 )says that the primary focus should be on Torah but one can study”wisdoms” “b’akrai(occasionally, or in a manner than is not fixed). However a closer look reveals that it is talking about priorities in Torah learning and the wisdoms are the Torah subjects of astronomy, calcucations and Kabbala.  One cannot draw conclusions about secular studies or studying to prepare for a career.  Let us look at a disagreement among Tannaim from which we can start a consideration of this complex and important hashkafic topic.

 

  “Why does the Torah tell us, “And You shall gather your grain?”. Because another verse says, “This scroll of the Torah shall not depart from you mouth and you shall meditate in it day and night”. We might understand it literally; therefore note that “You shall also gather your grain” – combine Torah study with the way of the world(Derech Eretz). These are the words of R. Ishmael.

 

R. Shimon Bar Yochai says, “If a person plows at the time of plowing, sows at the time of sowing, winnows when it blows, what will become of Torah However, when Jews do the will of Hashem, their work is done by others…when they do not do the will of Hashem, they not only do not accomplish their own work but do the work of others. ”

 

Abbaye says, “Many have followed the words of R. Shimon Bar Yochai and did not succeed”. Rava said to the scholars: “: Do not come to the academy at harvest and gathering time lest you become impoverished and will have to engage in making a living the rest of the year (Brochos 35b).

 

So it seems that R. Ishmael recommends combining Torah study and work while R. Shimon Bar Yochai urges Torah study to the exclusion of other pursuits [1].

 

Surprisingly, other sources ascribe diametrically opposite opinions to these two Tannaim.  R. Ishmael says only Torah should be studied whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai accepts a very minimal obligation for daily Torah learning.

 

Ben Dama, the nephew of R. Ishmael asked him, “A person like me who has learned the entire Torah – can I go and study the wisdom of the Greeks””. He replied: ”Go and find time which is neither day nor night and study Greek wisdom then”.

 

“This scroll of the Torah shall not depart from you mouth and you shall meditate upon it day and night”. R. Yochanan said in the Name of R. Shimon Bar Yochai, ”Even if one reads the Shema morning and evening he has fulfilled this verse…

(Menachos 99b)

 

This contradiction did not escape the notice of Torah scholars and many reconciliations have been proposed [2].

 

Attention to the language used by these two sources suggests a reasonable explanation. It appears that R. Ishmael is speaking only of the active obligation to engage in earning a living and of combining Torah study with “the way of the world”, if one needs a parnosa (livelihood). One can sow and one reap and work for a living. However, for one who pursues secular studies for their own sake, he rules differently. Studying Greek wisdom, then as now, was unlikely to result in a good parnosa and should not be permitted. It may be that R. Shimon Bar Yochai, similarly, speaks of a utopian situation, when other nations materially support the Jews so they can freely study Torah. He will not necessarily apply it to the time in which he himself lived when such was not the case(3).

There were Tannaim who forsook paranosa to engage in full-time Torah study. On the verse in Mishle (5:19): “In her love (i.e. love of Torah) you shall be ravished always,” Rashi comments “For love (of Torah) you shall make yourself absent-minded and foolish, forsaking your own affairs and running to (hear) a word of halachah”  and in Eruvin 54b it is applied to R. Eleazar bar Pedas. In order to learn Torah, Rabbi Yohanan sold property which could have supported him in his old age (Shemot Rabba 47:5).

Rabbi Eliezer the Great, at the age of twenty-six, gave up a large inheritance and ran away from home to study Torah in Jerusalem at the yeshiva of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, where he rose to unprecedented greatness(Pirke D.Rabbi Eliezer, Ch.1).

The Gemara (in Ta’anit 21a) relates about Ilfa and Rabbi Yohanan who were suffering poverty and decided to leave the yeshiva and go out to work. After all, they said, earning one’s living is also a mitzva. They sat down to eat their lunch in a field, in the shade of a rickety wall. As they were eating Rabbi Yohanan heard two angels conversing. One said “Look at these two. They are leaving eternal life for the life of the moment. Let us push the wall over and do away with them.” The other replied, “No, leave them alone. One of them is destined for greatness.” Rabbi Yohanan said to himself, “Since I heard this and Ilfa didn’t, it must be meant for me.” Rabbi Yohanan went back to yeshiva, suffered, and eventually became Rosh Yeshiva and Gedol Hador. Ilfa went on to become a merchant, and unsuccesfully attempted to claim the position of Rosh Yeshiva.

Another example: Rabbi Meir in the last mishna in Kiddushin states that a father is obligated to teach his son a trade; otherwise it is as if he taught him banditry. Later in the mishna Rabbi Nehorai (who according to Rambam is Rabbi Meir by another name) declares: “I will leave all trades and teach my son only Torah.”

These examples establish that one is permitted to engage in parnosa, if he needs it, not that one must do so(5).

Some commentators pursue the solution along the lines of individualizing. They say that there are those who should engage solely in Torah study and those who should work. Pnei Yehoshua in Kiddushin answers that Rabbi Meir’s first statement is about ordinary people, who do not have the capacity to become great Torah scholars, while under the name of R. Nehorai he refers to one who possesses unusual alertness, intelligence and desire for Torah-learning, so that he would certainly merit having his physical needs looked after by others(4). Alternatively, it is about a person who showed at an early age the exceptional faith and trust in God needed to carry him through this type of life successfully (Sefer Hamakneh ad. loc.). The key is each one's nature and abilities(3).

Note the famous Rambam at the end of Hilchos Shemitta veYovel who also individualizes:

Not only the tribe of Levi but any person in the world whose spirit prompts him and whose mind convinces him to separate himself to stand before God in order to serve Him... and who casts off the yoke of the many calculations pursued by other people — he is sanctified, holy of holies, and God will be his portion in all eternity, and will also grant him a sufficiency for his needs in this world.

In summary: The most common approaches to explaining the various views of Tannaim regarding the nature of the obligation of constant Torah study is allow individualization and in making an allowance for paranasa, and, perhaps, study for parnasa(6).

 

 

1 The intensity of R. Shimon’s opposition to working is well described in the story of his years in the cave in Shabbos 33.

 

2 See twelve different reconciliations cited  by Y. Levy, Torah Study: A survey of Classiv Sources on Timely Issues (on the distinction between antural and peculative sciences see Part 7), Feldheeim, 1990, pp.58-63 and M. Levin,  With All Your Heart: The Shema in Jewish Worship, Practice and Life, Targum/ Feldheim, 2002, Ch. 13.

 

3. Shaagas Arye , Kuntrus Acharon, `1 s.v.Amnam

 

4 Others who make the distinction between different kinds of people: those who should engage in full time learning and those who should work, include: Nezer HakodeshGen, 68d, Keren Orah Menachos 99b, Maharam Schick Pirush on 613 mitzvos, 420; R. Chiya Pontremali in Toldos Adam to Sifri Eikev 42, n.5;Nefesh Hachaim 1:8, R. Shalom Rognoto in Darkey Sholom 124 (in the name of Divrey Nechamiah)

 

5 Regarding the mishna in Avo 6:5s that recommends combining Torah with Derech Eretz,  R Elchanan Wasserman in Chidushei Agados brings that based on the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabah 13:15) that "Derech Eretz" in the Mishnah does not refer to work but it refers to good deeds. This is an interesting but unique view.

 

6.Provided it does not involve study of heretical works (Shulchan Aruch, Y”D 145, 4 and in Shulchan Aruch O”C  307, 15-18

 

Difficult Aggada in Chullin 7b: Powers of witchraft

"A woman tried to dig up some earth from under R. Chanina's feet (to use for a spell against him). He said: "Take, it won't work, for it says: "there is no one but He(Devarim 4,6)".

(How can this be, do we not learn that witchcraft has power, did not) R. Yochanan said: 'Why is witchcraft called keshafim? Because they weaken(makchishim) the Family above". (Answer:) R. Chanina is different for he had great merit!".

This is very difficult to understand. Do witches have the power to overcome G-d's plan or do they not? If they do, they should be able to hurt a person with merits as wells as one without. If they don't have such powers, than they cannot bypass Hashem's plans in any way, even for an average person.

R. Chaim Volozhiner in Nefesh Hachaim 3:12 derives from here that concentrating on Hashem's uniqueness and power willl dispel the negative powers. In other words, R. Chanina was not unique. What he could do, unlike other people is that he was able to cleave to Hashem and concentrate on Hashem's Unity to the utmost. Others who can do the same will also be saved from dark powers. R. Chaim calls it ""a wonderful segula". The Brisker Rov followed this advice during WWII and was repeatedly saved by concentrating on Hashem's unity at dangerous times(see here, p. 31).

The story of R. Chanina is preceded by another statement of R. Chanina: "No man stubs his toe below unless it is decreed upon him in Heaven". This too appears to contradict the statement that witchraft can overcome the Supernal Family. Farthermore, who is this "Family"? Rashi to Zevachim Rashi (41b DH Famalia) says: "A king's Famalya is his company that agrees with him. If the majority soured, his Famalya does not endure. He partially leaves their company, and is not as informal with them as before. Likewise, if most of Yisrael sinned, it is as if there is no Kedushah." Famalya appears to refer to Israel as it exists even on earth and also in the higher spheres.

Sefer ha'Chinuch(28) draws a distinction between intermediate powers Above and Hashem himself. Witchraft can overcome the intermediate powers but not Hashem himself."Hashem created everything with a nature to do beneficial things in the world. Everything has a power above it forcing it to do its action, e.g. every grass has an angel above it telling it to grow. Hash-m commanded that we not mix seeds or animals to make a new species and Mevatel the species it came from. Chachamim say that Keshafim Machchishim Famalya Shel Ma'alah, i.e. it temporarily overpowers the power above it. It does not say that it overpowers the *decree* above, for Hash-m decreed that this action come from them."

R. Bechaye (Shmos 22:17) explains that kishuf is like chemistry (my analogy), "Kishuf is connecting separate things. When lower things are connected, the forces above join, and a wondrous strange act results. "

R. Chananel rejects a part of our passage. He explains that it "appears as if they are Machchishim Famalya Shel Ma'alah. Really, they cannot change Hashem's decree, like R. Chanina said. The Gemara said that he is different due to his merits, but we do not rely on this answer".

I suggest that the solution may come from what avakesh wrote about BIlaam. It is based on Recanti's commentary to the the following verses in Mishpatim.

It says in Shemos 22:18 that. "Yo shall not allow a witch to live". The next possuk is: "All who lie with an animal shall be put to death". Note that it also says: 'He who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed, except to Hashem alone". These last words echoe R. Chanina's words, "There is no One but He".

What's the connection between these verses?

Recanati in his commentary on this verse brings several Zohars, including one that speaks about Bilaam and implies that the connection is that a sorcerer brings his "bris" into the world of impurity in order to perform sorcery. Recanti goes on to say: "and understand this very well". He goes on the say something enigmatic about a human's "nefesh" descending into the world of animal "nefesh".

 I heard it explained that humans live on an intermediate plane of being; above them is the angelic sphere and below them is the world of animals and spirits. One can "shortcircuit" the intermediate plain by either rising above it and acting within it so that there are effects upon the world of humans below, or one can accomplish the same results by going under the human plane and working within it. Animals do not affect the world of humans because they do not have intelligence. But a human being with intelligence can descend into this lower world and cause effects there that will cause changes within the human world.

This what Chazal mean when they say that Bilaam was intimate with his donkey. They are saying that he used the most spiritual implement that a man has, his sexuality, to descend to and become a part of the animal world, to couple with a donkey and to become a great sorcerer.There is a hint to this in the Torah itself. Bilaam is introduced to us as "Ben Baor", which in Hebrew means,"the son of a "beheima".

Now we understand how witchcraft can overcome the family above. It means that a witch or a sorcerer can affect human levels and the worlds immediately adjacent to the one in which we live by descending ot lower levels. R. Chanina, however, lives in a world higher than these worlds. Kishuf cannot reach that high! R. Chanina was immune to witchraft because he lived, as we may say, in the world of Atzilus, on the levels not susceptible to the reach of sorcery.

On a deeper level, this is the meaning of the "talking donkey". There were two talking animals in the Torah: Bilaam's donkey and the snake in Genesis (see Ibn Ezra's comparison of the two). On a very basic level both are symbolic of human descent. When men and animals speak, they become equated. For Bilaams, the donkey represents his descent, not only below the level of a prophet but even below the level of a human, when he disregarded Divine Will and insisted on cursing Israel.

 

Are disagreements arbitrary?

A recent post about the distinct ways R. Akiva and R. Ishmael interpret verses merited this comment: "i am so confused. i choose to be a democrat or a republican. that is arbitrary. same with choosing a mode of interpretation. just one opinion or another. i like vanilla, you like chocolate. different theories, not! just he says, he says. am i missing something?".

I thought that it warranted a specific reply, and in depth.

The perception that all disagreements are arbitrary is prevalent in the modern world. Perhaps it is because so many disagreements that we encounter are quite arbitrary. People disagree with others because they don't like them  or the way in which they say what they say, or their groups; because they wish to belong to a popular group or party or because , at that moment, they are ornery and feels like disagreeing.

I particularly hear this sentiment from those who are exposed to Jewish thought in the Conservative venues. How does a typical Conservative adult education session works? The leader asks a member to read a (usually translated) statement from,  say R. Akiva. Then someone else reads a quote from R. Ishmael. Then the leader asks, "And how do you feel about it", and a discussion ensues, in which rank beginners pass judgments and share feelings about what was said by the greatest Tannaim.

The truth is that ALL disagreements among serious people are based on underlying assumptions. For example, the debate about raising or not raising the Federal debt ceiling is at the root a disagreement about the role of the government. Some believe that it should be constrained and, therefore, are against raising the debt ceiling. Others believe in expanidng governmental powers and want the ceiling raised so more money is available to the governmental agencies. In turn, that underlying dispute is also predicated on different views on the role of the individual in the society, on the nature and goals of the American Experiment and on many other equally weighty propositions.

The point is that even in the secular sphere, disagreements are based on something that is deeper than they.

For us as Jews looking at our tradition, disagreements are a fact of life. They are everywhere. Granted, what we agree on is much more than what we disagree about, the sheer number of disputes is a prominent fact.

Why do Tannaim disagree? Some believe that the personality of a Tanna determines his views. Conservative scholars, beginning with Zecharias Frankel in Darke ha-Mishnah" (Leipsic, 1859).   and many others claimed that it was because this Tanna was tacitun and withdrawn or gregarious or outgoing that he selected a certain view. Even R. Dovid Tsvi Hoffman allowed this approach to seep into his "Mar Samuel", for which R. Samson Raphael Hrisch vehemently denounced him. R. Hirsch (Selected Writings, vol. 5) consdered this a form of heresy but he did not himself provide an good explanation for the phenomena of machlokes. I am not talking about how disagreements are possible but why specific Tannaim select specific stands.

Many Conservative scholars, for example Professor FInkelstein (Pharisees and Sadduccees), explain this through a Marxist lens, Pharisees were a group of small shopkeepers and merchants and, therefore, they championed certain views whereas Saducess were aristocrats and warriors and they defended a different view. Neeedless  to say, I don't accept this facile and wholly inadequate explanation for it is too reductionist; neither is the Marxist perspective any longer popular.

To me, disagreements among Sages represent their differing grasps of spirituality. One Sage sees reality on a a certain spiritual plane, one in which the haalacha appears in one way, and another Sage, because his root of the soul is different, sees it in another way. The Lubavitcher Rebbe's approach is similar, for example, the disagreements between Hillel is due to Shammia representing Gevura and Hillel representing Chessed. Rebbe's view is solidly based on Zohar and has influenced several contemporary writers, such as R. Jonathan Sacks and R. Nachman Cohen, who published several books extending this concept to other pairs of Tannaim who disagree. When I discussed this once with R Cohen, he rolled off a number of other authorities throughout the ages who employed this approach.)

This is similar to what Ritva says in Eruvin 13b. He says that Moshe received every possible opinion but it was handed over to the Sages as to what opinions they would select according to what the generation needs. See an interesting article on this here.

At least, this is how I see this issue at this time. As I reach higher in the never ending climb to the root of my soul, perhaps my perception will change.

 

 

More on R. Ishmael and R. Akiva.

The disagreements between the school of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva [1] are not arbitrary but based on different approach to interpretation. In other words, they use different methodologies (an idea first suggested by R. Dovid Tzvi Hoffman).In general, R. Ishmael and his school used definite rules of interpretation and applied them only when there was a 'hermeneutical marker', an indication within the verse that the Torah intended a derash [2]. Thus, for example, a gezerah shavah (use of same words) can be used only if there exists a redundancy, an unneeded or 'extra' repetition of the term in one or both verses. This is called mufneh. R. Ishmael "hears" the intended, under the surface meaning of a verse and grasps its directions to the reader. He always uses the terminology "Shomea ani". You must hear when the verse hints to you that there is additioanl meaning hidden within it and you must comply. When the verse provides a marker, it is it and not a human interpreter that interprets. R. Ishmael calls such a situation 'maggid or omer lecha hakkasuv'- the verse tells you. When there is no such marker, R. Ishmael objected strongly to making a derash. R. Ishmael uses klal and perat, which are fairly close to a careful literal meaning [3]. R. Akiva uses ribbuy and miyut, which is more technical and less apparent. R. Eliezer and R. Akiva, on the other hand, used fairly arbitrary devices such as ribbuy and miyut and do not ask for a hermeneutical marker. R. Akiva would both "find" established halachos in verses that possess no difficulties and derive new halachos from such verses. Passages from R. Akiva's school use expressions that place the power to interpret in the hands of the human interpreter. They use terms such, "Yachol" - I might think to say so…but there is ground to say differently. In the following passage R. Eliezer uses a ribbuy and R. Ishmael objects. And a garment of wool or linen that contains tsaraas… I only know a garment of wool or linen, how do you know to include garment of kelaim? Talmud teaches "and garment'. I know only when one of the types is kelaim in a part of a garment; how do I know when it is throughout the garment or about when one kind is throughout and the other only in a part? Talmud teaches: 'And the garment'. I know only when it is a garment in which a kelaim of three by three cubits was woven, what about a garment in which there is less than three by three? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". I only know a garment that has space for the tsaraas to spread. What about when there is no additional space? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". These are words of R. Eliezer. R. Ishmael said to him: You are saying to the verse (hakkasuv): "Be silent until I interpret". R. Eliezer said to him: "Ishmael, you are a mountain palm (that does not bear fruits suitable for Bikkurim, see Bikkurim 1,3)". It may be suggested that R. Eliezer, viewed by his contemporaries as Sinai (Sukka 27a), as "a cistern that does not loose a drop (Avos,2)", as one who never taught anything that he did not hear from his teachers (Sukkah 27b), viewed Derash as something that merely backed up received traditions. As such, he did not need to be overtly restricted by literal meaning. R. Ishmael on the other hand, often utilized the principles of interpretation to derive new laws; as such, he would allow interpretation only when the verse itself commanded: "Darshen me!" R. Akiva went farther and imposed meanings onto verses even ehrn there were no difficulties within them. In support of this idea we may adduce a Sifri in Parshas Chukkas, which suggests that R. Ishmael also occasionally used ribbuy. The cow shall be burned as he watches - its hide, its blood on its intestines(Numbers 19,5). A ribbuy that follows another ribbuy is to exclude (lemaet) - these are words of R, Ishmael. Mishna Shevuos 2, 5 may contain another instance of R. Ishmael using a ribbuy. In addition, we find in Bechoros 51a that Rebbi, who usually uses 'klal and prat' occasionally uses ribbuy and miyut. In Bechoros, he uses it on the basis of its use by "tanna d'bei R. Ishmael". Might it be that R. Ishamel himself resorts to ribbuy when he possesses a tradition that for which no hermeneutical marker can be located? The distinction between methodology of different Tannaim allows as to bring a sharper focus into our study of Halachic midrash and to its citations within the Talmud. 1 R. Ishmael studied under R. Nechunia ben Hakone (Shevuos 26b) and his school includes R. Yonatan, while R. Akiva's method appears to have been inherited from R. Eliezer and carried forward by most of the enxt generation of the Tannaim, who were his students as well as R. Yoshia. 2 For a book length treatment of this point, seee Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos: R. Ishmael and the origins of Midrash,, Univ.Penn. Press, 2004. 3 When there is a general statement of principle followed by particular example, you allow the general to be defined by the particular. For example, "from animals , from cattle, from sheep you shall bring your offerings (Leviticus 1, 2)". Animal is a general category, for wild animals are also included under the rubric of 'animals', such as when says, "These are the animals that you shall eat - cow, sheep (domesticated)…ram and antelope (wild) (Deuteronomy 14, 4)". The verse proceeds with "from cattle, from sheep" - this is a particularization for it excludes wild animals. The overall meaning is that the general term "animals" that is used here includes only those animals that are similar to those in the particularizing clause - in other words, only domestic animals. Consequently we interpret the term "animals" in the beginning of this verse as if it excludes wild animals. Fifth rule: Specific followed by general, such as, "Do not just watch the donkey of your brother or his sheep when it was lost…return it to your brother…and so shall you do to his donkey and so shall you do to his raiment and so you shall do to all that your brother has lost…(Deuteronomy 22, 4)". Ox, sheep, donkey and raiment are specific and "all that your brother has lost" is general, broadening the category beyond the specific examples mentioned, to any kind of thing that is lost. Sixth rule: General, then specific, then general (again) - you first limit the original broad category and then expand it again. (In conclusion, the general is somewhat limited but it is broader than the specific examples found in the verse). For example, "If a man gives to his fellow silver or vessels to watch and it is stolen from that man's house… if the thief was not discovered, the man in whose house it was shall approach the judges (to swear) that he did not send his hand out (to use) his fellow's property (Exodus 22, 8). It continues, "For any matter of negligence" - this is a general category. "For ox, for donkey, for sheep, for raiment" - this is specific. "For any matter that is lost" - general (again). The verse enunciated specific examples to show us that just like the specific examples are in a class of movable entities that have a monetary value, so also the general category include only what is movable and had monetary value (but not restricted to only those examples specified by the verse).

Talmud, Oedipus, and Cannes

This film took a prize in Cannes.

The story of a great rivalry between a father and son, both eccentric professors in the Talmud department of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The father's lifetime of painstaking work was made superfluous by the discovery of the manuscript he was reconstructing. The son is a publicity seeking, recognition craving academic-celebrity. The Israel Prize, Israel's most prestigious national award, is the jewel that brings these two to a final, bitter confrontation.

Hearat Shulayim is a traditional film in more sense than one (at Cannes, the crew refused limousines and walked to the evening screening in the rain to observe the Shabbos)

 

But, really, a mainstream film about professors of Talmud! You can't make this stuff up.

Which is larger: Oral or Written Law?

Here is a passage in Yerushalmi Peah 2:4 which is not particularly striking but it will bring us to important "yesodos" in understanding the unfolding of Torah She Baal Peh.

E. Zeiri in the name of R. Elazar says: "I will write for him most of my Torah (Hoshea 8:12)". Was the majority or the Torah written? Rather, more numerous are things that are derived orally from what is derived from text. Is it really so? Rather, more precious are things derived orally from things derived from a text.

There is a simlar passage in Bavli GIttin 60b, where R. Elazar and R. Yochanan disagree whether most of Torah was given orally or in writing. It is not surprising that Yerushalmi reports R. Elazar's position explicitly and R. Yochanan's position as stamma d'gemora; after all, Rambam writes in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishan that the editor of Yerushalmi was R. Yochanan.

א"ר אלעזר תורה רוב בכתב ומיעוט על פה שנא' (הושע ח) אכתוב לו רובי תורתי כמו זר נחשבו ור' יוחנן אמר רוב על פה ומיעוט בכתב שנא' (שמות לד) כי על פי הדברים האלה ואידך נמי הכתיב אכתוב לו רובי תורתי ההוא אתמוהי קא מתמה אכתוב לו רובי תורתי הלא כמו זר נחשבו ואידך נמי הכתיב כי על פי הדברים האלה ההוא משום דתקיפי למיגמרינהו

What is more difficult to udnerstand is what this means. What does the question of whether most Torah is in writing or Oral signify and how is "most" defined.

There is a parallel Yerushalmi (Chagiga 1:8) that can throw some light on this question.

ר' זעירה בשם ר' לעזר (הושע ח) אכתוב לו רובי תורתי וכי רובה של תורה נכתבה אלא

 מרובין הדברים הנדרשין מן הכתב מן הדברים הנדרשין מן הפה וכיני אלא חביבין הדברים הסמוכין לכתב מן הדברים הסמוכין לפה

What this is saying is that there are laws. Some are connected to texts and some are connected to oral traditions. The argument is whether more are connected to a text or more are connected orally.

What does this mean?

To understand it, let me present the brief history of systemization of Oral Law as I understand it.

When Jews returned to Judea from Bavel, they brought with them a mass of unorganized traditions. There were numerous laws but they were not arranged in any kind of pattern that allowed systemization. There was just a mass or rules and precedents, each standing on its own. There were also the Pentateuch (the Law), Prophets and various other books. These books were presumably Kesuvim, since Kesuvim were not canonized  until Anshei Kneses Hagedola, as described in Bava Basra 15a. However, they could also be handbooks of laws.This is how Ben Sira (written in this period) explains it in his introduction: "My grandfather Jesu, after he had much given himself to a diligent reading of the law, and the prophets, and other books, that were delivered to us from our fathers...".

Josephus says this: "Antiquities XIII, 297, What I would now explain is this, that the Pharisees have passed on to the people a great many observances handed down by their fathers, which are not written down in the law of Moses. For this reason the Sadducees reject them and say that we are to consider to be obligatory only those observances which are in the written word, but need not observe those which are derived from the tradition of our forefathers."

Saducees apaprenlty did not disagree that there were received laws. However, they either maintained that these Laws did not any longer matter, because "times have changed", or they thought that only what was written was reliable. Both of these positions are known to us from later times.

One way to counter this was to organize Oral Law in close conjunction to Written Law.

The first to organize the traditions were the Sofrim. As stated in the Yerushalmi Shekalim 5 and quoted in Tosafos Kiddushin 30a, s.v Nikreu Sofrim, Sofrim is best translated as Enumerators and not Scribes. They arranged traditions into groups, such as: "A woman is bethrothed in 3 ways", "With 10 sayings the world was created", "FIve should not take teruma" etc etc. Essentially they made lists in order to organize the mass of traditions into some kind of a rudimentary structure. See a discussion here

Once this was accomplished, another question arose. Would it be better to now organize the traditions based on the verses of the Written Torah, which everyone knew by heart, or would it be better to organize them into a freeestanding work that has no connection of the verses. R. Ishmoel and R. Akiva chose the former and so they wrote Midrashei Halacha. Others, R. Meir, for example, composed the rudimentary Mishna, Mishna Rishona, which went on to evolve into Tosefta, Mishna and Beraysos.

The Yersushalmi and perhaps also the Bavli, want to understand which was the dominant process.

The disagreement in the Yerushalmi is whether at the intial point of systemization, most traditions were organized according to the verses (written) or in a freestanding rudimentary mishnaic type arrangement (oral).

Pshat will out!

I have gradually come to understand that even when Chazal appear to abandon pshat in a particular verse, often, though not always, what they abandon is a pshat interpetation of a particular verse but not the halacha that actually comes out of the pshat in that verse. Of course, sometimes they tell us explicitly that a certain interpretation is incorrect and substitute their more complex and less simple intepretation for pshat. However, more comonly they say that the verse means something else than what it appears to be saying, ignoring the pshat but not dismissing it. In such cases, very often the pshat is still reflected in halacha, but it may not be traced to this specific verse. It may be connected as a drash to yet another verse, or it may be introduced as an anonymous halacha of Torah she baal Peh.

Let's look at an example. 

A verse in Parashat Shemini appears to forbid one from becoming tamei at any time.  The Torah writes concerning non-kosher animals, "you may not eat their flesh, nor shall you touch their carcass; they are impure to you" (Vayikra 11:8).

 The gemara (Rosh Hashana 16b), however, interprets this verse compeltely differently and in a way that can only be called drash. Rabbi Yitzchak says that only kohanim are forbidden to become "tomei meit" (impure as a result of contact with a corpse).  If so, the verse as referring to a special halakha related only to the three regalim (pilgrimage festivals) - Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot: "A person is obligated to purify himself on the festival, as it says 'You shall not touch their carcass.'" The reason would appear to be that these are the times of pilgrimage, when every person ttouches or eats kodashim.

 The Rambam codifies this halakha of Rabbi Yitzchak: "All Yisrael are commanded to be pure every festival, for they must be prepared to enter the Mikdash and eat 'kodashim' (the festival sacrifices), as it says in the Torah, 'You shall not touch their carcass' [which refers] only to the festivals.  If one did become tamei, he is [nevertheless] not lashed (makkot).  However, no such prohibition applies during the rest of the year." (Hilkhot Tum'at Okhlin 16:10)

The Rambam seems to have held that this halakha relates strictly to the laws of the Mikdash and kodashim.  It therefore follows that it would not apply nowadays, in the absence of the Mikdash.  Moreover, it would only apply on the three festivals on which each Jew must go to the Mikdash and eat kodashim.  It would not apply on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, which do not require traveling to Beis Hamikdash.

At first glance, this gemara takes a verse competely out of its pshat meaning. The posuk says that one is not allowed to touch carcasses and Gemara says that it applies only on Festivals, of which there is no mention in this verse or any other verse.

However, the halacha of the pshat in this verse does return... but unconnected to this verse.

Mishne Lamelech to this Rambam cites various authorities who imply or say that there is a standing prohibition to become Tamei, just as the verse in Shemini says. It is the position of Tosafos in several places and, in fact, it is the simple meaning of gemara in Chullin 34a. Rashi to Chullin 35a(Daleicha) also says it. The concept is called "Tumas Gviah".

It is not surprising that there is even a verse that is connected to this prohibition. Not only that, an entire mysterious and complex system of law is predicated on this prohibition: "Ochel Chullin B'Tahara". This refers to the widespread practice of eating one's regular food items in a state of preparedness and separation from inpurity that one needs for eating kodashim. Usually understood to be rabbinic and of late provenance( see Yoma 23a), Hagahos Mahari Ronshburg on Chullin 2b, cites a Ylakut Shimoni (Ki Tisa, end of Remez 386) that derives it from the verse: " And you shall make yourself Holy and be Holy (Vayikra 20). "From here said R. Gamliel: "Not only to Kohanim was holiness given from Sinai, but to all of Israel, as it says, "You shall be Holy (kedoshim tohyu)".

Here you have an example of a non-pshat explanation of a verse in Shemini but the simple explanation is not rejected. Instead it returns as derived from a different verse.

For completenesss, I must add that not everyone agrees that there exists a blanket prohibition to make oneself ritually impure. See ArtScroll notes to Chullin p. 33a, n. 33.

Now an aside. The Me'iri says a different explanation of the halakha in Rosh Hashana 16b.  Every person must purify himself on the festival in order to eat his regular food, Chullin – not the sacrificial meat – in a state of purity.  Rav A. Sofer (in his notes on the Me'iri) notes the novelty of this approach and its far-reaching ramifications. This is also the opinion of the Tur. The Tur (O.C. 603) cites a tradition from Avi Ha-ezri that one should try to eat all his food in a state of tahara during the seven days between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur.  He explains that this tradition speaks of only seven days (rather than all ten days of repentance, including Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur) because it is superfluous on Rosh Hashana.  Since a person must be pure on the festivals (including Rosh Hashana), there is no need for a special tradition to require eating in a state of tahara on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur. Similarly, Likewise, the Shibbolei Ha-leket (283) quotes the law of Rabbi Yitzchak and adds that this law applies to every festival – "and even more so on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, which are days of judgement."  He go so far as to require the recitation of a berakha when one immerses in a mikveh before Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur as part of his process of teshuva (repentance).  The Tur (ibid. 606) records Rav Sa'adya Gaon's ruling that one recites a berakha when immersing in the mikveh before Yom Kippur.  The Rosh, however, strongly disagreed, arguing that there is no basis in the Talmud at all for this custom. Bach tries to defend R. Saadia Gaon. R. Yeruchem Perlow in Sefer Hamitzvos L'R Saadiah Gaon suggests that the blessing is derived form a Biblical obligation to purify oneself before Yom Kippur, "Before Hashem shall you be purified".

How could one explain Meiri? I suggest that Rabbon Gamliel, the same one who Biblically obligates to eat Chullin in purity in the Yalkut, holds that Rosh Hashana and Yom Kipur are like festivals for the purposes of voiding aveilus  and this is halacha  (YD 9 and OC 14). The obligation to become purified on Festivals is a component of the obligation to eat Chullin in Purity and even on Rosh Hashana, when one eats plenty of Chullin and no Kodashim, this obligation applies.

Let us now come back to the concepts.

We saw that Chazal often do not abandon pshat but substitute drash for the pshat. The pshat, however, returns under a guise of a derivation from another verse, or as halacha without a stated derivation. Why do they do it?

I think that it is because no derivation stand alone. One who learns Talmud quickly sees that various Sages had an interconneted and complex system of derivation of various details of a particular halacha from different verses. One often sees how a Sage derives several details from different verses and another Sage who disagrees with one  of these details is forced to construct another structure of derivations. The first Sage objects that if so, how do you derive this  and that, and the other Sage is forced to proivde verses for that detail as well. I think that we see only a portion of this inteconnected drash systems in the gemara and that they are more complex and interlinked. Sometimes we see an isolated drash that seems "far out" but do not realize that it is a part of an entire structure of interpretations. In order for the structure to be sound and withstand scrutiny, some halachos must bear a more forced and a more drash type of intepretation. When we see this particular interpretation in isolation we do not appreciate the need that forced it and we wonder.

Now, you might think, after I got through with it, that R. Yitzhak's intepretation, that one must purify himsf on a Festival is just a drash and that it has not basis in Pshat. Wrong again!

Rashbam in four places ( Shemos 29:37, 30:29, Vayikra 6:11 and 11:8) explains pesukim in a way that demonstrates that R.Yitzhak is also saying pshat. R. Yitshak says that one must purify himself on Festivals because he will then be touching or eating kodshim. The Torah itself says it, according to Rashbam. In these places it says that one who approaches or touches consecrated things, "yikdash (shall be holy"). The traditional understanding of this is, as Rashi brings, that when a piece of sacrificial meat of lesser holiness absorbs from a piece of greater holiness, it too is treated as having greater holiness. Rashbam says differently. He says that it means that someone who approaches a mizbeach or kodshim must purify himself. He supports it from the identical language used at the sanctification at Mount Sinai (yikdashu).

Here we also see how a what appears to be a drash is actually a simple meaning of a different verse, which Chazal also darshined in a way different from its pshat.

It seems that the realm of derivation and drash and of halacha and pshat are  seen as completely separate realms, neither of which takes away from the other.

Fascinating!

 

 

Omer: the day after the Sabbath

And HaShem spoke unto Moses saying:

10 Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them: When ye are come into the land which I give unto you, and shall reap the harvest thereof, then ye shall bring the sheaf of the first-fruits of your harvest unto the priest.
11 And he shall wave the sheaf before HaShem, to be accepted for you; on the morrow after the sabbath the priest shall wave it.
12 And ye shall count unto you from the morrow after the sabbath, from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the waving; seven sabbaths shall there be complete...
16 even unto the morrow after the seventh sabbath shall ye number fifty days; and ye shall present a new meal-offering unto HaShem...

The simple meaning of these verses is that the Omer is counted after the first Shabbos after the beginning of Pesach festival. According to this understanding, the "Sabbath" means exactly the same thing each time that it is used, namely, Shabbos, the seventh day.

The Chazal[ however, explain that the Sabbath in verse 11 refers to the first day of Passover, whether it falls on Shabbos or during the week. The priest always waves the omer on the 16th of month of Nissan. The other Sabbaths in the passage mean not the Shabbos day but rather weeks. The difficulty of course is that the same word is said to mean two different things in proximate verses. This difficulty has not escaped sectarians who gleefully point to it as disproving the traditional understanding of the passage and claim that their understanding of the passage is the original one. Here is schema that comes from a karaite source:

I was reading Chanoch Albeck's introduction to the Mishna, Vol 1, ch. 2 and he points out that the Rabbinic reading is unequivocally supported by the following verse in Yehoshua 5:11.

The day after the Passover, that very day, they ate some of the produce of the land: unleavened bread and roasted grain.

It says, "the day after Pesach", not "the day after Sabbath".

Actually Rambam in Hilchos Temidim Umusofim 7:2 brings this proof.

I then remembered that this verse came up previously in the Rabbinic vs. sectarian polemic and their response was that it so happened that year that day, the day after Pesach happened to be Shabbos.This only works for Karaites, who agreed with the lunar calendar. According to Karaites, Shabbos falls at different times on different years on Pesach. According to Zaddokim, if we assume that they used a solar calendar, Shabbos always falls on the same day in relation to Pesach.

Albeck feels that the verse from Yehoshua is a decisive proof and the only reason that Menachos 65 A did not use it was because it wanted to bring a proof from the Torah itself. He points out later in the chapter that Septuagint, a much earlier work than the Talmud, also translated "the morrow of Shabbos" as the day after the first day of Pesach.

For more of in depth discussion, see here.

I wrote about it as well.

I think that "morrow of Pesach in the Torah must mean the day of the 16th of Nissan, since Pesach refers not to the first day of Yom Tov, a term that does not exist in Biblical Hebrew, but to the Paschal sacrifice. If so, if the Torah wanted to say, "on the day after the first day of Yom Tov", it HAD TO somewhat imprecisely use the words, "the morrow of Sabbath", because there was simply no other word to use.

The verse for Yehoshua would be a problem to this, however. Perhaps, "the language of Torah is different that the language of the Prophets(Chullin 137)

Vhadvorim Atikim

Chumros on Pesach and in general

I seem to write about chumros every Pesach because every Pesach brings with it additonal insights into this subject. Chumros on Pesach are a prominent feature of the Pesach landscape and partake of many related and important ideas in spirituality and Avodas Hashem.

Why is even a tiny piece of Chametz forbidden on Pesach? Radvaz (Rabbi David ben Zimra, 1479-1573) askes this question in She'elot uTeshuvot Radvaz, 3:546 (977). After finding that there is no other halacha that makes quite such  stringent demands, he concludes that this is because chametz symbolizes the yetzer hara (evil inclination). One place where this idea is expressed is in Brochos 17a, where it says that when Rabbi Alexandari finished saying the amidah, he would add a tefillah: "Master of the Universe, You know full well that it is our desire to act according to Your will; but what prevents us from doing so? The se’or in the dough..."

However, Chido in Simchas Haregel extends this idea from searching for chometz to Pesach in general. He writes(Machazik Bracha 457): "It is well known that every person accepts on himself stringencies, adding fences and barriers because of the severity of the prohibition of chomets, as Radvaz explained in a teshuva". He adds that there is no prohibiton of appearing super-punctillious but it should be done in private and the rabbi who rules for others should not follow only the letter of the law. The Minchas Eleizer writes similarly in Machazil Bracha 457 that on other ares of halcha "the power to permit is preferable" but our tradition regarding chometz is to rule according to strict opinons. He attributes this approach "our rabbis, ZTZ'L". This, unlike Chido, he directs even the rabbis to rule strictly, even for others. This approach finds its expression in the the Chabad saying, "Pesach is andersh(different)" and in the practice of Ismach Moshe to accept any possible chumra found is seforim, as documentd in Tehila L'Dovid, a sefer written by his grandson. This remains the prevailing approach in Satmar as documented in the article in the Pesach issue of Mishpacha about the Williamsburg Matza bakery, the only bakery in the world in which, based on R. Yoel's directive, every possible chumra is being kept.

The  Mei HaShiloach quotes Reb Bunim MiParshischa who said that all the stringencies that the Jewish People adopt on Pesach are adornments to holiness, and this is alluded to in the verse that states (Shir HaShirim 1:!0) tzavareich bacharuzim, your neck with necklaces. This means that every limb of a person’s body has a corresponding ornament or garment, whereas the neck can be adorned with an ornament that is not unique to the neck. A precious stone is not designed to clothe someone. Rather, it is intended to be suspended from a person’s neck. Similarly, the stringencies that have been adopted by the Jewish People on Pesach is due to the fact that the neck is the vehicle through which the food enters, and it is specifically regarding food matters that all the stringencies on Pesach apply.

Here is how I understand this concept. Generally, a chumra is praiseworthy thing and an expression of loving G-d, except that a person should not take on stringencies that are far above his or her current level of observance. Doing so exposes his other deficiencies and represents  Kefitsas Hamadreigos which is not the right way in serving Hashem. However on Pesach even chumros that are far above the observance level are fully legitimate. Pesach is the time of mortal combat with Yetser Hara and in a fight to the last, any weapon is acceptable. It is no dishonor to a warrior in the midst of the battle to slay his enemy with a tree trunk, should a sword not be available. Similalry, Pesach is a "time-out" during which the usual considerations in Derech Hoavoda do not apply. 

I always thought that the statement of Ramo in in Orach Chaim 443:6 contradicts this approach. Ramo writes that those who scour and wash the walls before Pesach have what to rely on and shold not be ridiculed. Mishan Berura points out that they rely on a Yerushalmi. Doesn't this indicate that chumros even on Pesach must have something on which to rely, something at least of the gravity of Yerushalmi?

There is also found in the traditional sources an approach that is against all chumros on Pesach. Not surprisingly it comes from Breslov. Sichos HaRan #235 says:

"The Rebbe was also very much against all the special stringencies that are observed on Pesach. Many people went so far in observing many fine points of custom that they were literally depressed by the holiday. He spoke about this at length. One of his followers once asked the Rebbe exactly how to act with regard to an ultra-stringent observance. The Rebbe made a joke of it.

The Rebbe spoke about this quite often. He said that these ultra-strict practices are nothing more than confused foolishness. He told us that he had also been caught up in this and would waste much time thinking up all sorts of unnecessary restrictions. Once he worried about the drinking water used during Pesach. He was afraid that a small amount of leaven might have fallen into the well from which they drew water. The only alternative would be to prepare water in advance for the entire Pesach week, as some people do. But this was also not good enough, for the water had to be carefully safeguarded from leaven from the day before Pesach, and this was very difficult."

Here is how the RCA put it in a statement issued in 1997. " The promulgation of stringencies were condemned because they add additional financial burdens on the Jewish consumer. Unnecessary stringencies are divisive........they foster an atmosphere of cynicism that no standards are ever good enough."

However, there is also a middle approach, one that says that some chumros are good and some are bad.The good ones keep you out of trouble because they bring with them zechus avos.

Inyan this year, the magazine of Hamodia, contains an interesting interview with the Squarer Rebbe. In it he quotes this Ramo as an indication that chumros IN GENERAL, not only on Pesach, must have something on which to rely. "This is how the Rav of Ostrow interpreted this Ramo. This something should be a received tradition from our forefathers."This is a gevaldige message", the Rebber enthuses. "If one relies on his ancestros, it is their responsibility to ensure that he does not stumble. On the other hand, if their way does not find favor in his eyes,then it is as if he has forged a new path, and in that case ancestors bear no responsibility and one is dependent on his own zchyos". He goes on to share a story of a certain machmir who would not eat of the Magid of Chernobyl's shirayim because of the minhag of not to "mish" (eat other people's food on Pesach). The Maggid told him to check his water barrel and he found there a piece of floating chometz.

It is important to point out that this is not the kind of oppositon to chumros that one sometimes finds in the "modern" sector. The argument here is for the authority of traditional minhagim, not their dismissal as not somehow relevant to our 21st centruy lives. What the Squarer Rebbe says is that raditional chumros are to be mantained but new ones should not be manufactured by individuals.

I end with a quote from Shelah, Beis Chochma, vol1.

We find that as generations unfold more and more halachic stringencies are enacted. During days of Moshe Rabbeinu only those prohibitions that were explicitly received on Sinai were proscribed. Moshe Rabbeinu enacted a nubmer of stringencies based on his perception of the spiritual needs of the nation. In later generations, be it at the time of the prophets or the Tannaim, the prevailing spiritual leadership instituted additional halachic stringencies and guidelines.

 

Parshas Porah is d'oraisa.

Shulchan Aruch in the beginning of HiIlchos Purim says that some say that Parshas Zakhor and Porah is of Biblical origin and villagers who don't have a minyan the rest of the year should travel to larger towns to hear these parshiyos read in a minyan.

Almost everyone who commented on this passage questioned that Parshas Porah is of Biblical origin, and for a good reason. There is no Scriptural source for such an obligation, neither is there any clear Talmudic source for it. Until newer manuscripts of certain Rishonim became available, the only source for this contention that was available to the commentators was a note to hagahos Asheiri. It is easy to dismiss a single source. In fact, Nachal Eshkol ( I aso heard it in the name of Gro) attempted to explain even that source away in quite an ingenious manner. He posited that there was a scribal error and that originally what was written in it was the abbreviation Peh"Peh. It was meant to stand for parshas purim and to refer to the story of Amalek's attack that we read from Beshalach on Purim morning. The intent was that parshas Zakhor at the end of Ki Teitse as well as parshas Beshalach that we read on Purim morning can fulfill the obligation to remember Amalek, nothing to do with Porah (this si a machlokes bewtween Mogen Avraham and others). When a subsequent copyist tried to expland the abbreviation, he mistakenly did so as "parshas porah" instead of "parshas purim".

However, now we have much more manuscript evidence. No one ever found any manuscript that contained this putative abbreviation. No one ever found this passage with the words of parshas purim. Instead we now have Ritva to Megilla 7b, Tos. R. Yehuda Hachasid and Tos. Harosh to Brochos 13a (see Rashbo there) who all have the version "parshas Porah".

I heard from Rav Hershel Schachter that by reading parshas Porah we fulfill the command to remember the Cheit Ha'eigel -- the sin of the Golden Calf. In Parshat Eikev (9:7) we read: "Z'chor al tishkach eit asher hiktsafta et Hashem Elokecha b'Choreiv" -- "Remember, do not forget, that which you angered the Lord, your G-d at Choreiv (Sinai)," a reference to the Golden Calf. Rashi (Chukas 19:22) quotes from R. Moshe HaDarshan that the Red Heifer served as an atonement for the sin of the Golden Calf. He uses an allegory concerning a child who dirtied the king's palace. "Let the mother (the Heifer) clean up the mess made by her son (the Golden Calf)."  What this emasn is that Red Heifer is a euphemism for Godlen Calf. I would add that in Megilah 25b it says that the second story of the Godlen Calf we read but do not translate, so as not to create an impression that the calf had powers. Similarly, we fulfill the command to remember Miraim's sin of speaking against her brother Moshe only in the course of the annual Torah rading and we do not establish a specific ceremony for it, as we do for remembering Amalek (Magen Avron 60). This is so as not to embarss Miriam. So we see that not all commandments to remeber should be fulfilled openly.

So as not to produce a wrong impression, we read parshas porah instead of the portion fo Godlen Calf to fulfill the commandment to remember the sin of the Golden Calf.

Aruch Hashulchan O'CH 685 suggests that the obligation of parshas porah is Biblical because the Biblical passage that contains it needs to be read during the purification ceremony. His proof to it is the Talmudic passage in Zevachim 90. There the question is asked: "Why chattos is always first in verses but by yoledes, olah precedes chatos?" The answer is , "Lemikroah", to read it. Rashi there and in the beginning of Tazria understands that this means "designation". Chattos is still brought first but in the case of Yoledes, the olah is designated first, before chattos. Aruch Hashulchan explains the word "lemikroah" differently, to mean that the verses that describe the sacrifice of Yoledes must be read during that sacrifice, and he draws an analogy to Porah. It remains to be asked, "what is the connection betrween Porah Adumah and Yoledes"?

R. Moseh Shternbuch in Moadim UZmanin (2;168) provides stronger evidence. He asks us to take three steps:

1. In Yoma 5b it says that the verse in the beginning of Shemini where the korban of Miluim is explained, "This is the word(Davar) thaty ou shall do...", means that the passages of Miluim must be read from the Torah when Miluim are brought. In fact, if it was not read, the miluim sacrifice would be ineffective.

2.In Yoma 68B, the first Rashi to the Mishna explains that the Cohen Godol's ceremoney of reading of the Torah on Yom Kippur is derived from Miluim. (Parehtetically, it explains that this Torah reading is a part of the sacrificial order and not like other Torah readings that we do, and illuminates the manner in which the mishna there presents it).

3.Yoma 2b, "As he did on this day, so shall you do to do, to atone for you". This passage form Miluim is explained by the Gemara to mean: "To atone - this is the actions of Yom Kippur; to do-this is the actions of Porah". Hence, it draws a connection between Yom Kippur and Porah and requires the Torah reading of the relevant passage to be performed during the ceremony of Red Heifer purification.

In conclusion, what Rishonim who say that parshas Porah is d'oraysa mean is that reading it is Biblically required during the ceremony of Porah Adumah. It does not mean that we, in our own time have a Biblical obligation of parshas Porah.

A great source but still not compatible with the statement in the Shulchan Aruch from which we started.