avakesh

Purim at BMG (Lakewood)

How Chabad and the Yeshiva World parted ways

Download Godol

It is well appreciated that until about 50 years ago, the Litvishe Yeshiva world and Chabad were not antagonistic to one another, whereas now they are. Decades ago, not only did the Rebbes of Chabad attend rabbinic conferences, they had a close relationship and worked together on community issues with the leaders of Lithuanian Jewry. There may have been some tension but no more than between misnagdim and any other chassidic group. Yet, in the USA , those who know, know that the mistrust and suspicion go back many decades, and they intensified in the past thirty years. R. Hillel Goldberg, for example, reports scathing criticism of the messianic tendencies in Lubavitch by R. Hutner already more than four decades ago and I remember hearing remarks as well from another godol about the tendency of Lubavitch to duplicate communal institutions instead of joining in community wide institutions decades ago as well. There was the Shanghai controversy. It seems to me, though, that the antagonism in the USA is different than it was in R. Shach's camp in Eretz Isroel, where it was still drawing on the two hundreds year-old ideological opposition to chassidus in general.  Was there a precipitating event in the USA after which everything went downhill?

R. N. Kaminetzky in his controversial, "Making of a Godol",reports such an event. Now, I attempted to check some of the facts that he reports and was not able to do so. I spoke to some people who asked good questions but had no independent knowledge of this issue. I would appreciate if someone who does know more can respond in the comments sections. I attach the relevant pages form R. Kaminetzky's book and the relevant issue of Hekeriah V'Hakedusha.

In brief, the journal Hakeriah V'Hakedusha, a new Lubavitch periodical in Yiddish, that was supposedly under the direct supervision of the Friedeker Rebbe, published an editorial  by Y. Segal on  October 13, 1940 (the journal, unfortunately sans the relevant first volume is available on HebrewBooks.org), which asserted that studying talmudic passages like the one about, "ox which gored a cow",  important as it may be , is completely physical (kulo gashmi), is a meagerly inspiring subject even from a worldly perspective... and one will gain nothing spiritual from studying it...Certainly, the superficial study (of this mishna) has no connection with G-d and reminds a student very little of Him: No spark of Divine light is beheld in the revealed part of the Torah. But when Chassidus takes on the same mishna and begins to unravel from it the depths of the Torah, the hidden part,  a new light arises which reminds the Jew about the Giver of the Torah and which leaves the student and participant with a deep moral lesson  of tremendous spiritual worth".

This may have been just an unfortunate choice of words because standard Chabad teaching does not denigrate the study of Nigleh or relegate it to a secondary status. Perhaps the writer was simply not familiar with Nefesh Hachaim's approach to this topic. This is a summary of what the Yeshiva World considers axiomatic:

Nefesh HaChaim Shaar 4 Chapter 2:
First I will set my words, on the subject of torah study 'lishma'. What is 'lishma'? This is a stumbling block for many who think 'lishma' means with great and constant 'dveikus' (emotionally cleaving to G-d).

And even worse than this, they think learning torah without dveikus is worth nothing and has no purpose, chas v'shalom. So when they see themselves, that their heart is not going in this level, that their learning is not with constant dveikus, they won't even start to learn and therefore (in our times) the torah has fallen....

To learn torah 'lishma' , the truth is 'lishma' does not mean 'dvekus' like most people think... the truth is learning torah 'lishma' means - for the sake of the torah... as the Rosh explains:
to know and to understand, and to increase lekach (knowledge) and pilpul (sharp analysis) and not to be insolent (l'kanter) and to show off (l'hitgaos)...

Nevertheless, certainly we cannot say that you don't need any purity of thought and yiras Hashem in learning torah. As it says 'if there's no yira, theres no torah' (mishna)...(see the text for an explanation of the purpose of Yira as a 'warehourse' for the torah learned)

Thus the true path, which He chose... (Rabbi Normal Lamm wrote a book devoted to this subject. 

With this in mind, one could have predicted that the nascent American Yeshiva World would strongly react and it did. It was surely not meant to provoke it, but it did.

This poorly thought out piece in the Lubavitch flagship publication brought on a firestorm of criticism in the Yeshiva World, since it attacked its raison d'etre and its bedrock of legitimacy - Talmudic study for its own sake. R. Kaminetsky informs us about how much it upset R. A. Kotler and others and how R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik was recruited to write a response, which he did.

I believe that this was the incident which set the unfortunate pattern of animosity and suspicion between the two groups. In the highly tradition centered environment of the yeshivos, in which the mesorah was paramount, students absorbed a certain view of this incident from their teachers and it became invested with the authenticity and holiness of mesorah, and so it expanded and grew to our own day. Chabad messianism came later and was another icing on the cake. May Hashem soon bring peace, respect and reconciliation between all Jews. 

More on Techeles: It's enough to visualize blue

by Chaim Gershon

In a recent post, I discussed the various views about Techeles in out time. They ranged from the attempts identify the source of the dye, using any source of dye that meets the criteria, and the claim that Techeles would not be renewed until Moschiach comes.

There is another way to fulfill the commandment of Techeles these days, without actually wearing it. It may be enough to try to visualize the blue.

This approach is cited in Ben Ish Chai (end of first Noach) and the Chida's
Birkei Yosef (OC 24). It is to imagine/visualize that some of the strings are
colored with Techeles. Why this works is explained in depth in Kav HaYashar by Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kaidanov in Perek 45, as follows:  The gematria of Techeles (850) is the sum of  twice the gematria of eye ( 2 x 130) plus the gematria of Tzitzis (590). One
should thus looks at one's tzitzis with both of one's eyes with this intention.

Heart of darkness

The Jews have produced a rich and varied literature during the second Temple period. Most of these works, termed Apocrypha[1] and Pseudoepigrapha,[2] have been purposefully excluded from the Jewish Scriptural canon for various reasons. Some of them reflect non-traditional views[3] and they were forbidden to be read and studied for this reason. Others, such as Wisdom of Solomon[4] and Maccabbees are cited on occasion by Rishonim and Ben Sira[5] is treated by the Talmud as containing some important and true teachings. Presumably some acceptable writings were rejected because they were not written with Ruach Hakodesh. In addition, in our own day, we became aware of clearly sectarian writings, such as the Dead Sea Scrolls.

These writings are certainly not Torah but they can on occasion shed light on obscure Midrashic passages. They do so by either preserving the same tradition that the later midrashim cite, demonstrating ancient origin of many Midrashic interpretation, but also by helping identify interpretive issues. Consulting these works can often clarify or explain why Midrash pursues one explanation rather than another. In the latter cases, Midrashic writers may have been aware that a sectarian teaching may stem from a particular interpretation and have taken steps to provide us with a different explanation.[6]

The following verse is a case in point:
You shall surely rebuke your neighbor and you shall not bear sin over him (Lev. 19, 17).

There are ahost of exegetical issues and anyone writing about this verse must take them into account. For our purposes let us focus solely on one issue.

Why does one who does not reproach bear sin? What is this sin and who incurs it? Who is the verse focused on - the sinner who is being rebuked or the one who administers the rebuke?[7] The context of surrounding verses, all of which are in 2nd person argues that the sin is that of the rebuker; however, it is also possible that it is of the person being rebuked for which the rebuker than bears responsibility.

The first one to tackle this issues appears to be Ben Sira who writes: "Reproach a friend before getting angry secretly. ..it is better to reproach than to be angry (20:2)".  He seems to understand the verse in Leviticus as teaching us that hate hidden deeply inside the heart leads to anger and to other transgressions. The sin is that of anger and it is of the rebuker. He must administer rebuke or else he will grow angry, which is itself a grevious transgression. This interpretation assumes that holding back from reproach leads to the sin of anger. Its weakness is that this rebuke is ultimately self-serving, solely for rebuker's own benefit, so as not to be angry, and not at all to benefit his neighbor. That is not the sense that one gets from reading this verse on context, including the famous "Love your neighbor as yourself". All other exhortations are focused precisely on benefiting the other and not yourself.

Testament of Gad, a pseudoepigraphical part of the Testament of the 12 Patriarchs, interprets the connection between the beginning and end of the verse somewhat differently. The sin that you must avoid is one that your brother may fall into if you rebuke him improperly.

Love one another from the heart and if anyone sins against you, speak to him peacefully, having banished the sin of hatred and do not maintain treachery in your heart... If he listen to you, you have gained a brother.[8] If he denies, do not dispute with him, lest he swear and you thereby sin doubly (6:3-4).

This is weak as well for it is difficult to understand what the purpose of the rebuke really is. If hatred is already banished from the heart, what purpose does it serve to speal to him peacefully? What purpose does rebuke serve and what does it accomplish, for you have already forgiven him and he is already your brother. In fact, the only thing that is likely to result from it is that your brother be led into more sin by denying his fault, the exhortation not to dispute notwithstanding. Besides, why should the rebuker care about leading someone's else to sin by fulfilling a commandement to rebuke, being that he himself is doing the right thing by administering the rebuke?

Thus, Ben Sira explains the sin as that of anger into which the reproacher will otherwise fall while Testament of Gad explains it as that of the person being rebuked, who through proper rebuke may confess and make peace but with improper kind of rebuke, may be led into additional sins.[9] Both explanations are weak.

The Sifra offers the following explanation.

Do not hate your brother in your heart. You might think you should not hit him, curse him, slap him (to make rebuke successful). It says, 'in your heart', the only thing prohibited is hating him in your heart (but slapping, cursing and hitting are OK).

This interpretation is clearly the opposite of that of the Testament of Gad.

How do you know that if you rebuke him 4 or 5 times (and do not accomplish), that you continue to rebuke him. It says: "You shall surely rebuke".

The Sifra appears to hold the purpose of the rebuke is for the "neighbor" to repent. Pressure in the form of hitting, if needed, slapping, and cursing is a part of successful rebuke. The purpose is to benefit the indivudal who is being rebuked by bringing him or her to repentance.

Are there limits to how rebuke can be administered, as Testament of Gad claims?

You may think even if his face changes, "It says and you shall not incur a sin over him".

Thus, only as much pressure as is required to bring about repentance is allowed but no more. In addition there are limits. It is not permitted to cause him emotional pain, even if that would accomplish repentance. That would be a sin and the rebuker is warned to avoid it.

It is obviously quite difficult for anyone to forcefully escalate rebuke but stop just short of emotional damage.

R. Tarfon said: by Divine Service, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to administer rebuke. R. Elazar Ben Azaria said: By Divine Service, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how to receive rebuke. R. Akiva said: By Divine Service, if there is anyone in this generation who knows how rebuke is given. R. Yochanan ben Zakkai said: I bring Heaven and Earth into witness that that R. Akiva was flogged more than 4 and 5 times through me by R. Gamliel, that I complained about him, so much was I certain that he would love me even more.

The Sifra's explanation keeps a proper balance between concern for one's neighbor and one's own proper spiritual welfare. Unlike the explanations offered by non-canonical writings, it is consistent with the context by keeping the focus on the rebuker, the one referred to throughout the surrounding verses as "thou". In this it is a much superior explanation on the level of pshat.

Consideration of how non-canonical works handled exegetical concerns enables us to throw the Midrashic comments into sharper relief and to appreciate how Tannaim offered a comprehensive, more satisfying, and therefore more "true" interpretation than their contemporaries who did not have access to or rejected the Oral Law.

---

1 Works that were a part of the Septuagint and consequently of Vulgate and accepted as canonical by the Catholic Church.

2 Works attributed to Bibilcal characters and preserved by Eastern or Ehtiopian Churches in Amharic, Slavonic or Syriac versions.

3 An example is the book of Susanna which casts aspersion on the "elders" and also portrays the process of cross examination that is against halakha (contradictions in testimony revealed by cross examination of bedikos are ground for applying the law of premeditated false witness (zomamim), sig. Professor Sid Leiman.

4 Cited by Ramban in the Introduction to his Torah commentary.

5 See Sanhedrin 101a.

6 Most references are taken from J. Kugel's, In Potiphar's House, Harvard U. Press, 1990

7 The connection between hidden hatred and verbal deceit is drawn in other Biblical books, for example, Proverbs 25:9-10, 26:24-25 and 10:18

8 The use of terms 'brother' and 'neighbor' supports the contention that both these passages have the Leviticus passage in mind.

9 The Ramban ad. loc. offers an explanation that incorporates both these ideas.

10 This statement of R, Akiva appears to be a reaction to the disagreement between R. Tarfon and R. Eliezer. R. Akiva notes that the two Sages disagree about rebuke and points out the obvious fact that there is no one in his generation who understands the parameters of giving rebuke.

Daas Torah: A criticism from Tanya

The concept of Daas Torah, as the specialy granted ability of Gedoei Hador to receive Divine assistance in ruling  on all matters, including those that are not explicitly linked to a Torah source, is often linked to the"chassidic revolution" and the concept of the Rebbe as a guide in all matters of body and soul.

Here is an exerpt of an article that makes this point, here:

"

Some observers, such as Dr. Jacob Katz, feel that the idea that these are de facto binding on the whole community is a novelty to those outside of Haredi Judaism.

Prior to the modern period, rabbis functioned as the primary leaders of every Jewish community. Lay leaders served under the general guidance of the rabbincal leadership regarding religious issues, and often on political matters as well. This was not understood to mean that rabbis, even gedolim, were infallible, but simply that they were seen as the best qualified leaders for the Jewish people (Feitman 1995).

Some argue (e.g. Kaplan 1980) that with the rise of modernity and the wider availability of secular knowledge (and a reduction of commitment to religion), various groups, including groups within the "Orthodox" world, raised challenges to the exclusive leadership role of the rabbis. These theorists suggest that to some degree, this generated a backlash in the Haredi world, intensifying the Da'as Torah concept to imply near infallibility for gedolim.  ...

Many believe that the gedolim receive Divine guidance in their leadership role. Some regard the rise of the Da'as Torah concept as a return of a form of low-grade "prophecy" to Judaism, and a number of social researchers in Israel see the appearance of Da'as Torah possibly as part of a process or reaction, in the Haredi world, to the Holocaust and the establishment of a Haredi society based on a very large proportion of men devoting themselves to full-time Torah study. ... "

Here is how Avo Sharan explains this concept:

"Da'at Torah is not some Jewish equivalent to the Catholic doctrine of papal infallibility. Not only can rabbis make mistakes of judgment, there is an entire tractate of the Talmud, Horiut, predicated on the assumption that they can, that even the Sanhedrin is capable of erring, even in halachic matters. What Da'at Torah means, simply put, is that those most imbued with Torah-knowledge and who have internalized a large degree of the perfection of values and refinement of character that the Torah idealizes are thereby rendered particularly, indeed extraordinarily, qualified to offer an authentic Jewish perspective on matters of import to Jews - just as expert doctors are those most qualified (though still fallible, to be sure) to offer medical advice."

Note that this is a little different in that it has makes recourse to Divine Inspiration.

For an extensive discussion of this concept and how it relates to older similar concepts, see here:

It is interesting that Tanya appears to agree with some of the modern criticisms of this concept (Iggeres Hakodesh, 22);

חכמי ישראל הראשונים והאחרונים

Has such a thing ever happened in days past? Where indeed have you found such a custom in any of the books of the early or latter sages of Israel,

להיות מנהג ותיקון לשאול בעצה בגשמיות, כדת מה לעשות בעניני העולם הגשמי

that it should be the custom and established norm to ask for advice in mundane matters, as to what one ought to do in matters of the physical world?

אף לגדולי חכמי ישראל הראשונים, כתנאים ואמוראים, אשר כל רז לא אנס להו, ונהירין להון שבילין דרקיע

[Such questions were not asked] even of the greatest of the former sages of Israel, such as the tannaim and amoraim, the authors of the Mishnah and the Gemara, “from whom no secret was hidden,” and “for whom all the paths of heaven were clearly illuminated,”

כי אם לנביאים ממש אשר היו לפנים בישראל, כשמואל הרואה, אשר הלך אליו שאול לדרוש ה׳, על דבר האתונות שנאבדו לאביו

but only of actual prophets who used to live among the Jewish people, such as Samuel the Seer to whom Saul went to inquire of G‑d through him about the donkeys that his father had lost.

Why, indeed, were sages of stature such as the tannaim and amoraim not asked about mundane matters?

כי באמת כל עניני אדם, לבד מדברי תורה ויראת שמים, אינם מושגים רק בנבואה

For in fact all matters pertaining to man, except for words of Torah and the fear of heaven, are apprehended only by prophecy.

ולא לחכמים לחם

[As the verse states,] “there is no bread unto the wise,”

כמאמר רז״ל: הכל בידי שמים, חוץ מיראת שמים

and as our Sages, of blessed memory, said, “Everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven.”

ושבעה דברים מכוסים כו׳: אין אדם יודע במה משתכר, ומלכות בית דוד מתי תחזור כו׳

Likewise, “Seven things are hidden...: no man knows how he will earn his living, nor when the Kingdom of David will be restored...,” i.e., when Mashiach will come.

הנה הושוו זה לזה

Note that these [two questions] are likened to one another. Just as no one knows exactly when Mashiach will come, so, too, no one knows by what means he in fact will obtain his sustenance.

ומה שכתוב בישעיה: יועץ וחכם חרשים

As for the phrase in Isaiah, “A counselor and a man whose wisdom silences all,” suggesting that Torah wisdom qualifies one to advise in other fields as well, —

וכן מה שאמרו רז״ל: ונהנין ממנו עצה ותושיה

and also, as for the statement of our Sages, of blessed memory, regarding one who studies Torah lishmah, “for its own sake,” that “people derive from him the benefit of etzah (counsel) and tushiyah (wisdom),” —

היינו בדברי תורה, הנקרא תושיה

these teachings refer specifically to [counsel in] matters of the Torah, which is called tushiyah (assistance).

כמאמר רז״ל: יועץ, זה שיודע לעבר שנים ולקבוע חדשים

Thus the Sages, of blessed memory, said: A counselor is one who knows how to intercalate years, making certain years leap years by interpolating an additional month of Adar, and how to determine the months, establishing what day is Rosh Chodesh, the first day of the lunar month,

שסוד העיבור קרוי עצה וסוד בלשון התורה, כדאיתא בסנהדרין דף פ״ז, עיין שם בפירוש רש״י

for in Torah terminology the principle of intercalation is called “counsel” and “a secret,” as stated in Tractate Sanhedrin, p. 87; see the commentary of Rashi there, which states explicitly that the terms “counselor” and “advice” are related to the principle of intercalation.

Of course, this passage must be seen in the light that the Alter Rebbe himself functioned as any Chassidishe Rebbe and willingly dispensed direction and advice about all matters of life, not ony Torah issues.

A note in the Lessons in Tanya makes the folowing point:

"As we all know, however, chassidim in every generation have in fact asked their Rebbe for advice in mundane matters and, moreover, each of the Rebbeim has in fact obliged. How is this possible? Elder chassidim of earlier generations used to explain that the Alter Rebbe himself sanctions this conduct — in the letter that he wrote “close to the time of his passing,” regarding the value of “fraternity and counsel from afar with regard to all family matters....”

Be it as it may, the position expressed above by Tanya should be an important addition to the debate about the validity of the concept of Daas Torah.

Mixed motivations

Is there a value in serving Hashem with impure intention?  In other words, is a mtisva worth anything if it is performed selfishly, not because it is a Divine commandment and for the sake of God alone? The Talmudic sources are contradictory and so are the resolutions of these contradictory sources. 

There are passages that state that a commandment performed shelo lishma has not only no value but is considered a sin. In Berachos 17b a person who acts in this fashion is said to be "better off not having been born". Chovos Halevavos goes as far as to compare such a person to an idolater, for he serves himself instead of Hashem (Shaar Yichud Hamaase, Ch. 4).

There are, however, also sources that indicted the serving God for selfish reasons is a positive act. Such is the passage in Pesachim 50b that says," A person should always engage in (Torah - in some editions these words are not present) and commandments shelo lishma for from an insincere intention there comes a sincere intention". In other words, one should engage in Divine service even for insincere reasons for this will in due time lead him to sincere performance of the commandments. This may be for several reasons. One can explain that the very act of maimtanining religious discipline allows gradual transformation of the inner self, whereas one who abandons observance is unluikely to ever return to it.The Sefer HaChinuch in mitzvah fourteen offers a different explanation. He maintains that even one who studies Torah shelo lishmo will be affected by his Torah study and he ultimately will attain the level of studying Torah leshmo. The Chinuch posits that this is analogous to one who collects taxes illegally on behalf of the king. Eventually, such a person will transform into a thief, as his actions will influence him negatively. Conversely, if one performs positive actions, albeit for the wrong reasons, he will ultimately be influenced to perform those actions altruistically.

There are two main ways in the Rishonim to resolve this contradiction between Talmudic sources. These two approaches disagree percisely about the value of insincere service. Tosafos in Pesachim 50b and a number of other places suggests that the statement in Brochos refers to someone who uses his learning solely to put down others and has no intention at all to apply what he learns. Such a person is better off not having been born. However, one who has no evil intent but has simply not yet risen to the level of lishma, should continue to perform the commandments as best as he can.

However, R. Avrohom ben Harambam writes in his Hamaspik Leovdei Hashem (Ch. 3) that even though the Sages felt that it is better to perform mitzvos insincerely than to completely neglect them, the truth is that superficial service is unworthy before God, the Master of Truth. In fact, the defective group who serve God thusly are called " the group of hyppocrites (Sotah 42b), who are among those who do not merit to greet Divine Presence.  Similarly, R. Hai Gaon wrties in Teshuvos that there is no reward for shelo lishma. One must ask: "If so, how could the Sages recommend continuing insincere performance of commandments, if it carries with it such dire consequences". The answer seems to be that this dispensation is restricted only to those who in any case are not capable (yet) of serving lishmo, such as minors and the ignorant.

Anyone who occupies himself with Torah in order to receive reward or to prevent any troubles is not doing so for the sake of it, whereas anyone who does so out of love for the Master of this world, and not with any ulterior motives, is doing so for the sake of it. The Sages said that one should always occupy oneself with Torah even if not for the sake of it, for out of doing so not for the sake of it one will come to doing so for the sake of it. Therefore, when one is teaching children, women and ignoramuses one should teach them to serve God out of fear and in order to be rewarded. As their knowledge increases and they become more wise, we reveal this `secret' to them bit by bit and accustom them to this concept in repose until they totally understand it, and will serve out of love (Rambam Teshuva 10:5).

I find it interesting that these rishonim do not offer the suggestion that serving God with mixed emotions is acceptable and should be done, for all human beings have mixed motivations and act for many intertwined and complex reasons. Serving him completely insincerely, without "good" motivations at all,  should be eschewed. Such an answer is offered by Mesillas Yeshorim (Ch.16). Ramchal says that motivations can be complex but it is the main intention that is determinative.

It must be borne in mind, however, that just as the concept of purity of thought is applicable to bodily deeds - which by their nature border on the realm of the evil inclination - in the sense of one's withdrawing them from it so that they do not come to appertain to it, so is this concept applicable to worthy deeds, close to the realm of the Creator, may His Name be blessed, in the sense of one's not setting them far from Him and not permitting them to enter the province of the evil inclination. This is what underlies the idea of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself" which is often mentioned by our Teachers of blessed memory. However, it is clear from their words that there are various kinds of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself," the worst being the type in which one serves not for the purpose of Divine service at all, but in order to deceive people or to gain honor or wealth. About such a one it is said (Yerushalmi Berachoth 1.2), "It were better had he been smothered in his placenta." And the Prophet says about him (Isaiah 64:5), "We have all become as one unclean, and all our righteousness as a soiled garment." Another type of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself" is serving for the sake of reward, about which it is said (Pesachim 506), "A person should always occupy himself with Torah and mitzvoth, even if not for the sake of the mitzvah itself, for doing so will lead him to serve for the the sake of the mitzvah itself." There is no question, though, that one who has not yet attained to the latter mode of service is far from attaining his perfection.

That, however, in relation to which one requires greater insight and effort is the intrusion of a forbidden element into his motives. For sometimes one embarks upon a mitzvah entirely for its own sake, our Father in Heaven having decreed it, but does not prevent himself thereby from incorporating some other motive such as desire for praise or reward into his deed. And sometimes, though he may not desire to be praised, still, in rejoicing over the praise that he receives, he might come to take greater pains than he normally would, as in the case of R. Chanina ben Teradyon's daughter (Avodah Zarah 18a), who overhearing some men remark about her graceful stride, "How beautifully that girl walks," immediately sought, because of this praise, to display even more grace.

Though an undesirable motive may be outweighed by the major intention behind a deed, still, the deed which contains such a motive is not completely pure. And just as it is not permissible to offer up upon the earthly altar any but the cleanest flour, sifted through thirteen sieves (Menachoth 76b) and therefore entirely free of any impurity, so is it impossible to offer up upon the Heavenly altar so that they will be accepted as representing perfect, choice, Divine service, any but the choicest of actions, entirely free of imperfections. I am not suggesting that anything which does not come up to this standard will be completely rejected, for the Holy One Blessed be He does not withhold the reward of any creature, but rewards good deeds in accordance with their worth

This understanding is strongly supported by several several Talmudic passages. In fact, there are passages that go even farther and suggest that there is value even to a mitsva that is performed entirely for unworthy reasons.

The Gemara in Pesachim 50a quotes a Beraisa that teaches that one who works on Erev Shabbos after Minchah time will see no blessing from his labor. The Gemara quotes a second Beraisa that teaches a similar lesson. "There is one who toils and gains, one who toils and loses, one who is lazy and gains, and one who is lazy and loses. The one who toils and gains is the one who works all week except for Erev Shabbos. The one who toils and loses is the one who works all week and on Erev Shabbos. The one who is lazy and gains is the one who does not work all week, and he does not work on Erev Shabbos either. The one who is lazy and loses is the one who does not work all week but he works on Erev Shabbos."

The RIF explains that the Beraisa teaches that even a Mitzvah she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah. That is why one who refrains from work on Erev Shabbos because of his laziness, and not because of the Mitzvah to refrain from work at that time, is considered to have "gained" the Mitzvah nonetheless. Not only that, Rava adds that even the women of Mechuza, who refrain from work because they like to indulge in pleasure, are still credited with the Mitzvah. Rava teaches that when the Beraisa says that a Mitzvah done she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah, that is true not only when one does the act of the Mitzvah without intention to fulfill the Mitzvah, but even when one does the act of the Mitzvah with specific intention to accomplish something else with the act.

Other sources that imply a similar understanding are in Pesachim 9b and the sources collected in the Tosafos ibid.

 It may be that the Rishonim take the position that, yes, there are mixed motivations to most actions, but only one of them is primary and the others are rationalizations. Thus, were a man to only know himself, he could isolate that "real"  motivations and everything else is secondary and only obscures the true and sole motivation.

Interestingly, the approach of Mesillas Yesharim is expressed in halacha.

Shulchan Oruch O"C 38: 8 codifies the law that "scribes who write tefllin and mezuzos, and sellers and resellers of these items, ... are exempt from putting on tefillin, except at the time of Shema and Tefillah". Magen Avrom comments: "Only if their main intent is to makes these items available but if their main intent is  to gain financially, they would not be called "engaged in the mitsva" and would not be exempt". It appears then that one with mixed motivatons is still considered to act lishma as long as his MAIN intention is for the sake of Heaven, exactly what Mesillas Yesharim says. Beiur Halacha argues that even if the two intentions are equally prominent, it is still called lishma (Beiur Halacha clearly considers the issue of "lishma" and of "osek bamitsva" to be the same).     Thus, from the standpoint of halacha, when sincere and insincere motivations are equally matached, one is still considered to be acting lishma. Only when the insincerity predominates can one be said to act truly insincerely.

In this example we can see how a question that might be considered to be purely within the discipline of Mussar, has ramifications for understanding Talmud, Rishonim and halacha.

 

Egyptians on gilgul.

 R. Samson Raphael Hirsch was no fan of superstitions and gilgul was to him a grave superstition. He was not alone; opponents to this belief include: Rav Saadiah Gaon (Emunos v'Dayos 6:8); Rabbeinu Avraham ben HaRambam (see R. Margoliyos, in his introduction to Milchamos Hashem p. 19 note 11); Rabbi Avraham ibn Daud (Raavad I, in Emunah Ramah 7); Rabbeinu Yitzchak ben Avraham Ibn Latif (Rav Poalim, p. 9 section 21); Rav Chasdai Crescas (Ohr Hashem, ma'amar 4, derash 7); Rav Yosef Albo (Sefer HaIkkarim 4:29); and Rav Avraham Bedersi (Ktav Hitnatzlut leRashba). See too Tosafos Yom Tov (approbation to R' Naftali Hertz Bachrach, Emek HaMelech), who cites Abarbanel that transmigration is an import from Greek philosophy rather than being part of Kabbalah (but contradicted by his comments on yibbum in parshas Ki-teitse), and Rashash to Bava Metzia 107a. (most sources from Rabbi Yitzchak Blau, "Body And Soul: Tehiyyat ha-Metim and Gilgulim in Medieval and Modern Philosophy," The Torah u-Madda Journal vol. 10 (2001)

In his commentary to Genesis 50:2, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch juxtaposes the Jewish belief and the Egyptian belief in immortality. This contrast serves an explicit exegetical purpose in his earlier comments, for it explains Yakov's insistence on being buried in the Land of Canaan rather than being embalmed AND left in Egypt.

" Here we have an interesting contrast between the Egyptian view - as
expressed in embalmment - and the Jewish view. Such contrasts, whenever
they occur, should be analyzed, and should be stressed especially in
our confrontation with those who deny the Divine source of the Torah,
who regard "the work of Moses" as merely the product of "his genius'
which "drew upon the wisdom of the priests of Egypt."

How striking is the contrast that is revealed here! The Egyptian would
embalm the body, so that its individuality should endure. However,
the soul, he thought, did not remain in its personal individuality,
but wandered from body to body - even to animal bodies - in manifold
metamorphoses. The Jew believes that the soul endures forever, whereas
the body wanders. Once the soul has been gathered unto the souls of its
people, the body has nothing more to do with the individual. Rather,
it is a mitzvah to bring the body as soon as possible into close contact
with the decomposing earth (see Sanhedrin 46b). The body returns to dust,
and goes through all the transformations of earthly matter. The Egyptian
believed in the transmigration of the soul, and tried to protect the
body from any possibility of change. The Jew believes in the soul's eternal personal existence, and surrenders the body to earthly change."

 

The exegetical point would disappear if Egyptians did not believe in transmigration of souls and, in fact, they did not. This misconception, that comes to us through Herodotus but not found in a clear form in the Egyptian sacred texts, may have entered the classical world though the identification of Pythagoros' views on transmigration with the opinions that he brought from his sojourn in Egypt. It was not uncommon for his Greek contemporaries and followers to identify beliefs and rituals of Pythagoreans, strange as many of them appeared in Greek eyes, with Egyptians and Babylonians. The ancient Egyptians embalmed the dead in order that the body might be preserved and accompany the soul into the other world. This rather suggests their belief in resurrection than in reincarnation.

 

 

 

The Vilna Gaon's messianic role

An interesting article in Jewish Action contains this:  

According to the Gra’s thinking, the Geulah is not a one-time event but rather a gradual process. In his view, we are currently experiencing the ikvata d’Meshicha, the pre-Messianic period, and, on the historical timeline, we are standing on the threshold of the “Mashiach ben Yosef” period. According to the Gra’s approach, Redemption begins by natural means—as in the days of Coresh and the Second Temple—via aliyah to Eretz Yisrael, settling the Land, bringing it out of its desolate state and, most importantly, rebuilding Jerusalem. (The Gra’s work Aderet Eliyahu states, “for the main thrust of the mitzvot is dependent on the Land.”) It was the Gra who, through his charismatic authority, dismissed the traditional passive approach of waiting for heavenly miracles to initiate the Geulah, which was based on the prohibitions known as the “three vows.” These vows are to not “go up as a wall” (referring to mass immigration to Eretz Yisrael), to not attempt to hasten the Redemption and to not rebel against the ruling nations while in exile. In his commentary on Shir HaShirim, the Gra states that these three vows apply only to the building of the Beit Hamikdash: “They are sworn not to, of their own volition, go out to build the Temple, until [the Mashiach] comes.”

The Gra’s authority, according to his talmidim, stems from a Divine mission placed upon him to discover secrets of the Torah and to accelerate the Redemption. This idea is based on a verse in Devarim, “Even sheleimah vetzedek yihyieh lach… [A perfect and honest weight you shall have]” (25:15). The verse, found in the sixth parashah of Sefer Devarim, includes the words “even sheleimah,” which are understood to allude to Eliyahu ben Shlomo (the Gra). According to this kabbalistic interpretation, the books of the Torah represent human history: The story of Creation in Sefer Bereishit represents the first millennium of the world’s existence; the rest of Bereishit refers to the second millennium; Sefer Shemot tells of the third; Sefer Vayikra, the fourth; Sefer Bamidbar, the fifth and Sefer Devarim, the sixth. Each of the ten parshiyot in Devarim (with Netzavim and Vayelech counted as one) represents one century of the sixth millennium. On this timeline, the words “even shleimah vetzedek,” towards the end of the sixth parashah of Devarim, fall just at the point in history when the Gra, made his appearance on earth to carry out his Divine mission. The following parashah, corresponding to the seventh century of the sixth millennium, is that of “Ki tavo el haAretz [When you shall come to the Land].” According to this interpretation, this clearly means that from the year 5600 (1840) the process of kibbutz hagaluyot, the ingathering of the exiles, begins, and the process of Redemption on the deterministic path of “beitah,” in its appointed time, starts to unfold. The Gra himself, in the view of his disciples, was “a spark of Mashiach ben Yosef.”

The French Revolution of 1789 and Napoleon’s expedition to Eretz Yisrael in 1799 were interpreted by the Gra’s followers as historical proofs of the dramatic changes taking place in the world. As a result of these changes, the belief that the Gra indeed had a Divine mission to advance the Redemption was strengthened, and his disciples began organizing groups for aliyah. Arriving in three waves, 511 followers of the Gra and their family members settled first in the Galilee region and, later on, in Jerusalem. These olim were not fleeing from war, economic hardship or persecution, and they included some of Lithuania’s wealthiest and most respected and learned Jews. In fact, their aliyah was part of a Messianic revival that took place among the Jewish people in the early nineteenth century. But unlike the thousands of other Jews who had left the lands of the Ottoman Empire for Eretz Yisrael at that time to await the coming of Mashiach, whom they expected to arrive suddenly and by miraculous means in 1840, the Gra’s disciples clung to the view that the Geulah was a historical process that should be advanced by human action.
....

Having finally obtained the long-awaited permit and begun the building project, the Gra’s disciples viewed these events as nothing less than the etchalta deGeulah, the beginning of the Redemption, heralded by this symbolic “rebuilding of Jerusalem.” Accordingly, in 1837 some of the Perushim discontinued certain customs associated with mourning the destruction of the Temple, such as the midnight recitation of Tikkun Chatzot and the stanza beginning “Hitna’ari, meafar kumi” from the liturgical poem “Lecha Dodi,” traditionally sung at the onset of Shabbat, on the assumption that the Redemption was already underway [see Hastening Redemption, by Arie Morgenstern (New York, 2006) pp. 130-131].

While these activities were being directed towards the rebuilding of Jerusalem as an expression of the kabbalistic concept of “et’aruta deletata [awakening from below],” a group of the Gra’s disciples in Tzfat was attempting to re-establish authentic rabbinical semichah and to re-institute the Sanhedrin, both of which are necessary steps in the Redemption process and are prerequisites to the coming of the Mashiach.

Comment: English translation of the Gaon's  "Kol Hator", here

 

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