Are interpersonal offenses really sins against G-d?

One of the many interesting features of the teshuva process before Yom Kippur is reconciling with those who we have offended. But what if we offended a friend or a relative and our relationship is such that they surely had already forgiven us? Do we still need to go through the uncomfortable process of confessing to them and asking for forgiveness, or is it sufficient to rely on that fact of having been forgiven and not need to ask?

At question is the very nature of the idea of asking forgiveness. Is it for the offender's sake or for the offended's benefit? Is it a technical requirement, without which forgiveness is not complete or a practical obligation because those who we think have forgiven us, perhaps have not? Or is it that asking forgiveness is a part of the teshuva process  of Yom Kippur, irrespective of whether it actually obtains forgiveness; in other words, is it something we must engage in as preparation for Yom KIppur (a halacha of Yom Kippur and not of teshuva) and not because we must go into the Yom KIppur free of interpersonal sins. Or, one may ask, is it that offending another human being is also an offense against G-d? May it be that it is not enough that the friend forgave us, we must still ask for forgiveness so that the sin to Heaven is also expiated?

The early sources seem to imply that one must always ask a friend for forgiveness, even if one knows that the friend had already put an incident or injury behind him.

Sefer Haminhogos writes: "A man must pacify his friend after he had forgiven him so that the friend prays to Hashem that He should (also) forgive, as our Father Abraham had done(for Avimelech), I heard that this is why the tribes fo Israel suffered a punishment - because they did not ask Yosef that he should pray on their behalf". This implies that it is not enough to rest in the security of the knowledge that one had been forgiven. Even if so, an active attempt to enroll the friend in praying on the offender's behalf is also necessary. It is quite clear that to Sefer Haminhogos every interpersonal offense is also a sin against G-d. Even if a human had forgiven, G-d may not. Similarly Birkei Yosef writes every interpersonal offense contains also a sin against Hashem. As long as the friend had not forgiven, the offense again Hashem cannot be forgiven.

"Sages said about the Shofar that if the mouth piece is covered with gold, it is posul. Rav Yakir Boruch explained that this hints to interpersonal offenses for there are matters that require that one go and verbally ask for forgiveness. If (instead) one is proud and wants to bribe the offended one with gold but does not go and humble himself before him, the sin is not forgiven(brought in S. Y. Agnon's "Days of Awe", see Shaloh 229:2)

On the other hand, there are indications that being sure that a friend had forgiven him is enough. Many people declare nightly in their version of bedtime Shema that they had forgiven all who wronged them, and it is a part of Tefila Zakah before Yom Kippur. If forgiving someone who had not asked for it does not work, why do it? There are poskim who say lechalacha that if know that a friend had forgiven him, he need not ask(Teshuvos D'var Yehoshua 5:20; Az Nidberu 7:65, 66). I am pretty sure that I saw In the name of Yosef Ometz in S. Y. Agnon's Days of Awe that if one knows that a friend had forgiven him, he does not need to ask for forgiveness. Unfortunately, I was not able to find it now, when I went to check the references(but I do recall that it was a parenthetical quote in a chapter that dealt with an unrelated topic).

There are several sources that appears to indicate otherwise. In Yoma 87a we are told that when someone wronged R. Zeira verbally, he would go and stand in front of him, to make it easy for him to ask him for forgiveness. We are also told a story about Rav. R. Huna told his Rebbe, Rav, that he was on his way to kill someone. Rav went to a butcher who had insulted him. Rav Huna knew that the butcher who had wronged Rav, would not respond in a positive way, thereby making his situation in Heaven worse. His prediction came true when the butcher, looking up and seeing Rav standing in front of him, slighted Rav and the butcher was killed right away by a bone chip. 

In Kochvei Ohr 5, R. Yitshak Blaser explains that R. Zeira and Rav imitated Hashem who always extends himself to his people to do teshuva. He also points out that apparently it is not enough to simply forgive someone, one also needs to persuade that person to ask for forgiveness, for if not, it would have been enough for Rav to simply verbally declare that he forgives the butcher.

An interesting proof for the idea that forgiving someone in one's heart is not enough comes from Rabbeinu Bachya to Bareishis 50:17. It tells us there that Yosef's brothers came to him and asked him to forgive them for selling Yosef to Egypt. In response Yosef cried and assured them that they should not feel bad and that it came from Hashem, "to sustain many people". Strikingly, he never responds to them with words, "I forgive you". This, says R. Bachye, is why the sin of the Tribes ultimately required expiation through the death of the The Ten Martyrs. Here we also see that it is not enough to forgive in thought; one must also verbally express it.

Until this year, I thought that there perhaps are two views on this question but now I think that they can be reconciled. The reconciliation comes from a distinction cited in Mishnah Berura to O"C 607:4. It says there that sins that one confessed in previous years should be again confessed this year. In sief koton 13, a Pri Megadim is quoted. He makes a distinction between sins such as stealing from another person, which one has to confess every year, because it is also a sin against G-d and "purely" interpersonal offenses. For sins such as verbally insulting another or "ani hamechapech b'charara(taking an opportunity away)", once a sin was confessed once and the friends had forgiven him, it need not be gain confessed in subsequent years. Shaar Tsion adds that perhaps it need not be confessed on Yom Kippur either, since the friend had already forgiven the sin.

Comes out that there are two types of interpersonal offenses: those that are both against Man and G-d, and those that are against Man alone. If so, we have here our distinction, although I don't currently know the parameters of how to define which sins are which. It would then stand to reason that purely interpersonal offenses do not  require that forgiveness be sought, only that the offended person forgives, even solely in one's heart. The sins that are both against Man and G-d require the asking of mechila.

This has many ramifications in halacha and hashkofa. The only problem that I have with it is that it argues against the concept that the reconciliation with the Divine is modeled after human relationships, which is what I used to think and of which I wrote here.

 

 

 

Comments

[micha]

Are sins against G-d really interpersonal offenses?

Take "דעלך סני - לחברך לא תעביד. זו היא כל התורה כולה, ואידך פירושה הוא, זיל גמור" literally (as opposed to redefining "Chaverekha" to refer to the Creator or the like). Or take R' Aqiva or Ben Azai at their word: "ואהבת לרעך כמוך רבי עקיבא אומר זה כלל גדול בתורה; בן עזאי אומר זה ספר תולדות אדם זה כלל גדול מזה.‏‏" All three tannaim appear to say that bottom line, it's all about the interpersonal.

On the other hand, in the second mishnah in Avos, Shim'on haTzadiq appears to be saying Torah, Avodah, and Gemilus Chassadim are three distinct primary, irreducible, values.

[Nosson]

'Comes out that there are two types of interpersonal offenses: those that are both against Man and G-d, and those that are against Man alone. If so, we have here our distinction, although I don't currently know the parameters of how to define which sins are which.'

- It is possible, based on what you have written from the Pri Megadim, that the distinction may be whether the harm done was tangible or non-tangible. Was there a noticeable change brought about by the exchange or not. Stealing is an act that affects the environment in a tangible way. However, the removal of an opportunity or insults affect the interiority of the person alone. The surface appearance of the surrounding environment was not changed in any noticeable way. If these are the parameters, then we could explain your questions/points as follows:

'The early sources seem to imply that one must always ask a friend for forgiveness, even if one knows that the friend had already put an incident or injury behind him.'

- Sefer Minhagos cites the cases of Avimelech and Yosef (as does Rebbeinu Bachya). These are both cases in which the harm caused was tangible. Hence an expressed mechila was required.

- The cases in Yoma of R Zeira and Rav involved insults which pashtus would be cases involving the non tangible harm to the individual alone. The difference in these cases is that they were known Talmidei Chachomim. So in terms of their own honour, they probably would have been moichel. But in terms of Kovad HaTorah, they were representing something outside of their individual sphere of self. They were representatives of the klal, which is a tangible degradation of the authority of Torah. For such an offense they required and encouraged the antagonists to take responsibility for their actions.

[Nosson]

'On the other hand, there are indications that being sure that a friend had forgiven him is enough. Many people declare nightly in their version of bedtime Shema that they had forgiven all who wronged them,'

-The act of forgiveness has two functions. One is more obvious than the other. One is for the sake of the mazik, it releases the antagonist from his liability as we have been discussing. But the other reason is for the nizak himself. The capacity to forgive and let go of grievances, to be Maaver al HaMidos is by definition the fulfilment of Halicha Bederochov of the 13 Middos HaRachamin.This is discussed thoroughly in the Ramak’s Tomer Devorah. So therefore, forgiveness is a process in this respect quite separate from the original issue that brought rise to the need to forgive.

[avakesh]

Thank you for your contributions. The need to let go is certainly a real one but is it codified in halacha? What does it mean to nightly forgive others when it is has no actual effect?

Regarding your suggestion on interpersonal, it can certainly be. I was thinking that the acts which involve Hashem are ones in which something granted by Him was taken away, f.e. stealing. On the other hand, an insult or taking away an opportunity to profit, is a purely interpersonal offense.

[Nosson]

'The need to let go is certainly a real one but is it codified in halacha?'

- The closest thing I could find so far in Shulchan Aruch is the Rema in O'Chaim 226:1. There he writes that one should not be cruel by refusing to forgive someone. The earliest source in the Rishonim I could find was Rebeinu Yonah in Sefer HaYirah, who says to forgive others nightly. But yes it is an interesting question. Why isn't this brought down in Shulchan Aruch, Rambam or Rif? One could possibly suggest that based on the source of this practice to forgive in Megillah 28, the Gemorah was asking as to the special merits of great people such R Nechunia Ben Hakanah. So the Gemorah was treating this practice as Midos Chasidus. As a result, the Poskim did did not see fit to codify this practice as normative. This makes sense, as we all presumably know it is one thing to say Rebono Shel Olam and another to really mean it!

'What does it mean to nightly forgive others when it is has no actual effect?'

-It does have an effect. The Gemorah in Megillah lists two.

1 Arichas Yomim of the forgiver.
2 Forgiving someone else creates a ripple effect which bounces back to the forgiver. It causes klapei Shamaya to be mochel the forgiver for his own iniquities.

'I was thinking that the acts which involve Hashem are ones in which something granted by Him was taken away'

- Yes, or perhaps in other words, that which is already granted and thus manifested by Him in the world could be likened to 'hekdesh dami' (conceptually speaking of course) So therefore the process of rectification is more involved requiring the formal mechila process to repair the damage of 'maeilah' that was done towards the other party.