avakesh

On this Tisha B'av- let's put aside our differences

The Joys of Pshat: Rashbam

A few months ago,  a friend showed me a new edition of an old commentary on the Torah. I now finished Bamidbar and by doing so, brought nachas and joy into my life.

Strange to say that of a commentary, no?

Not if the commentary is Rashbam!

Unlike his illustrious grandfather Rashi's commentary, published and republished thousands of times and commented about by hundreds of enthusiastc scholars, Rashbam's pirush barely survived at all. In fact, only one manuscript made it into the modern era, and that one, the basis of all subsequent work on Rashbam, was found in Moses Mendelsohn's library. Presumably, Mendelsohn used it in writing his own German commentary, the Biur. Yet, Rashbam's effort is still better known than other commentaries of the French-German school, such as R. Yosef Kara, R. Yosef Bechor Shor, or Chezkuni.

The new edition is by Meir Yitzhak (Martin) Lockshin and it is put out by Chorev but it looks like and is arranged after Mossad HaRav Kook. The fascinating thing about R. Lockshin's notes is that he focuses on Rashi - Rashbam dynamic, while at the same time he carries on a concurrent conversation with the other modern Rashbam specialist Eliezer Touitou. Lokshin's methodology is to compare Rashbam's interpretations with Rashi. For me, having  been learning Rashi weekly for decades, this often revelas crucial and underappreciated nuances in Rashi (see Rashbam's report of his conversation with Rashi about Pshat in the beginning of parshas Vayeshev). For a taste of Lokshin's approach, see Ch. 6 in this book.

Rashbam explains in the first first comment in Bareishis ( some Mikraos Gedolos editions censored the first five verses of his commentary in order to omit a passage where Rashbam implies that the day begins in the morning and not at nightfall)  that the Author encoded binding halachic information in the Torah by the means of extra letters, unusual spellings, and variant syntax but the actual meaning of passages and sentences can be legitimately read in a way different than Chazal's interpetation. He often offers strikingly different interpretations than Chazal and that is where the beauty comes in, for those who are conditioned by Rashi and Midrash. When you combine it with a humble stand and heartfelt Yiras Shomayim, the commentary both uncovers unexpected facets of the text and its moral and religious meaning. Here is one example of how Rashbam pursues Pshat:

1. The second verse in Devarim identifies the places near which Moshe spoke to Bnei Yisrael. Unfortunately, most of these places are not mentioned anywhere else; besides why do we need such an exact rendering of the location? Consequently Rashi follows a midrashic explanation, that these are not place names at all but veiled references to rebukes. Rashbam contends that it is the manner of Scripture to identify locations in an exacting manner (siman btoch siman) and shows that such is the case regarding other locations. Thus, he elegantly solves the exegetical problem on all counts. 

For those who want to move from Rashi to the wider religious, philosophical, exegetic, and mystical issues, there is no substitute to Ramban. For those who want to gain a narrow but beautiful perspective on the text itself, Rashbam is your man.

Expressions, numbers and depths by Chaim Gershon

A popular idiom may become so universal that people who never encountered the circumstances on which it is based, easily adapt the jargon into their vocabulary. The Talmud often cites popular expressions as support to its own statements. Perhaps this is because there is a spiritual root to such expressions. There is, for example an expression, “Up to Eleven”. We will now explain this expression.

 

This week’s parasha Devorim says that the Jewish people’s  journey through the desert to the Promised Land was to be but eleven days.  Why eleven?

 

Some simple explanations can be found here but on a deeper level (see also Tzemach Tzedek’s Ohr Hatorah Devarim Volume 1 p.16-19 or here  ( Devarim, first column): the concept is that the Eleventh’s level is beyond the normative 10 sefiros paradigm of the side of Holiness.

This has many years after the Arizal and the first early Chassidic Rebbes been recently encapsulated by the phrase “Up to Eleven”

 

One can similarly propose that the reason why the Douglas Adams chose to write in his Hitchhikers Ultimate Guide to the Unverse that the  “Ultimate Answer to the Ultimate Question of Life, The Universe, and Everything is 42” is the Divine Name of HaShem whose gematria is 42, which is one of the bases for existence !

Three exiles

There are three exiles:

The first is of Israel among the nations.

The second is of talmidei chachamim among the amei haaretz

And the last

 of straight and upright tamidei chachamim among the

wily ones.

R.Yakov Yosef of Polnoye

cited in Mishpacha Vol 199

The Rabbi and the Bishop

Repost:

Rashi comments (Devorim 1:13):

And understanding: -- who understand one thing from another. This is what Arius asked of Rabbi Yose: What is the difference between wise men and understanding men? A wise man resembles a wealthy money-changer: When people bring him "dinars" to examine [and exchange] he examines them, but when they do not bring them to him he (merely) sits and does nothing. An understanding man resembles a merchant money-changer, when people bring him money to examine, he examines them and when they do not bring it to him, he seeks about and brings money of his own.

The Lubavitcher Rebbe suggests that what is going on under the surface is a discussion of... Trinity:

"Arius was an early christian bishop who established a new denomination in christianity which emphasized unity in G-d, as opposed to the standard christian belief in the trinity. As a result of his "heresy," he was denounced, disrobed and exiled, but was later reappointed to his station.

The difference between unity and trinity in Arius's philosophy may be analogous to the difference between secular wisdom and understanding. Unity symbolizes the unitary spark of wisdom, while trinity alludes to the three stages of understanding. Therefore, Arius who represented unity (wisdom) questioned and challenged the "understanding" of trinity. "

To explain: Chochma is the unitary genesis of an idea in the mind. As it develops into Binah-understanding there are three stages of expansion.

Sichos In English
Volume 32
Shabbos Parshas Devorim
4th Day Of Menachem Av, 5746

The explanation is daring and striking. The curious application of Chabad categories of thought to christian sectarianism shows the incredible breadth of knowledge and universal scope of the Rebbe's concerns.

More on Arius:

Avos 2:3: Wanting and giving up

He would also say: Make His will your will, so that He should make your will  as His will. Nullify your will before His will, so that He should nullify the will of others before your will.

This is a very confusing Mishna. First, what is the difference between the first and second part, between doing His will instead of your will and nullifying your will before His will. Secondly, the two parts of the Mishna are not symmetrical; In the first, the Mishna promises the if you do His will, he will do your will. In the second, it promises that if you nullify your will, He will not nullify His will, but nullify the will of others before yours (Tiferes Yisroel does understand that hullifying your will lead to G-d nullifying His will in your favor, but the Mishna expressed it euphemistically out of respect for the Almighty).

I never really "got" this Mishna until if realized that there is a very simple and basic difference between tis two parts. In the first, your will and His will are not in conflict. Say, you want to have grilled chicken for supper. He wants that the Glory of His kingdom be sanctified. If you take His will as paramount and learn Torah and perform Mitzvos, and try to do what He wants, He will bring about that your will be done and that you do get grilled chicken for supper I If you think that wanting grilled chicken for supper is beyond His concern, see Kesuvos 67b .

The second part of the Mishna is talking about a different case, where His will and your will contradict. He wants that you should go daven and your want to stay in bed. In that situation, man must nullify his will. Hashem cannot then reciprocate and hullify His will before yours, for your will no longer exists. You are already at that minyan. But  what He can and will do is to nullify the desires of others before your will in other matters or even in this matter itself.

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Shabbas during the Three Weeks by Chaim Gershon

   The three weeks is a period of mourning: yet they include three shabbosim. How should we feel on Shabbas during the mourning period of the Three Weeks for the Beis HaMikdash? There is a halacha that one cannot show public signs of aveilus  on Shabbas. By analogy, mourning for a person should be no different that mourning for Temple. Indeed the halachic framework setup to commemorate the destruction of the Temple is suspended on Shabbas. Moreover even if Tisha B'Av itself is Motzei Shabbas, one can eat meat and wine just before fast even as much as " the  banquets of Shlomo HaMelech at the height of his reign"; we do not eat the usual bread and ashes on this Shabbos. Nonetheless, there are those who have the custom on Shabbas Chazon to sing the mournful Eicha tune to L’cha Dodi and even to not wear Shabbas clothes. Nite Gavriel brings that there were communities who extending these customs even to the other two Shabbasim of teh Three Weeks. There are those who do not say the bracha Shechechiyanu even on Shabbas during the Three Weeks.

  On a hashkafic plain there is a tension between the enjoyment (Oneg) required on Shabbos and the Mourning for the Beis HaMikdash. Volumes have been written to teach and convey how one can assist feeling Shabbas such as this one . Books  and software have been written to help us feel the loss of Beith Hamikdash.  Few today can even claim to perceive the Supernal Temple and its connection to the remnants below. Can anyone fully relate to the perspective of the Ramchal of the Temple    .  

   The general Chassidic perspective on redemption (Maor V'Shemesh, Tiferes Shlomo, Imre Noam, Nesivos Shalom) is that the three Shabbas's during these weeks are much higher in holiness than those of the rest of the year: the Munkatcher Rebbe (Shar Yissoschar) quotes the Chozeh of Lublin that each one of teh three Shabbosim respectively possess the same essence as the three holidays of Pesach, Shavuous and Sukkos. The revelation of such a hidden level of good and/or the belief that Shabbas is a higher level than whatever happens in the world lead to  experience joy among mourning. In this vein,  R' Tzadok of Lublin (Pri Tzaddik) says that these three Sabbaths are a correction/tikkun for the three cardinal sins of Man (Chemda/jealousy, Gaava/Pride and Taavah/Desire). Chabad takes a complicated and somewhat more intellectual approach, focusing of the positive benefits of galus  as leading to Redemption (see footnotes)

   Others have pursued a more personal and emotional approach to this conundrum.

Do you feel the Shabbas? What do you feel during the three weeks? Do you feel a loss? What do you feel on Shabbas? Did you know that Shabbas is described in Tanya as bring on the level of Teshuvah Ilah ? There are many paradoxical possibilitiesthat can be experienced especially during this time of the year. Our mourning period occurrs during the summer which in the secular world is a happy time and time for vacations. During the times of the Temple, these summer days were days of Simcha due to the bringing of Bikkurim. Which of these losses do you experience? Perhaps it would be easier if the three weeks were during the winter when darkness would assist mourning. What; however, what would be the consequences if Tisha B'av rather than Channukah was the competing holiday of the season?!

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Footnote

יהפכו ימים אלו

לששון ולשמחה

על־ידי המצרים – משיגים...

השלימות שבעבודת הקרבנות לעתיד לבוא באה על־ידי העבודה בזמן הגלות דווקא. ועל־פי הכלל

הידוע שדבר הגורם הוא למעלה מהדבר הנגרם על־ידו, כיוון שבכוחו דווקא לגרום את הדבר, הרי מובן גודל

מעלת העבודה שבזמן הגלות, כיוון שעל־ידה דווקא באים לשלימות עבודת הקרבנות כמצוות רצונך.

ויש לומר, שזהו גם מה שכתוב השיגוה בין המצרים: שכאשר נמצאים בין המצרים, הנה דווקא אז השיגוה

– שמגיעים להשגות הכי נעלות, ועד שמגיעים לזמן שבו תהיה עבודת הקרבנות דלעתיד, שעניינם הוא

תכלית השלימות דדירה בתחתונים.

( ('תורת מנחם – התוועדויות' תשי"א ח"ב (ג) עמ' 235

שמחה בשבתות

עניין העצבות ש"בין המצרים" אינו צריך להיות בשבת, כיוון שבשבת צריכה להיות שמחה.

ויתירה מזה, בשבת זו צריכה להיות השמחה עוד יותר מאשר בשבת אחרת, כדי שלא יהיה חשש שהעדר

השמחה בא מצד העניין ד"בין המצרים".

והביאור בזה בפנימיות העניין:

שבת היא מעין דלעתיד לבוא, "יום שכולו שבת". ומכיוון שלעתיד תהיה הגאולה באופן שלא יישאר

שום רושם מהגלות – לכן גם בשבת אין צריך להיות העניין ד"בין המצרים".

( ('תורת מנחם – התוועדויות' תשט"ו ח"ב (יד) עמ' 224

להפוך לששון ולשמחה

...ענינה של שבת זו הוא נתינת כוח להפך את "בין המצרים" לששון ולשמחה, כיוון שהגילוי שלעתיד

– שהוא למעלה לגמרי מעניין גלות וגאולה – בכוחו להפך את "בין המצרים" גופא לששון ולשמחה.

וזהו גם כן מה שנפסק בשולחן־ערוך, שבשבת שבין המצרים מותר לעשות אפילו כסעודת שלמה

בשעתו, והרי בימי שלמה "קיימא סיהרא באשלמותא". בשבת זו ישנה נתינת כוח שהימים האלו יהפכו

לששון ולשמחה.

('תורת מנחם – התוועדויות' שם)

('תורת מנחם – התוועדויות' שם)

 

How Hamodia dealt with the question

Download Hamodia_Memory

 

How Mishpaha dealt with the question

Download SadnessandJoy

 

How not to "give over" Tisha B'Av and more...

Fever, Shabbos Laws and Medical Science

One of the unresolved issues in medical halacha is how to apply laws that were fixed at a time when medical science was different than it is now. An example of this is- when one is permitted to violate Shabbos for a fever? A life-threatening fever justifies and  sets aside Shabbos prohibition, as does any other life threatening illness. How is a dangerous fever defined?

Until farily recently what we now call "symptoms' were considered diseases. For example, a patient suffered from diarrhea, or fever, or fainting spells.  Vestiges of this mentality survive in medicine to this day in the names of certain diseases. We speak, for example, of Rehumatic Fever, or Yellow Fever whereas doctors now see these as conditions caused by infections by specific micro-organisms. In the current medical paradigm, it is the dangerousness of a disease that should determine whetheer Shabbos is violated, not the height of the fever. A low fever casued by a serious illness should be treated with greater seriousness than a high fever caused by a benign illness. Is this how halacha sees it?

The underlying diagnosis of what is causing fever may or may not be of a halachic significance. Ktzos Hashulchan 138 (p.99) writes that a temperature of 38 degrees Celsius allows taking medications on Shabbos.  R. Moshe Feinstein in Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 129 wrote  that a temperature of 102 degrees Farenheit (and even 101 degrees, if the patient insists) allows the suspension of Shabbos prohibitions. These poskim do not incorporate the underlying diagnosis into this calculation, probably because classical sources do not do so either. Some however suggest that the underlying diagnosis should also be taken into account when assessing the degree of fever for the purposes of Shabbos violation (The Halachic Guide to Medical Practice on Shabbos, by Michael Chizkiah, Targum Press, 2005, p.199, fn 4). It is my impression that most poskim in our time and place would take the underlying diagnosis into account in regard to this question.

 

What good are the rabbis?

Sifri in Pinchas (134) contains an interesting passage that raises many questions. The verses present the laws of inheritance.

God spoke to Moses, saying:
27:7	The daughters of Tzelafchad have a just claim. Give them a hereditary portion of land alongside their father's brothers. Let their father's hereditary property thus pass over to them.
27:8	Speak to the Israelites and tell them that if a man dies and has no son, his hereditary property shall pass over to his daughter.
27:9	If he has no daughter, then his hereditary property shall be given to his brothers.
27:10	If he has no brothers, you shall give his property to his father's brothers.
27:11	If his father had no brothers, then you shall give his property to his flesh which is close to him, who shall then be his heir. This was the decreed law for the Israelites, as God had commanded Moses.

Verse 11 is ambiguous. The Karaites interpreted it as saying that once there are no brothers, the property is evenly divided between all available relatives. This is not how the Sifri interprets the verse.

Torah gave knowledge (daas) to the Sages to interpret the Torah and to say that whichever relative is nearer (as a relative) is prior with regard to inheritance.

In other words, the Sages estblished categoreis of priority. No Scriptural proof that this is the correct explanation ofverse 11 is advanced. What justifies this interpretation? The knowledge that Torah gave to the Sages.

This perplexing passage can be interpreted in several different ways.

1. R. Pardo in Sifrei D'Bei Rav explains that the intent is that the Sages had Ruach Hakodesh which allowed them to divine the true interpretation. The idea that Divine Inspiration serves as the source of authority for Sages' interpretation is quite widespread and is found in many Rishonim and Acharonim.

The Chazon Ish in letter 2:24 expounds the idea that Divine Inspiration determined the unfolding of Oral Law. In his other writings he invokes the element of the Divine Spirit that rested on the Sages throughout history, an idea already enunciated by Nachmanides (Deuteronomy 17,11).

Azzan Yadin in his Scripture as Logos: R. Ishmael and the origins of Midrash, U.Penn. Press, 2004, proposes that Halachic Midrash is a product of two distinct schools. Mekhilta, and Sifrei on Numbers and Deuteronomy come from the school of R. Ishmael whereas the Sifro is largely from the school of R. Akiva . R. Ishmael was heir to "Priestly" tradition that saw correct interpretation as arising directly from Torah text. The role of the interpreter was to "hear" and learn from the verse (hakatuv), with the help of received principles of interpretation [1]. R. Akiva, on the other hand, saw the interpreter's role as finding the basis for received traditions within the text. To this end he and his school often resorted to interpretations that were far from pshat, for they did not as much interpret the text as attach traditions to it [2].

Interestingly, a similar idea had already been expressed by the Netsiv, the commentator per excellence on Halachic Midrash, in his introduction to the commentary on the Sheiltos (1:10, 17) and in He'emek Davar to Deutronomy 1,3. R. Berlin writes that from the very beginning two distinct methodologies of Torah study co-existed. The first, that he calls Eish, was utilized by Aharon, King Shaul, Temple Priesthood , Talmud Yerushalmi and the Geonim. It consisted of straightforward and direct derivation of Halacha from the Chumash under the influence of Ruach Hakodesh. The priests were especially qualified to apply this method for they were in daily direct contact with Ruach Hakodesh as they served in the Temple . The other approach is that of Moshe, David, Bavli and Rishonim and it consists of what we now call pilpul -intense, complex argumentation that aims to encompass all aspects of the question and thereby discover the truth. This idea can be easily applied to the schools of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva.

The Sifri thus enunciates the idea that Divine Inspiration is determinative in deriving law out of text.

2. There is another girsa (textual variant) in the Sifri. The Gra changes the word "knowledge (Daas) to "authority" (reshus).

This approach is consistent with his view that many details of law were "given over to the Sages to determine". Already found in the Rishonim, it was enunciated again in our day by the Chazon Ish (See Chazon Ish E'H 22,3; Y"D 5:3, Ch'M Nezikin 11:1, 8:1, Kovetz Inyanim pp. 194-197). Presumably, the laws of inheritance were ones of many that were left for the Sages to "fix" during a specific historical period. Once this period has passed, so did the authority to interpret [3].

M. Halbertal in People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority , points out that in interpretation can be correct because it expresses correctly the original intent, or because it is offered by the only individual or body that is authorized to interpret. Thus, for example, the United States Constitution means whatever the Supreme Court says that it means because it is the only body authorized to interpret the Constitution. Similarly, Chazal's interpretations are correct not because they tell us what the original intent necessarily is but because the Torah gave them, and only them, the authority to define its meaning.

3. A. J. Heschel has this to say about this passage: This saying that was observed in the school of Rabbi Ishmael , claims priority for logic in understanding Torah, and opens a path for understanding Rabbbi Ishmael's hermeneutical system" (Theology of Ancient Judaism, 1:12).

Much of Dr. Heschel has written is valuable but much of it is also altogether too facile. This explanation does not accord with either the simple meaning of the passage or with plain logic. The passage is clearly referring to the last verse - This was the decreed law (MISHPAT) for the Israelites, as God had commanded Moses. This unusual closing implies a specific principle that applies only to the laws of inheritance. The Sifri derives therein a principle, that there is special authority or knowledge that was provided to the Sages, specifically for this set of inheritance laws. It has nothing to do with the use of logic in general interpretation of the Torah and Dr. Heschel's comments are not, in my opinion, justified [4].

This short passage in the Sifri once again illustrates how much of contemporary theological and academic discussion can be traced to early sources. The Tannaim have already considered, argued and resolved many of the questions that we so unsuccessfully debate. May we be fortunate to understand and properly interpret their profound teachings.

---

1 The book is not entirely clear on this point but this is Dr. Yadin's intent, as I understood it in personal communication.

2 As we previously discussed in this series, the intent may have been mnemonic or polemical.

3 The Chazon Ish certainly believed that many laws were of Sinaitic origin and restricted the principle of "Torah gave permission" only to some laws. This is different from a similar idea proposed by Zecharias Frankel, the Rector of Breslau Rabbinic Seminary and spiritual father of Conservative Judaism, whose true belief in Sianitic Law was never clarified (See R.S.R. Hirsch, Selected Writings, Feldheim, Vol. 5)

4 The question of whether the 13 principles of interpretation of R. Ishmael are logic or received tradition has previously been discussed. For additional sources on this topic that I recently found, see R. David Cohen, Kol Hanevua, (Mossad Harv Kook, 1979) and D. Schwarts, Unique Hebrew logic in the teachings of HaRav HaNazir, Higayon 2 (1993), 9-28.