I recently heard Alan Morinis speak about the role of halacha in determining moral boundaries. He reminded me of something we all know but often forget, that without outside guidance, human beings can often see the same situation from very different moral perspectives. One of the things that he did was to break the largely beginner audience into three groups, each one to discuss and assess a moral dilemma. One, for example, was the well-known prohibition of bearing a grudge or taking revenge.
Yoma (23a):
For it has been taught: What is revenge and what is bearing a grudge? If one said to his fellow: "Lend me your sickle," and he replied "No," and tomorrow the second comes [to the first] and says: "Lend me your ax," and he replies: "I will not lend it to you, just as you would not lend me your sickle" – that is revenge. And what is bearing a grudge? If one says to his fellow: "Lend me your ax," he replies "No," and on the morrow the second asks: "Lend me your garment," and he answers: "Here it is. I am not like you who would not lend me [what I asked for]" – that is bearing a grudge.
At the end, after the members of the groups expressed widely divergent opinions about what was right (some felt that it was right and just to refuse to lend back), he provided the halachic texts that deal with this situation.
As an aside, bearing a grudge and exacting revenge is a classic area of where cultures differ greatly about what is right. Vendetta (revenge) cultures aside (Sicily comes to mind), even for Jews, there are situations when grudge (and revenge?) is proper.
Yoma 22b:
Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Any Torah scholar who does not avenge himself and bear a grudge like a serpent, is no [real] scholar. But surely it is written: "You shall not avenge, nor bear any grudge"! That refers to monetary affairs, as it has been taught… But does not [this prohibition apply also to] personal affliction? Has it not been taught: Concerning those who are insulted but do not insult others [in revenge], who hear themselves reproached without replying, who [perform good] work out of love of the Lord and rejoice in their sufferings, Scripture says: "But they that love him be as the sun when it goes forth in its might" (Shoftim 5:31). That means, that he keeps it in his heart [without taking action].
Alan illustrated the point with an interesting recollection of Ram Dos (Richard Alpert),a well-known guru figure from the 1970s. When Ram went to bathe in the "holy" Ganges river, he, as all others was met by wall to wall screaming, cajoling, supplicating beggars, each more pitiful tham another, thousands of them. "What should I do", he wondered. He first thought to give to the most needy. He quickly realized, however, that it was impractical for who has precedence - the guy with one leg, or the one without an arm, or both legs.? What about no arms and one leg?. He then decided to give "to whomever he feels like at the moment", in order to pursue the quality of spontaneity.
As an aside, to a Jew this sounds very jarring. To us, in this encounter, there is both giving, which is good and not giving, which is harmful. To not give to some, even if you are giving to others, harms the giver because it envelopes him in the experience of denying a need and acquiring the quality of cruelty, or uncaring, and should never be a freely elected option. Once one runs out of money, one knows that he does not have what to give, and it's different. I am not an authority on hilchos tsedaka, but it would seem to me that one should take with him a limited sum of money (the obligation not to exceed one fifths lapses when there is a need "in front of us", as per Aaahvas Chesed, but this obligation is not incumbent until the need is encountered- similar reasoning is quoted in the name of R. Chaim Kanievsky in regard to opening the door for a pauper when he is not aware that the householder is at home, in Priorities in Tsedaka
To return to our subject, halacha , therefore, limits the variation in opinions that one can legitimately express on moral issues. Why not say that halacha defines morality and that what is permitted is moral and what is forbidden is always bad? This is a view expressed by Chazon Ish in his Emuna and Bitachon, see also end of Choshen Mishpat 16:1. In his example, opening a shop next to a competitor in the same line of business, is forbidden as "hasagas gevul" but opening an yeshiva next to an already existing institution is fine and completely permitted because "the jelousy of scribes increases wisdom". What makes these two otherwise identical situations so different from the moral standpoint? Halacha!
In all fairness the Chazon Ish is careful in his formulation in Ch.3 of Emunah and Bitachon: "Moral obligations as sometimes one body with halachic rulings".
The reason that his view is almost universally not accepted is that the assumption that morality goes beyond halacha is so central and supported by so many sources that one can write a book consisting of sources alone. In fact such a bookhas been written. It only stands to reason, for how can one envision Judaism without aggadah, mussar, chassidus, all of which envision a moral sphere that is distinct and different from the halachic sphere.
I will not even get into a related discussion of whether morality is identical with God's will or independent of it. Obviousely, if it is independent, God is both bound by it Himself and he is also unable to entirely encompass it within the halachic sphere. This is a favorite topic of R. Aharon Lichtenstein, covered in the second volume of his Leaves of Fath, and written about extensively by his students. The question dates back to Plato, although when I heard R. Aharon speak about it in 1984 in relation to a Ramban on parshas Vayera (Shall the Judge of all the earth not do Justice?), he traced it to Origen.
To me, the best way to formulate the Jewish position is to say: " Halacha does not encompass all of morality and does not provide unambiguous guidance for all ambiguous moral sitations. However, it sets about boundaries within which a more focused discussion about moral imperatives can take place, guided both by the values of halacha, overarching lessons from the sacred literature, mussar and aggadic works, and the fifth shulchan aruch (of common sense). The point is that Halacha winnows out most of the extreme possibiliies, leaving in in place a narrrowly focused field of inquiry, precise terminology and shared assumptions, so an effective moral discourse can take place. "
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