avakesh

Rebbe Nachman says: Never despair (by Yosef Karduner)

Cosmological and teleological proofs for existence of God

 This lecture should be studied together with the one on the Ontological Proof in this series. It is being posted out of sequence due to techincal problems that have delayed it

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More on R. Ishmael and R. Akiva.

The disagreements between the school of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva [1] are not arbitrary but based on different approach to interpretation. In general, R. Ishmael and his school used definite rules of interpretation and applied them only when there was a 'hermeneutical marker', an indication within the verse that the Torah intended a derash [2]. Thus, for example, a gezerah shavah (use of same words) can be used only if there exists a redundancy, an unneeded or 'extra' repetition of the term in one or both verses. This is called mufneh.

The language that R. Ishmael uses tells us a great deal about his approach. R. Ishmael "hears" the intended, under the surface, meaning of a verse and "feels" the direction in which the dersh should go. He always uses the terminology "Shomea ani". You must hear and comply with the implied directive to darshin in a specific manner. When the verse provides a marker, it is it and not a human interpreter that interprets. R. Ishmael calls such a situation 'maggid or omer lecha hakkasu"'- the verse "tells" you. When there is no such marker, R. Ishmael objected strongly to making a derash.R. Akiva, on the other hand, sought for meanings that were not necessarily self-directed.  

R. Ishmael uses klal and perat, which are fairly close to a careful literal meaning [3]. R. Akiva uses ribbuy and miyut, which is more technical and less apparent. Passages from R. Akiva's school use expressions that place the power to interpret in the hands of the human interpreter. They use terms such, "Yachol" - I might think to say so…but there is ground to say differently. In the following representative passage R. Eliezer uses a ribbuy and R. Ishmael objects.

And a garment of wool or linen that contains tsaraas…

I only know a garment of wool or linen, how do you know to include garment of kelaim (mixed wool and linen)? Talmud teaches "and garment'. I know only when one of the types is kelaim in a part of a garment; how do I know when it is throughout the garment or about a case in which  one kind is throughout and the other only in a part? Talmud teaches: 'And the garment'. I know only when it is a garment in which a kelaim of three by three cubits was woven, what about a garment in which there is less than three by three? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". I only know a garment that has space for the tsaraas to spread. What about when there is no additional space? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". These are words of R. Eliezer.

R. Ishmael said to him: You are saying to the verse (hakkasuv): "Be silent until I interpret". R. Eliezer said to him: "Ishmael, you are a mountain palm (that does not bear fruits suitable for Bikkurim, see Bikkurim 1,3)".

It may be suggested that R. Eliezer, viewed by his contemporaries as Sinai (Sukka 27a), as "a cistern that does not loose a drop (Avos,2)", as one who never taught anything that he did not hear from his teachers (Sukkah 27b), viewed Derash as something that merely backed up received traditions. As such, he did not need to be overtly restricted by literal meaning. R. Ishmael on the other hand, often utilized the principles of interpretation to derive new laws; as such, he would allow interpretation only when the verse itself commanded: "Darshen me!"

Proposing an overarching medhodological difference between teh two schools allows us to understand the situations in which one school unexpectedly uses the techniques of the other school. Such would be the case for R. Ishamel when the verse inludes an interpretative marker that says,"use ribbuy and miut". In such a case, R. Ishamel would be forced to do so even though he does not generally use ribbuy and miut.  In support of this idea we may adduce a Sifri in Parshas Chukkas, which suggests that R. Ishmael also occasionally used ribbuy.

The cow shall be burned as he watches - its hide, its blood on its intestines(Numbers 19,5). A ribbuy that follows another ribbuy is to exclude (lemaet) - these are words of R. Ishmael.

Mishna Shevuos 2, 5 may contain another instance of R. Ishmael using a ribbuy. In addition, we find in Bechoros 51a that Rebbi, who usually uses 'klal and prat' occasionally uses ribbuy and miyut. In Bechoros, he uses it on the basis of its use by "tanna d'bei R. Ishmael".

(One migh, however, say that R. Ishmael himself resorts to ribbuy when he possesses a tradition attached to a verse for which no hermeneutical marker according to his method can be located within that verse? )

The distinction between methodology of different Tannaim allows as to bring a sharper focus into our study of Halachic midrash and to its citations within the Talmud.

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1 R. Ishmael studied under R. Nechunia ben Hakone (Shevuos 26b) and his school includes R. Yonatan, while R. Akiva's method appears to have been inherited from R. Eliezer and carried forward by most of the next generation of the Tannaim, who were his students as well as R. Yoshia.

2 For a book length treatment of this point, seee Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos: R. Ishmael and the origins of Midrash, Univ.Penn. Press, 2004.

3 When there is a general statement of principle followed by particular example, you allow the general to be defined by the particular. For example, "from animals , from cattle, from sheep you shall bring your offerings (Leviticus 1, 2)". Animal is a general category, for wild animals are also included under the rubric of 'animals', such as when says, "These are the animals that you shall eat - cow, sheep (domesticated)…ram and antelope (wild) (Deuteronomy 14, 4)". The verse proceeds with "from cattle, from sheep" - this is a particularization for it excludes wild animals. The overall meaning is that the general term "animals" that is used here includes only those animals that are similar to those in the particularizing clause - in other words, only domestic animals. Consequently we interpret the term "animals" in the beginning of this verse as if it excludes wild animals.

Fifth rule: Specific followed by general, such as, "Do not just watch the donkey of your brother or his sheep when it was lost…return it to your brother…and so shall you do to his donkey and so shall you do to his raiment and so you shall do to all that your brother has lost…(Deuteronomy 22, 4)". Ox, sheep, donkey and raiment are specific and "all that your brother has lost" is general, broadening the category beyond the specific examples mentioned, to any kind of thing that is lost.

Sixth rule: General, then specific, then general (again) - you first limit the original broad category and then expand it again. (In conclusion, the general is somewhat limited but it is broader than the specific examples found in the verse). For example, "If a man gives to his fellow silver or vessels to watch and it is stolen from that man's house… if the thief was not discovered, the man in whose house it was shall approach the judges (to swear) that he did not send his hand out (to use) his fellow's property (Exodus 22, 8). It continues, "For any matter of negligence" - this is a general category. "For ox, for donkey, for sheep, for raiment" - this is specific. "For any matter that is lost" - general (again). The verse enunciated specific examples to show us that just like the specific examples are in a class of movable entities that have a monetary value, so also the general category include only what is movable and had monetary value (but not restricted to only those examples specified by the verse).

 

Levels of Spirit

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Betrayal

I thought you angels, you were men,

Possessed by faults that men possess,

Like me. Same problems, same regrets

I longed for more but there was less

Trust not in humans says the Lord

Unless that's all you can afford.

*

They all meant well, they really tried,

They gave so much, they couldn't more,

They were upholding their right,

Nay,,, obligation, duty, law

But.. self-delusion drove them forth

In righteous anger, zeal and froth

*

Integrity is hard to find,

Few are the men who know themselves,

Rule their hearts, bind their mind,

And gaze beyond their narrow cell.

If you encounter such a man,

Give'm all the Honor that you can.

*veritas

Passing by the Rebbe of Belz

It has been predicted...

 

 

Prior to the coming of the Moshiach

There will be scholars without Torah

Chassidim without Chassidus

Tsaddikim without good deeds

And

baalei middos with every character flaw imaginable.

(Rebbe Simcha Bunim of Peshischa)

Dispute for the sake of Heaven: R. Ishmael and R. Akiva.

" But a person who defiantly reviles Hashem that person shall be cut, cut off (hikores tikores) (Num. 15, 31)/ R. Akiva says: " hikores -in this world, tokores - in the World to Come. R. Ishmael says: "It also states, "that individual shall be cut off". Do I understand that to mean that he will be cut off in yet a third world? What does it teach us? (Nothing), the Torah speaks in the language of men. (Sifre Bamidbar 112) [1].

In 1888, R. David Tsvi Hoffman, a noted Posek and Rector of the famed Hildesheimer Rabbinic Seminary in Berlin , published a German language study in which he demonstrated that Halachic midrash stems from two disparate schools, each with its own terminology, interpretative approach and authorities quoted [2]. He showed that the Mekhilta [3] and Sifre Numbers form one group of works and the Sifra and Sifre to Deuteronomy, another. The former come to us from the school of R. Ishmael and the latter from the school of R. Akiva . J. N. Epstein elaborated on this finding and devoted the third section of his seminal work, Mavo L'Sifrut Hattanaim, Tel Aviv, Dvir, 1957) to it [4].

R. Ishmael is mentioned 29 times and his students R. Yonasan and R. Yoshia 18 and 15 times respectively in the first tractate of the Mekhilta (Pischa). In the next four tractates, that are agadic and not halachic in nature, he is mentioned once in the first three and not even once in the fourth. He then again is referred to extensively in the succeeding tractates. The same situation holds true in Sifre Numbers, where 78-106, 131, 1234-141 contain almost no mention of R. Ishmael but the rest extensively cite him [5].

An important characteristic of many, if not most disputes between R. Akiva and R. Ishmael is that they do not result in halachic differences. Much of the time, the disagreement is solely about the correct source verse for an established Halacha. At other times the issue is theological or aggadic. This is very different from the disagreements between the Houses of Hillel and Shammai in which there is almsot always a halachic disagreement.

This point argues that R. Ishmael and R. Akiva set out to provide Scriptural references and to support received traditions. In other words, they took the proto-Mishna and systematically sought to link its laws to verses. What may have impelled them to do so?

I suggest that the exigencies of the time required this approach. In the days of these two great Sages and even before, various heretical movements threatened survival of traditional Judaism. Appeal to Oral Law meant little to these sectarians and only a Scriptural proof carried some weight.

It may be suggested that the method of providing Biblical support for existing laws, Biblical or Rabbinic in origin, may have come into use in order to counter movements that denied Oral Law and would not accept any law that could not be anchored in Scripture. There is, I think, an explicit source to this contention. "… the Saducees wrote a Book of Decrees…and when they wrote it out…if someone asked them, (they would say) go and look in the book…they would not know how to bring proof from the Torah. The Sages said to them, "Surely it says, 'According to the Torah they will teach you" (Megilat Taanit Ch 4)" [6]. This citation from Megillat Taanis, the first work of Oral Law to be committed to writing [7], suggests that an appeal to a book such as Mishna could not possibly succeed for the heretics would simply respond, "You have your book and we have ours". Thus, R. Ishmael and R. Akiva were occupied largely with establishing each received law on the basis of Scripture.

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1 Although this passage is strictly speaking from the end of Shelach rather than from Korach (which is out parsha), I chose it because it is such a good example.

2 This work was translated into Hebrew as L'Cheker Midrashei Hatannaim and published in a compilation Mesilot LeTorat hatannaim, Tel Aviv, 1928. All citations are from A. Yadin, Scripture as Logos: Rabbbi Ishmael and the origins of Midrash, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

3 The Mekhilta is called Sifre to Shemos by some Rishonim, including Rashbam to Bava Basra 124b. For a list of others, see David Metzger's introduction to Kovetz M'farshei Mechilta.

4 This appears to represent an established fact. It has been misused by A. J. Heschel in his Torah min Hashemaim to posit theological bases for all disputes between R. Ishmael and R. Akiva. Readers of this series know that I strongly disagree with such methodology on ideological as well substantive grounds. J. Harris in How do we know this: Midrash and fragmentation of Judaism Albany SUNY-Press, 1995, denies R. Hoiffman's conclusion but offers no analysis to counter his.

5 Epstein shows that Toras Kohnaim, Kedoshim, also stems from R. Ishmael's school.

6See also Menachos 65a where R. Yochanan Ben Zakkai used Scriptural proofs to confound the heretics.

7 See Radal' Introduction to Pirkei D'Rabbi Eliezer.

Just another (wild and crazy) day in Crown Heights

The enigma of spiritual and physical.

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