avakesh

Pshat will out!

I have gradually come to understand that even when Chazal appear to abandon pshat in a particular verse, often, though not always, what they abandon is a pshat interpetation of a particular verse but not the halacha that actually comes out of the pshat in that verse. Of course, sometimes they tell us explicitly that a certain interpretation is incorrect and substitute their more complex and less simple intepretation for pshat. However, more comonly they say that the verse means something else than what it appears to be saying, ignoring the pshat but not dismissing it. In such cases, very often the pshat is still reflected in halacha, but it may not be traced to this specific verse. It may be connected as a drash to yet another verse, or it may be introduced as an anonymous halacha of Torah she baal Peh.

Let's look at an example. 

A verse in Parashat Shemini appears to forbid one from becoming tamei at any time.  The Torah writes concerning non-kosher animals, "you may not eat their flesh, nor shall you touch their carcass; they are impure to you" (Vayikra 11:8).

 The gemara (Rosh Hashana 16b), however, interprets this verse compeltely differently and in a way that can only be called drash. Rabbi Yitzchak says that only kohanim are forbidden to become "tomei meit" (impure as a result of contact with a corpse).  If so, the verse as referring to a special halakha related only to the three regalim (pilgrimage festivals) - Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot: "A person is obligated to purify himself on the festival, as it says 'You shall not touch their carcass.'" The reason would appear to be that these are the times of pilgrimage, when every person ttouches or eats kodashim.

 The Rambam codifies this halakha of Rabbi Yitzchak: "All Yisrael are commanded to be pure every festival, for they must be prepared to enter the Mikdash and eat 'kodashim' (the festival sacrifices), as it says in the Torah, 'You shall not touch their carcass' [which refers] only to the festivals.  If one did become tamei, he is [nevertheless] not lashed (makkot).  However, no such prohibition applies during the rest of the year." (Hilkhot Tum'at Okhlin 16:10)

The Rambam seems to have held that this halakha relates strictly to the laws of the Mikdash and kodashim.  It therefore follows that it would not apply nowadays, in the absence of the Mikdash.  Moreover, it would only apply on the three festivals on which each Jew must go to the Mikdash and eat kodashim.  It would not apply on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, which do not require traveling to Beis Hamikdash.

At first glance, this gemara takes a verse competely out of its pshat meaning. The posuk says that one is not allowed to touch carcasses and Gemara says that it applies only on Festivals, of which there is no mention in this verse or any other verse.

However, the halacha of the pshat in this verse does return... but unconnected to this verse.

Mishne Lamelech to this Rambam cites various authorities who imply or say that there is a standing prohibition to become Tamei, just as the verse in Shemini says. It is the position of Tosafos in several places and, in fact, it is the simple meaning of gemara in Chullin 34a. Rashi to Chullin 35a(Daleicha) also says it. The concept is called "Tumas Gviah".

It is not surprising that there is even a verse that is connected to this prohibition. Not only that, an entire mysterious and complex system of law is predicated on this prohibition: "Ochel Chullin B'Tahara". This refers to the widespread practice of eating one's regular food items in a state of preparedness and separation from inpurity that one needs for eating kodashim. Usually understood to be rabbinic and of late provenance( see Yoma 23a), Hagahos Mahari Ronshburg on Chullin 2b, cites a Ylakut Shimoni (Ki Tisa, end of Remez 386) that derives it from the verse: " And you shall make yourself Holy and be Holy (Vayikra 20). "From here said R. Gamliel: "Not only to Kohanim was holiness given from Sinai, but to all of Israel, as it says, "You shall be Holy (kedoshim tohyu)".

Here you have an example of a non-pshat explanation of a verse in Shemini but the simple explanation is not rejected. Instead it returns as derived from a different verse.

For completenesss, I must add that not everyone agrees that there exists a blanket prohibition to make oneself ritually impure. See ArtScroll notes to Chullin p. 33a, n. 33.

Now an aside. The Me'iri says a different explanation of the halakha in Rosh Hashana 16b.  Every person must purify himself on the festival in order to eat his regular food, Chullin – not the sacrificial meat – in a state of purity.  Rav A. Sofer (in his notes on the Me'iri) notes the novelty of this approach and its far-reaching ramifications. This is also the opinion of the Tur. The Tur (O.C. 603) cites a tradition from Avi Ha-ezri that one should try to eat all his food in a state of tahara during the seven days between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur.  He explains that this tradition speaks of only seven days (rather than all ten days of repentance, including Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur) because it is superfluous on Rosh Hashana.  Since a person must be pure on the festivals (including Rosh Hashana), there is no need for a special tradition to require eating in a state of tahara on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur. Similarly, Likewise, the Shibbolei Ha-leket (283) quotes the law of Rabbi Yitzchak and adds that this law applies to every festival – "and even more so on Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, which are days of judgement."  He go so far as to require the recitation of a berakha when one immerses in a mikveh before Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur as part of his process of teshuva (repentance).  The Tur (ibid. 606) records Rav Sa'adya Gaon's ruling that one recites a berakha when immersing in the mikveh before Yom Kippur.  The Rosh, however, strongly disagreed, arguing that there is no basis in the Talmud at all for this custom. Bach tries to defend R. Saadia Gaon. R. Yeruchem Perlow in Sefer Hamitzvos L'R Saadiah Gaon suggests that the blessing is derived form a Biblical obligation to purify oneself before Yom Kippur, "Before Hashem shall you be purified".

How could one explain Meiri? I suggest that Rabbon Gamliel, the same one who Biblically obligates to eat Chullin in purity in the Yalkut, holds that Rosh Hashana and Yom Kipur are like festivals for the purposes of voiding aveilus  and this is halacha  (YD 9 and OC 14). The obligation to become purified on Festivals is a component of the obligation to eat Chullin in Purity and even on Rosh Hashana, when one eats plenty of Chullin and no Kodashim, this obligation applies.

Let us now come back to the concepts.

We saw that Chazal often do not abandon pshat but substitute drash for the pshat. The pshat, however, returns under a guise of a derivation from another verse, or as halacha without a stated derivation. Why do they do it?

I think that it is because no derivation stand alone. One who learns Talmud quickly sees that various Sages had an interconneted and complex system of derivation of various details of a particular halacha from different verses. One often sees how a Sage derives several details from different verses and another Sage who disagrees with one  of these details is forced to construct another structure of derivations. The first Sage objects that if so, how do you derive this  and that, and the other Sage is forced to proivde verses for that detail as well. I think that we see only a portion of this inteconnected drash systems in the gemara and that they are more complex and interlinked. Sometimes we see an isolated drash that seems "far out" but do not realize that it is a part of an entire structure of interpretations. In order for the structure to be sound and withstand scrutiny, some halachos must bear a more forced and a more drash type of intepretation. When we see this particular interpretation in isolation we do not appreciate the need that forced it and we wonder.

Now, you might think, after I got through with it, that R. Yitzhak's intepretation, that one must purify himsf on a Festival is just a drash and that it has not basis in Pshat. Wrong again!

Rashbam in four places ( Shemos 29:37, 30:29, Vayikra 6:11 and 11:8) explains pesukim in a way that demonstrates that R.Yitzhak is also saying pshat. R. Yitshak says that one must purify himself on Festivals because he will then be touching or eating kodshim. The Torah itself says it, according to Rashbam. In these places it says that one who approaches or touches consecrated things, "yikdash (shall be holy"). The traditional understanding of this is, as Rashi brings, that when a piece of sacrificial meat of lesser holiness absorbs from a piece of greater holiness, it too is treated as having greater holiness. Rashbam says differently. He says that it means that someone who approaches a mizbeach or kodshim must purify himself. He supports it from the identical language used at the sanctification at Mount Sinai (yikdashu).

Here we also see how a what appears to be a drash is actually a simple meaning of a different verse, which Chazal also darshined in a way different from its pshat.

It seems that the realm of derivation and drash and of halacha and pshat are  seen as completely separate realms, neither of which takes away from the other.

Fascinating!

 

 

Omer: the day after the Sabbath

And HaShem spoke unto Moses saying:

10 Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them: When ye are come into the land which I give unto you, and shall reap the harvest thereof, then ye shall bring the sheaf of the first-fruits of your harvest unto the priest.
11 And he shall wave the sheaf before HaShem, to be accepted for you; on the morrow after the sabbath the priest shall wave it.
12 And ye shall count unto you from the morrow after the sabbath, from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the waving; seven sabbaths shall there be complete...
16 even unto the morrow after the seventh sabbath shall ye number fifty days; and ye shall present a new meal-offering unto HaShem...

The simple meaning of these verses is that the Omer is counted after the first Shabbos after the beginning of Pesach festival. According to this understanding, the "Sabbath" means exactly the same thing each time that it is used, namely, Shabbos, the seventh day.

The Chazal[ however, explain that the Sabbath in verse 11 refers to the first day of Passover, whether it falls on Shabbos or during the week. The priest always waves the omer on the 16th of month of Nissan. The other Sabbaths in the passage mean not the Shabbos day but rather weeks. The difficulty of course is that the same word is said to mean two different things in proximate verses. This difficulty has not escaped sectarians who gleefully point to it as disproving the traditional understanding of the passage and claim that their understanding of the passage is the original one. Here is schema that comes from a karaite source:

I was reading Chanoch Albeck's introduction to the Mishna, Vol 1, ch. 2 and he points out that the Rabbinic reading is unequivocally supported by the following verse in Yehoshua 5:11.

The day after the Passover, that very day, they ate some of the produce of the land: unleavened bread and roasted grain.

It says, "the day after Pesach", not "the day after Sabbath".

Actually Rambam in Hilchos Temidim Umusofim 7:2 brings this proof.

I then remembered that this verse came up previously in the Rabbinic vs. sectarian polemic and their response was that it so happened that year that day, the day after Pesach happened to be Shabbos.This only works for Karaites, who agreed with the lunar calendar. According to Karaites, Shabbos falls at different times on different years on Pesach. According to Zaddokim, if we assume that they used a solar calendar, Shabbos always falls on the same day in relation to Pesach.

Albeck feels that the verse from Yehoshua is a decisive proof and the only reason that Menachos 65 A did not use it was because it wanted to bring a proof from the Torah itself. He points out later in the chapter that Septuagint, a much earlier work than the Talmud, also translated "the morrow of Shabbos" as the day after the first day of Pesach.

For more of in depth discussion, see here.

I wrote about it as well.

I think that "morrow of Pesach in the Torah must mean the day of the 16th of Nissan, since Pesach refers not to the first day of Yom Tov, a term that does not exist in Biblical Hebrew, but to the Paschal sacrifice. If so, if the Torah wanted to say, "on the day after the first day of Yom Tov", it HAD TO somewhat imprecisely use the words, "the morrow of Sabbath", because there was simply no other word to use.

The verse for Yehoshua would be a problem to this, however. Perhaps, "the language of Torah is different that the language of the Prophets(Chullin 137)

Vhadvorim Atikim

Chumros on Pesach and in general

I seem to write about chumros every Pesach because every Pesach brings with it additonal insights into this subject. Chumros on Pesach are a prominent feature of the Pesach landscape and partake of many related and important ideas in spirituality and Avodas Hashem.

Why is even a tiny piece of Chametz forbidden on Pesach? Radvaz (Rabbi David ben Zimra, 1479-1573) askes this question in She'elot uTeshuvot Radvaz, 3:546 (977). After finding that there is no other halacha that makes quite such  stringent demands, he concludes that this is because chametz symbolizes the yetzer hara (evil inclination). One place where this idea is expressed is in Brochos 17a, where it says that when Rabbi Alexandari finished saying the amidah, he would add a tefillah: "Master of the Universe, You know full well that it is our desire to act according to Your will; but what prevents us from doing so? The se’or in the dough..."

However, Chido in Simchas Haregel extends this idea from searching for chometz to Pesach in general. He writes(Machazik Bracha 457): "It is well known that every person accepts on himself stringencies, adding fences and barriers because of the severity of the prohibition of chomets, as Radvaz explained in a teshuva". He adds that there is no prohibiton of appearing super-punctillious but it should be done in private and the rabbi who rules for others should not follow only the letter of the law. The Minchas Eleizer writes similarly in Machazil Bracha 457 that on other ares of halcha "the power to permit is preferable" but our tradition regarding chometz is to rule according to strict opinons. He attributes this approach "our rabbis, ZTZ'L". This, unlike Chido, he directs even the rabbis to rule strictly, even for others. This approach finds its expression in the the Chabad saying, "Pesach is andersh(different)" and in the practice of Ismach Moshe to accept any possible chumra found is seforim, as documentd in Tehila L'Dovid, a sefer written by his grandson. This remains the prevailing approach in Satmar as documented in the article in the Pesach issue of Mishpacha about the Williamsburg Matza bakery, the only bakery in the world in which, based on R. Yoel's directive, every possible chumra is being kept.

The  Mei HaShiloach quotes Reb Bunim MiParshischa who said that all the stringencies that the Jewish People adopt on Pesach are adornments to holiness, and this is alluded to in the verse that states (Shir HaShirim 1:!0) tzavareich bacharuzim, your neck with necklaces. This means that every limb of a person’s body has a corresponding ornament or garment, whereas the neck can be adorned with an ornament that is not unique to the neck. A precious stone is not designed to clothe someone. Rather, it is intended to be suspended from a person’s neck. Similarly, the stringencies that have been adopted by the Jewish People on Pesach is due to the fact that the neck is the vehicle through which the food enters, and it is specifically regarding food matters that all the stringencies on Pesach apply.

Here is how I understand this concept. Generally, a chumra is praiseworthy thing and an expression of loving G-d, except that a person should not take on stringencies that are far above his or her current level of observance. Doing so exposes his other deficiencies and represents  Kefitsas Hamadreigos which is not the right way in serving Hashem. However on Pesach even chumros that are far above the observance level are fully legitimate. Pesach is the time of mortal combat with Yetser Hara and in a fight to the last, any weapon is acceptable. It is no dishonor to a warrior in the midst of the battle to slay his enemy with a tree trunk, should a sword not be available. Similalry, Pesach is a "time-out" during which the usual considerations in Derech Hoavoda do not apply. 

I always thought that the statement of Ramo in in Orach Chaim 443:6 contradicts this approach. Ramo writes that those who scour and wash the walls before Pesach have what to rely on and shold not be ridiculed. Mishan Berura points out that they rely on a Yerushalmi. Doesn't this indicate that chumros even on Pesach must have something on which to rely, something at least of the gravity of Yerushalmi?

There is also found in the traditional sources an approach that is against all chumros on Pesach. Not surprisingly it comes from Breslov. Sichos HaRan #235 says:

"The Rebbe was also very much against all the special stringencies that are observed on Pesach. Many people went so far in observing many fine points of custom that they were literally depressed by the holiday. He spoke about this at length. One of his followers once asked the Rebbe exactly how to act with regard to an ultra-stringent observance. The Rebbe made a joke of it.

The Rebbe spoke about this quite often. He said that these ultra-strict practices are nothing more than confused foolishness. He told us that he had also been caught up in this and would waste much time thinking up all sorts of unnecessary restrictions. Once he worried about the drinking water used during Pesach. He was afraid that a small amount of leaven might have fallen into the well from which they drew water. The only alternative would be to prepare water in advance for the entire Pesach week, as some people do. But this was also not good enough, for the water had to be carefully safeguarded from leaven from the day before Pesach, and this was very difficult."

Here is how the RCA put it in a statement issued in 1997. " The promulgation of stringencies were condemned because they add additional financial burdens on the Jewish consumer. Unnecessary stringencies are divisive........they foster an atmosphere of cynicism that no standards are ever good enough."

However, there is also a middle approach, one that says that some chumros are good and some are bad.The good ones keep you out of trouble because they bring with them zechus avos.

Inyan this year, the magazine of Hamodia, contains an interesting interview with the Squarer Rebbe. In it he quotes this Ramo as an indication that chumros IN GENERAL, not only on Pesach, must have something on which to rely. "This is how the Rav of Ostrow interpreted this Ramo. This something should be a received tradition from our forefathers."This is a gevaldige message", the Rebber enthuses. "If one relies on his ancestros, it is their responsibility to ensure that he does not stumble. On the other hand, if their way does not find favor in his eyes,then it is as if he has forged a new path, and in that case ancestors bear no responsibility and one is dependent on his own zchyos". He goes on to share a story of a certain machmir who would not eat of the Magid of Chernobyl's shirayim because of the minhag of not to "mish" (eat other people's food on Pesach). The Maggid told him to check his water barrel and he found there a piece of floating chometz.

It is important to point out that this is not the kind of oppositon to chumros that one sometimes finds in the "modern" sector. The argument here is for the authority of traditional minhagim, not their dismissal as not somehow relevant to our 21st centruy lives. What the Squarer Rebbe says is that raditional chumros are to be mantained but new ones should not be manufactured by individuals.

I end with a quote from Shelah, Beis Chochma, vol1.

We find that as generations unfold more and more halachic stringencies are enacted. During days of Moshe Rabbeinu only those prohibitions that were explicitly received on Sinai were proscribed. Moshe Rabbeinu enacted a nubmer of stringencies based on his perception of the spiritual needs of the nation. In later generations, be it at the time of the prophets or the Tannaim, the prevailing spiritual leadership instituted additional halachic stringencies and guidelines.

 

Parshas Porah is d'oraisa.

Shulchan Aruch in the beginning of HiIlchos Purim says that some say that Parshas Zakhor and Porah is of Biblical origin and villagers who don't have a minyan the rest of the year should travel to larger towns to hear these parshiyos read in a minyan.

Almost everyone who commented on this passage questioned that Parshas Porah is of Biblical origin, and for a good reason. There is no Scriptural source for such an obligation, neither is there any clear Talmudic source for it. Until newer manuscripts of certain Rishonim became available, the only source for this contention that was available to the commentators was a note to hagahos Asheiri. It is easy to dismiss a single source. In fact, Nachal Eshkol ( I aso heard it in the name of Gro) attempted to explain even that source away in quite an ingenious manner. He posited that there was a scribal error and that originally what was written in it was the abbreviation Peh"Peh. It was meant to stand for parshas purim and to refer to the story of Amalek's attack that we read from Beshalach on Purim morning. The intent was that parshas Zakhor at the end of Ki Teitse as well as parshas Beshalach that we read on Purim morning can fulfill the obligation to remember Amalek, nothing to do with Porah (this si a machlokes bewtween Mogen Avraham and others). When a subsequent copyist tried to expland the abbreviation, he mistakenly did so as "parshas porah" instead of "parshas purim".

However, now we have much more manuscript evidence. No one ever found any manuscript that contained this putative abbreviation. No one ever found this passage with the words of parshas purim. Instead we now have Ritva to Megilla 7b, Tos. R. Yehuda Hachasid and Tos. Harosh to Brochos 13a (see Rashbo there) who all have the version "parshas Porah".

I heard from Rav Hershel Schachter that by reading parshas Porah we fulfill the command to remember the Cheit Ha'eigel -- the sin of the Golden Calf. In Parshat Eikev (9:7) we read: "Z'chor al tishkach eit asher hiktsafta et Hashem Elokecha b'Choreiv" -- "Remember, do not forget, that which you angered the Lord, your G-d at Choreiv (Sinai)," a reference to the Golden Calf. Rashi (Chukas 19:22) quotes from R. Moshe HaDarshan that the Red Heifer served as an atonement for the sin of the Golden Calf. He uses an allegory concerning a child who dirtied the king's palace. "Let the mother (the Heifer) clean up the mess made by her son (the Golden Calf)."  What this emasn is that Red Heifer is a euphemism for Godlen Calf. I would add that in Megilah 25b it says that the second story of the Godlen Calf we read but do not translate, so as not to create an impression that the calf had powers. Similarly, we fulfill the command to remember Miraim's sin of speaking against her brother Moshe only in the course of the annual Torah rading and we do not establish a specific ceremony for it, as we do for remembering Amalek (Magen Avron 60). This is so as not to embarss Miriam. So we see that not all commandments to remeber should be fulfilled openly.

So as not to produce a wrong impression, we read parshas porah instead of the portion fo Godlen Calf to fulfill the commandment to remember the sin of the Golden Calf.

Aruch Hashulchan O'CH 685 suggests that the obligation of parshas porah is Biblical because the Biblical passage that contains it needs to be read during the purification ceremony. His proof to it is the Talmudic passage in Zevachim 90. There the question is asked: "Why chattos is always first in verses but by yoledes, olah precedes chatos?" The answer is , "Lemikroah", to read it. Rashi there and in the beginning of Tazria understands that this means "designation". Chattos is still brought first but in the case of Yoledes, the olah is designated first, before chattos. Aruch Hashulchan explains the word "lemikroah" differently, to mean that the verses that describe the sacrifice of Yoledes must be read during that sacrifice, and he draws an analogy to Porah. It remains to be asked, "what is the connection betrween Porah Adumah and Yoledes"?

R. Moseh Shternbuch in Moadim UZmanin (2;168) provides stronger evidence. He asks us to take three steps:

1. In Yoma 5b it says that the verse in the beginning of Shemini where the korban of Miluim is explained, "This is the word(Davar) thaty ou shall do...", means that the passages of Miluim must be read from the Torah when Miluim are brought. In fact, if it was not read, the miluim sacrifice would be ineffective.

2.In Yoma 68B, the first Rashi to the Mishna explains that the Cohen Godol's ceremoney of reading of the Torah on Yom Kippur is derived from Miluim. (Parehtetically, it explains that this Torah reading is a part of the sacrificial order and not like other Torah readings that we do, and illuminates the manner in which the mishna there presents it).

3.Yoma 2b, "As he did on this day, so shall you do to do, to atone for you". This passage form Miluim is explained by the Gemara to mean: "To atone - this is the actions of Yom Kippur; to do-this is the actions of Porah". Hence, it draws a connection between Yom Kippur and Porah and requires the Torah reading of the relevant passage to be performed during the ceremony of Red Heifer purification.

In conclusion, what Rishonim who say that parshas Porah is d'oraysa mean is that reading it is Biblically required during the ceremony of Porah Adumah. It does not mean that we, in our own time have a Biblical obligation of parshas Porah.

A great source but still not compatible with the statement in the Shulchan Aruch from which we started.

Remembering a Purim Teshuva

On the occasions of the Yohrzeit of R. Moshe Feinstein.

On Purim day of 1981, Rav Moshe answered an inquiry by the Governor of the State of New York (Although his name is keeping with R. Moshe’s custom to not unnecessarily record names was not mentioned, Hugh Carey was the Governor of New York at that time). The question was: What is the Jewish view of the death penalty? Rav Moshe begins by expressing his feelings of love and respect to the Governor because of his desire to know the opinion of the Torah on this weighty matter. Rav Moshe points out that the Torah specifies the death penalty only for the most heinous of sins -- murder, kidnapping, forbidden sexual relations and idol worship -- because by committing these crimes a person abandons goodness and follows a path of cruelty. This being said, the Torah is extremely limiting on who may be killed, and by whom. First only a Sanhedrin composed of 23 men composed of the most proficient and careful Torah scholars Sages, who have received ordination from Moshe Rabbenut can only judge capital cases. It can do so only when the Temple is standing and only when the great Sanhedrin of 71 is also functioning. There must have been two witnesses who are not related and who were thoroughly cross-examined and warned about the gravity of their testimony.

After this explanation, Rav Moshe makes an about face and concludes with a different message. He tells the Governor that we live in a society where cruelty pervades and killing is rampant, and where murderers and those who commit acts of evil are abundant, and it is most proper for the government to protect its citizens and to check lawlessness (Choshen Mishpat 2:68).

Though some may argue that Death Penalty is not a question of medical halacha, death penalty by lethal injections and the ethics of physicians, who take an oath to heal and preserve life, participating in executions are extensively discussed in the Medical Ethics literature. The discussions often hinge on whether death penalty is good or bad for society.

Who is afraid of R. Yirmiah?

Hat Tip to MenachemMendel

Bava Basra 23b

בעי ר’ ירמיה: רגלו אחת בתוך נ’ אמה ורגלו אחת חוץ מחמשים אמה, מהו? ועל דא אפקוהו לרבי ירמיה מבי מדרשא

.R. Yirmiah asked a question about fledgling birds found near a privately-owned nesting box; the gemara rule that fledglings within 50 amot of the nesting box belonged to the owner of the box, but fledglings beyond 50 amot belonged to the finder. R. Yirmiah asked about the status of a fledgling found straddling the 50-amah line. His colleagues threw him out of the study hall

See B"M 21a

Altz is Gott: Is this classic Rabbinic theology?

The conventional view of Rabbinic theology is that it accepts a distinction between the physical and spiritual world. The spiritual is above and the physial is below. Divine Presence rests on the Ark, which measures 10 tephachim high. Never had Glory (Shekhina) descended below and never had Moshe and Eliahu ascended to above, as it says” The heavens are heavens of the L-rd and earth he has given to the sons of men (Tehilim115) (Sukkah 5 and in the Mekhilta D.Rabbi Yishmoel, Yisro). Revelation is perceived as ocurring within the boundary between the physical below and the spiritual above. We find an example of this phenomona in this week’s parsha, Yisro.

…You have seen that from heavens I have spoken to you (Shemos 20,19) One verse states: “that from heaven” and another one says:”…and Hashem descended upon the mountain Sinai (Shemos 19,20)…” How shall both verses be reconciled? A third verse comes and mediates between them - from heaven He made you hear His voice to chastise you and His fire he made you see on the earth and His words you heard from within the fire (Devarim 4) - these are words of R. Yishmoel. R. Akiva says: “This teaches that the Holy One Blessed be He spread upper heavens on top of the mountain and spoke to them from heaven as it says “and He spread heavens and descended and darkness under his feet (Tehilim 18). Rebbi says: “and Hashem descended on Mount Sinai -top of mountain “and He called to Moshe” - to the top of the mountain “and Moshe went up” - you may think as it sounds, no, just like one who employs helpers can reach to places personally or through helpers, so much more the Glory of One who spoke and the world came into being (in other words, some messenger angel carried out Hashem’s commands and He Himself was not present at the top of the mountain)

Rebbi’s wording is somewhat obscure. I follow the explanation of Hagahos uBiurim.

Rabbi Yishmoel, as Rashi explains in his comments to this verse, understands that “His Glory is in heaven and his fire and power are on the earth”. In other words, what concerns R. Yishmoel is an obvious contradiction between G-d being described as located both on the top of the mountain at Revelation, in the physical realm,  and Him being heard from heaven, presumably far above the mountain. The solution is likewise straightforward - He was seen on the mountain but His voice emanated from heaven. R. Akiva, on the other hand, resolves the contradiction by positing the folding over of heaven on top of the mountain. The spiritual was stretched and folded on top of the physical.

Similarly in an earlier comment, “…and all the people see the voices (20,15)”. They see that which is visible and they hear that which is audible - words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: They see and hear that which is visible. There is nothing that comes from the Mouth of the Almighty and (was not) inscribed on the tablets, as it says “the voice of G-d inscribes flames of fire”(Tehilim 29). Thus, here too R. Yishmoel simply points out that they saw the fire which was at one place, on top of the mountain, and they heard the sound that came from another place, from the heaven. R. Akiva, on the other hand, suggests that they saw and heard that joining of the physical and heavenly that was at that moment taking place on the top of the mountain. In Rashi’s words - “they saw the audible, something not possible in another place”

We realize, however, that R. Akiva is also addressing a completely different issue when we compare his words with an anonymous Tanna quoted in parsha 4 of the Mekhilta (19,20).

‘’...and Hashem descended on the mount Sinai”. You may think that the Glory literally descended and that He spread it over the mountain - it says to teach us - “for from heaven”. That teaches us that the Holy One Blessed be He spread the lower heaven and higher heaven on the mountain and that the Glory descended and spread them (the heavens) on mount Sinai as a man folds a pillow at the head of a bed and as a man who speaks from the top of that pillow. So it says: as the melting fire, fire bubbles water(Ishaia 64) and it says (ibid) in your making things of wonder”.

The most outstanding difference in formulation between this Tanna and R. Akiva is that the former describes a process of folding upper and lower heaven while the latter mentions only the upper heaven. The issue, perhaps, is whether there exists an intemediate substance, what philosphers called, ether (hiyuli), that is made of such fine particles that it is in some ways almost spiritual.This substance is the Lower Heaven. The interaction of the Heavenly and Earthly is portrayed as the touching of two opposite - fire and water. Nevertheless, though the twain shall never meet, they come together and are united at the boundary: the bubbles of boiling water.

It seems to me that R. Akiva is not as much troubled by the contradiction between verses as he feels the need to address the philosophical and religious difficulty that they present. Every religion must present a compelling vision of how the spiritual or heavenly realms can interact with the physical and the earthly. It does not matter whether the physical is the top of a mountain or the lowest valley and it should not matter whether you conceive of the spiritual as the highest or lowest heavens; the twain should never be able to meet. Yet history and human experience demonstrate unequivocally that in some way the physical and the spiritual intertwine, or at the very least, touch each other.

There are two ways of describing this relationship. The first one sees the spiritual as a dimension above and beyond the physical. To explain this, imagine a world that is completely two dimensional, consisting of length and width and nothing else. Imagine also that it is populated by two dimensional intelligent beings, sort of cut-out paper characters that operate and move solely along a two-dimensional plane. How would these beings perceive a man walking about in their world?

Well, first of all they see him as a set of footprints, unaware of the vast dimensions above their two dimensional space. More importantly, what they do percieve, seems to randomly disappear and then miraculously reappear far from where it was originally sighted. This is because they are only aware of him when he steps on their plain; they are blind to the process of walking that occurs above and outside their dimension.

R. Akiva sees the spiritual as a dimension above our world. Sefer Yetsira (5,2), attributed by many sources to R. Akiva (Pardes1,1) expresses this view in these words:”…depth of beginning and depth of end (dimension of time), depth of good and depth of evil (moral), depth of above and depth of below (height,) depth of east and depth of west (width), depth of north and depth of south (length)…When the dimensions, for a moment, connect, we perceive them as miraculous events - and that is what took place at Sinai. For more on this see here.

Chazal speak of Shkhina as "resting" upon a prophet. Avos are the Merkavah (Genesis Rabba 47:6). Just like the Shekhina rides upon the Keruvim, so can the Holy Spirit rest and touch a human being. Once you admit of it entering a human being, however, you are in the realm of the idolatrous, of incorporation of the spirit within a body, of a human becoming divine. Pagans believed in Possession, a spirit dwelling within the body as an uneasy guest, and Incarnation, a spirit entering the body as it sole element of vitality.

Chazal would never accept these concepts. There is no commentator (with the sole exception of R. Bachaya, which deserves a separate discussion) that would even consider explaining that the three men who visited Avrohom were incarnated beings.

There is, however, another solution to the problem of physical and spiritual. It is possible to see the spiritual as present within the physical and the physical as enveloping and enclothing the spiritual, and this is key, in a continuous process. Take for example, a concept such as kindness. Now, kindness does not exist in a physical sense; it cannot be touched, measured or tasted. It is, therefore, a spiritual entity.

One cannot, however, grasp the concept of kindness without understanding the concept of free choice to be kind or otherwise; in this sense, the concept of kindness enclothes the concept of choice within it. The concept of free choice itself cannot be grasped without knowing the concept of good and evil, without which choice mean nothing. Good and evil themselves presuppose a system of moral authority or a Divine Being from Whom it stems. The concepts of a Divine Being is enclothed within the concept of moral choice etc.

Thus, an observable physical act of kindness enclothes the concept of kindness, which itself enclothes a concept of choice, within which dwells the understanding of good and evil and the concept of a Divine Being. (I set up an example to consist of 4 stages corresponding to the 4 Kabbalistic worlds, but, of course, the act of kindness also envelopes many other concepts of different levels of complexity, analogous to the Kabbalistic idea of Partsufim).

The anonymous Tanna resolves the difficulty of the spiritual physical connection that is resident in the concept of Revelation in the manner just described. The higher heaven are folded into the lower heaven, G-d speaks, as if from a pillow above the double covering. In other words, spiritual comes in a series of "levushim", or, we might say is enclothed in various garments, some just a membrane, like a pillowcase, others thick and obscure, like the pillow itself. In kabbala, there is a disagreement whether this is true only of the spiritual worlds or even of the physical world. In other words, some believe that there is no discontinuity between the spiritual and the physical, so that the physical is sumply the end product of emanation. Others, hold that it is ony true of the spiritual worlds and the physical world was created through a separate process, as Creation, not as emanation.

The impression one gets from Chazal is like the latter view. It would be desirable to find the former view in the words of Tannaim as well, so as to legitimize it before all. The way in which we explained the view of the Anonymous Tanna may serve that purpose.

There is a well known diagreement between R. Yosi and Chochomim in Shevuos 35b. whether the name Tsva(k)os, which means Hosts, is a Holy Name of G-d of merely means hosts and is not holy. R. Yosi says that the name Tsva(k)os is not holy and can be erased, whereas Chochomim says it is Holy and cannot be erased (and this is the halacha). The Rogatchover once explained that the disagreement is the same one as about whether Tsimtusm is Kephsuto or not. If Tsimtsum Kipshuto, G-d withdrew from the world and allowed a space for physical beings to exist in it. He interacts with them from outside this "space" and hosts that are within it are not holy. All the things, (hosts) within it are physical bodies and are not holy. If not kepshuto, He remains within the physical space just as before the withdrawal, physical adn piritual are identical in essence, though not in degree, and both the name Hashem and Tsva(k)os are equally Holy.

 ת"ר כתב אלף למד מאלהים יה מיי' ה"ז אינו נמחק שין דלת משדי אלף דלת מאדני צדי בית מצבאות ה"ז נמחק רבי יוסי אומר צבאות כולו נמחק שלא נקרא צבאות אלא על שם ישראל שנאמר (שמות ז) והוצאתי את צבאותי את עמי בני ישראל מארץ מצרים אמר שמואל אין הלכה כרבי יוסי

In other words, is it that there is a separate G-d and there is a multiplicity of mundane events and beings in our world, the former is Holy and the latter are not. Or, is it that Holiness pervades all worlds, including our own and all the physical beings within it.

The anonymous Tanna and R. Akiva may be disagreeing about the very same point.

 

 

Names and destiny

Names continue to fascinate me. Kabbalistically, a person's name is connected with his essence and the root of his soul. R. Yosef Karo writes in Magid Meisharim (Shemos) that a man named Abraham leans toward the side of kindness and one who is called Yosef is either a hero in sexual matters or feeds and supports others. While essentially Kabbalistic, it could be interpreted to refer to the subconscious effect of carrying a name and its meaning, which creates an expectations that will influence a person to express precisely the qualities associated with the name. It appears incontrovertible that one's name has a shaping and clarifying influence on the development of personality and on how others view him/her, and that it modifies a person's perception of who he or she is. There is scientific evidence to this concept.

Before the world was created, there was only He and His name alone (some versions say Hakadosh Baruch Hu, not He.., see Sefer Hoemunos 4:7. Another version in the printed version of PRDRE says, "His great name...). The Name is Essence!

This assumption that a name affects the person may be based on Brochos 7b.

How do we know that the name is causative (shapes and affects individuals and events)? R. Elazar said. The verse says " come see works of Hashem, that he put destruction (shamus) in the land. Do not read Shamos but sheimos (names).[

There are other sources as well. In Yoma 83b we are treated to a story of how R. Meir was able to prevent financial loss by paying attention to a name of an innkeeper who turned out to be a wicked swindler. Similarly we read in Sotah 9b, "If her name was not Delila she should have been called that, since she weakened his strength and his vigor". Similarly in Sotah 34b we are told that all of the spies were named according to their deeds. I

In Tanach names are certainly reflective of their bearers. For example, Esav has a name indicating his physical appearance (Genesis 25:) and is also called Edom (red), alluding to his violent tendencies, that he sheds blood. Moses's name reflected how the daughter of Pharaoh drew him from the Nile (Exodus 2:10). Noah's birth was accompanied by the aspiration that the newborn would provide comfort "from our work and from the toil of our hands, because of the ground which God cursed" (Genesis 5:29). And he called his name Noach, meaning to say, "This one will give us comfort (e-noach-meinu) (Genesis 5, 29)". Here the name reflects the man's essence. Another example: "The name of one was Peleg, for in his days, the entire world became divided (ni-peleg-a) (Geneis 10,25)". There are countless such  examples.

That a name may indicate something about its owner also goes back to Tanach. "Naval is his name and navala he does (Samuel 1, 25,25). "It is for this that they called him Yakov and he outwitted me these two times (Genesis 27,36).

Not only this - we all have different names.

You find that a person is called by three names: one by which that his father and mother call him, one that people call him and one that he acquires himself. The best one is the one that he acquires himself (Tanchuma VaYakhel, 1).

As is known, Ashkenazim have the custom of not naming their children after living relatives. This is based on Sefer Chassidim 460 who says that it is discourage because it indicates an anticipation that that person will soon die, as explained by Noheg K'Tson Yosef, Yoledes 5.. Of interest, the issue of Gilgul(transmigration) is not cited exlicitly by Sefer Chassidim. An obvious explanation of why we should wait until a relative departs is to give his or her soul an opportunity to partially transmigrate into the newborn baby. To name a child by a parent's name while he is still alive is akin to the sin of Onan, wo did not want to give "seed" to his brother. Abarbanel (unlike Ari who held that souls transmigrate into animals and even stones and trees) on Yibum in Ki Teitse makes the point that giglul is the more appropriate the greater the degree of similarity between the source and the destination and that is why Torah commanded that a brother should marry his passed brother's wife and produce progeny. See a discussion here.

In the recent edition of Kolmos from Mishpacha(Chanukkah 5771, #15), R. Binyamin Jacobson answers a question from Kallah Rabbasi 3, where it says that 80.000 boys named Aharon were present at Aharon's funeral. Does this not sypport the view of teh Sephardim that one names children after LIVING relatives?

His answer is noteworthy. He brings Bareishis Rabba 37,7: "The ancestors, since they knew their genealogies, would derive names from events. We, who are not certain of our genealogies, derive names from our forefathers. Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel said: The ancestors who used the power of Divine Inspiration drew names out of (future) events; we who do not have access to Divine Inspiration, draw names from our forefathers (Genesis Rabbah 37,7)."

SInce Aharon's contemporaries named their children after events, they named them Aharon after the setting up of the Mishkon. Therefore, it does not apply to our practice at all.

This is an ingenious answer but it doesn't explain everything. There are many examples of Talmuidc Sages who were named after their fathers when they were still alive (see R. Reuven Margolios extensive note in his edition of Sefer Chassidim 460) and this still requires an explanation.

 

Religious extremism

An ignoramus cannot be a chasid (Avos 2:6).

Interpretation: A Chasid is someone who goes to exremes (Rambam: Deyos, Ch. 1). Only a scholar can understand what is an extreme and how far one can go and not cause harm to others. "If an ignoramus is a chasid, do not live in his neighborhood (Shabbos 63a)."

A true scholar will not ever cause harm through excessive stringency, ".for the book and the sword came together from heaven, and Israel was obliged to choose between them (Sifre, Deut. 40, end). If scribe, not robber and if robber, not scribe (Avodah Zara 18a). 

 
 

Talmudic thinking and secular education

 
To a modern man, the ability to think talmudically comes with effort. Conditioned by the scientific outlook, we tend to think of many concepts in a very different way than the Talmud, and without training, we see its discussions as peculiar and strange.

This Shabbos I was studying the last few sygyos in the first chapter of Chullin. Among them is a discussion of whether Temed, a mixture of left over grape skins and pits, with water added, before it is re-fermented to produce additional wine, can be purified thorugh "hashaka". Without getting technical, water, but not wine, can be given the halachic status of rainwater and be used as a mikvah, through this act of touching a body of an exisitng rainwater mikvah. Hashaka is effective because it is "planting (zriyah)". The comparison of making two bodies of water touch and planting is effortless and axiomatic in the Talmudic worldview and does not require farther derivation or defense.

The sugya implies that the best "hashaka" is when two bodies of water touch from the top and not from the sides. Apparently, this is predicated on the act of planting which is also performed from the top and not from the side. Farthermore, it is the act of planting that constitutes zriya, not mixing and not necessarily intermingling of waters. So also, many poskim hold that the Shabbos violation of planting occurrs as soon as a seed is placed into the ground, even if it is later removed and never actually sprouts (See Iglei Tal in the introduction), while others disagree.

To the scientific mind, it is very curious to call the mere act of placing a seed in the ground, "planting". We see planting as a process which involves surrounding the seed with earth, watering and tending it in the appropriate conditions, and then producing from it a growth. Because we see the process as a totality of growing, we necessarily see the linguistic content of the word "planting" in a much wider context. Chazal, instead, looked at what one sees when planting takes place and they saw a seed being placed into the ground, that is what they saw, and that is what they saw. As such, connecting two bodies of water is the same as placing a seed into the ground.

This example argues for the proposition that the only mind capable of immediately and effortlessly interpreting the Torah is a mind unaffected by secular knowledge. One would  ask,  "Why is more knowledge worse"? The answer is that Talmudic thinking is predicated on such a different way of seeing so many processes and facts that an over-educated mind is at a serious disadvantage, for it must first free itself from its pre-conceptions and then twist itself into what is a new and foreign way of perceiving relaity, whereas a mind never exposed to secular knowledge, does not.

I often wondered why Talmud so often offers as a way of seeing something, what it calls "salka daatach amrinan (you may first think that we say..)", and than tells that, no, "kamashma lan" that that is the correct way. But... it never proves it. What then is the purpose of the exercize - just tell us what the correct way is right away.

However, there is a purpose for the exercize! It is to model the Talmudic reasoning for us by example. This is how expertise is gained - through solving various problems and the subconscious acquisition of pattern recognition. Experts often cannot prove why they make a particular decision and why they select one option among several and there are always argments for either position. It is through modeling that experts are made. Similarly, this is why it is important to acquire a broad and wide backround in learning, what Talmudists call "filling the belly with Shas and poskim"(see Pesachim 68b).

Note that I am not arguing for the superiority of one or another way of looking at the natural world. I am simply saying that for an aspiring Talmudist, secular knowledge may, in fact, be an impediment to quick and accurate understanding of talmudic sugyos. It may be a advantage in understanding Aggada.. but that's another discussion.