avakesh

Getting back to Daf Yomi

Stopping smoking is the easiest thing to do. I've done it many times.

Mark Twain.

So, I got back into Daf Yomi, at Sanhedrin, after stopping after Gittin, at the birth of yet another child. It is an easy thing to do for I've done it many time. About 5. Over 28 years, to be more exact.

There are many things I learned over the years, which I am ready to share. I had some successes along the way but failure is definitely the best teacher.

So here are my pointers on how to succeed at Daf Yomi.

1.Start early. Begin daf beis one ot two days before everyone else and stay ahead. It is inevitable that you will miss a day here and there. If you don't, you are not really living. It takes a lot to learn a set amount every day, and if you are involved in other activities, like earning a living, family and/or communal work, you WILL sometimes miss a day. You have to plan for failure and build into it the possibility of success. This way, if you miss a day you will not be discouraged and you will retain a realistic chance to catch up. Most daf yomi learners give it up after they ao far behind that they do not see a way to catch up. If you start ahead you are less likely to fall too far behind.

Of course, the same may be acomplished by just skipping the dafim that you miss, but that is not as good a solution. First, not everyone has the personality to give up dafim without regrets. Second, it is not really learning daf yomi, is it?

2. Know your style! If you go slowly and identify many important points at first reading, perhaps that's all you need, If you tend to run through the daf and get the gist of it and then return for review, you need a differetn strategy. In that case, you may, and I do, learn through the daf twice, so that every day you review the daf that everyone else is doing today but you did yesterday, and then go ahead with the first run-through of the daf that the others will do tommorow.

3.Plan the extent to which you want to get into this. Will you learn all Rashis, or only the important ones? How and which tosafos do you want to cover? Will you focus on the practical psak that arises out of the daf or on covering the main disagreements in rishonim. WIth the many sheets, shiurim and daf aids that are now available, you can tailor your goals very well, and the ongoing focus on the methodology will save you time and provide the sense of accomplishment that will sustain and keep up your motivation.

Above, all approach this as only a part of your learning. The Daf can never substitute for the lofty and very motivating goal of becoming a Talmid Chacham. If you settle for ltat is what you will achieve - no more. If you don't really believe that you can, you are not likely to accomplish. Yes, it takes years, sometimes lifetimes. Yet, settting high goals is the way one succeeds in everything and this is no less true of Talmud Torah.

Hatzlacha Rabbah!

Converts of Jewish ancestry

Rav Amsalem, an Israeli expert on halachos of Giyur, is coming out with a new sefer, Zera Yisrael, in which he argues that those converts who have a biological Jewish connection, unlike those from a compeltely non-Jewish background, do not require a full acceptance of all the mitzvos and an acceptance of a "traditional" lifestyle is enough, because the identification with the Jewish people- serving in the IDF and keeping mitzvos such as Kiddush, Kashrus, Yom Kuppur etc is sufficient.

It will be interesting to see his arguments. In the meantime, a controversy is brewing. For myself, does anyone know how to explain a Rashi (s.v.giyra)that says clearly that one can accept a Ger who does not believe in the Divine origin of Oral Law, as long as the rabbi who accepts him is certain that the convert will eventually be persuaded to accept it? Did Rashi believe that an agreement to perform mitzvos is enough, and that Ikkarei Hadas play no role in Giyur, as the plain meaning of the Talmud in Yevomos 47a seems to suggest? Rambam Issurei Biyah Ch.  14:2 famously rewords that gemara to make it about more about theology, or at least about Oneness of G-d,  as well as mitzva observance.

ומודיעין אותו עיקרי הדת שהוא ייחוד השם ואיסור עכו"ם ומאריכין בדבר הזה ומודיעין אותו מקצת מצות קלות ומקצת מצות חמורות ואין מאריכין בדבר זה ומודיעין אותו עון לקט שכחה ופיאה ומעשר שני ומודיעין אותו עונשן של מצות כיצד אומרים לו הוי יודע שעד שלא באת לדת זו אם אכלת חלב אי אתה ענוש כרת אם חללת שבת אי אתה ענוש סקילה ועכשיו אחר שתתגייר אם אכלת חלב אתה ענוש כרת אם חללת שבת אתה ענוש סקילה ואין מרבין עליו ואין מדקדקין עליו שמא יגרום לטרדו ולהטותו מדרך טובה לדרך רעה שבתחלה אין מושכין את האדם אלא בדברי רצון ורכים וכן הוא אומר בחבלי אדם אמשכם ואחר כך בעבותות אהבה

Names determine

Names are interesting. Sometimes they tell us much about the person who carries the name; at other times they can guide us to what he or she likes.

 

In Tanach names are certainly reflective of their bearers. For example, Esav has a name indicating his physical appearance (Genesis 25:) and is also called Edom (red), alluding to his violent tendencies, that he sheds blood. Moses's name reflected how the daughter of Pharaoh drew him from the Nile (Exodus 2:10). Noah's birth was accompanied by the aspiration that the newborn would provide comfort "from our work and from the toil of our hands, because of the ground which God cursed" (Genesis 5:29). There are countless such  examples.

We learn from a verse that names "determine" (Berachot 7b) and the gemara gives us concrete examples, such as the meaning of Reuven and Ruth. The Sages certainly believed that names tell us much about people (Yoma 83b) and they conducted themselves in accordance with this belief.

RABBI Meir, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi were once on a journey. Rabbi Meir was always particular about the names of people, but Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi never bothered about them. They once came to some place and looked for lodgings, which they found. They asked the innkeeper what was his name and he said: Kidor. Then said Rabbi Meir, I gather that he is an evil man, for it was said: (Deut. xxxii, 20) For they are a very forward generation (Kidor). Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi entrusted to him their money, but Rabbi Meir did not. He hid it in the grave of that man's father. The innkeeper dreamed that some one said to him: Go and take the purse that is lying under that man's head. The next morning he told them about his dream. Said they to him: A dream of a Sabbath night has no meaning. Thereupon Rabbi Meir waited the whole day and took away his purse. The next morning they said to the innkeeper: Give us our purses. He answered that he knew nothing about them. Then Rabbi Meir said to them: Why didn't you pay any attention to the name? They answered:—Why didn't you call our attention to it, Master? He replied: I considered that one ought to be suspicious, but I did not consider it a certainty. Thereupon they asked the innkeeper to go with them to a shop where they noticed lentils in his beard. Whereupon they went to his wife and gave her this as a sign that he had ordered them to return the purses, and they received their purses. When he returned home he killed his wife...... From then on they too paid attention to names. Once they came to the house of a man named Balah, they did not enter the house, for they said: He must be an evil man, for it is written: (Ezek. xxiii, 43) Then said I unto her that was old in adulteries (Balah).

There is a great deal written on the roots of names in the higher spheres and the implications that this fact has on giving additional names to a critically ill person but that is not my focus here. Recently,a paper by Jones at al came across my desk that explains why "names determine".  Here is the abstract:

From the perspective of implicit egotism people should gravitate toward others who resemble them because similar others activate people's positive, automatic associations about themselves. Four archival studies and 3 experiments supported this hypothesis. Studies 1-4 showed that people are disproportionately likely to marry others whose first or last names resemble their own. Studies 5-7 provided experimental support for implicit egotism. Participants were more attracted than usual to people (a) whose arbitrary experimental code numbers resembled their own birthday numbers, (b) whose surnames shared letters with their own surnames, and (c) whose jersey number had been paired, subliminally, with their own names. Discussion focuses on implications for implicit egotism, similarity, and interpersonal attraction.

R. Dessler wrote many years ago that all love is self love (Kuntress Hachesed, Michtav M’Eliahu vol. 1, pp. 32-51, 140-145). We develop love from investing ourselves in others and what we love in them is the love, giving and effort that we invested. From the psychological perspective, you might say that the Sages preceded him by millenia in this insight and in understanding that names that we carry shape how we think of ourselves, because names are so closely related to who we think we are that we shape ourselves to conform to our names . Jones merely offers experimental evidence to support this contention. It's simple. A name that suggests a quality, a character trait, or an occupation, may lead its bearer to develop the same qualities within himself or herself.

A kabbalist, of course, will interpret the associations reported by Jones differently. A kabbalist would say that the connection we see between names and choices are merely a reflection of the fact that things that have the same name stem from the same root. People, for example, tend to marry those with similar names because their names reflect something essential about their similarity, etc. Whichever way you explain it, this paper supports and explains the Sages belief that names "determine".

 Related: here, here and here 

How Chabad and the Yeshiva World parted ways

Download Godol

It is well appreciated that until about 50 years ago, the Litvishe Yeshiva world and Chabad were not antagonistic to one another, whereas now they are. Decades ago, not only did the Rebbes of Chabad attend rabbinic conferences, they had a close relationship and worked together on community issues with the leaders of Lithuanian Jewry. There may have been some tension but no more than between misnagdim and any other chassidic group. Yet, in the USA , those who know, know that the mistrust and suspicion go back many decades, and they intensified in the past thirty years. R. Hillel Goldberg, for example, reports scathing criticism of the messianic tendencies in Lubavitch by R. Hutner already more than four decades ago and I remember hearing remarks as well from another godol about the tendency of Lubavitch to duplicate communal institutions instead of joining in community wide institutions decades ago as well. There was the Shanghai controversy. It seems to me, though, that the antagonism in the USA is different than it was in R. Shach's camp in Eretz Isroel, where it was still drawing on the two hundreds year-old ideological opposition to chassidus in general.  Was there a precipitating event in the USA after which everything went downhill?

R. N. Kaminetzky in his controversial, "Making of a Godol",reports such an event. Now, I attempted to check some of the facts that he reports and was not able to do so. I spoke to some people who asked good questions but had no independent knowledge of this issue. I would appreciate if someone who does know more can respond in the comments sections. I attach the relevant pages form R. Kaminetzky's book and the relevant issue of Hekeriah V'Hakedusha.

In brief, the journal Hakeriah V'Hakedusha, a new Lubavitch periodical in Yiddish, that was supposedly under the direct supervision of the Friedeker Rebbe, published an editorial  by Y. Segal on  October 13, 1940 (the journal, unfortunately sans the relevant first volume is available on HebrewBooks.org), which asserted that studying talmudic passages like the one about, "ox which gored a cow",  important as it may be , is completely physical (kulo gashmi), is a meagerly inspiring subject even from a worldly perspective... and one will gain nothing spiritual from studying it...Certainly, the superficial study (of this mishna) has no connection with G-d and reminds a student very little of Him: No spark of Divine light is beheld in the revealed part of the Torah. But when Chassidus takes on the same mishna and begins to unravel from it the depths of the Torah, the hidden part,  a new light arises which reminds the Jew about the Giver of the Torah and which leaves the student and participant with a deep moral lesson  of tremendous spiritual worth".

This may have been just an unfortunate choice of words because standard Chabad teaching does not denigrate the study of Nigleh or relegate it to a secondary status. Perhaps the writer was simply not familiar with Nefesh Hachaim's approach to this topic. This is a summary of what the Yeshiva World considers axiomatic:

Nefesh HaChaim Shaar 4 Chapter 2:
First I will set my words, on the subject of torah study 'lishma'. What is 'lishma'? This is a stumbling block for many who think 'lishma' means with great and constant 'dveikus' (emotionally cleaving to G-d).

And even worse than this, they think learning torah without dveikus is worth nothing and has no purpose, chas v'shalom. So when they see themselves, that their heart is not going in this level, that their learning is not with constant dveikus, they won't even start to learn and therefore (in our times) the torah has fallen....

To learn torah 'lishma' , the truth is 'lishma' does not mean 'dvekus' like most people think... the truth is learning torah 'lishma' means - for the sake of the torah... as the Rosh explains:
to know and to understand, and to increase lekach (knowledge) and pilpul (sharp analysis) and not to be insolent (l'kanter) and to show off (l'hitgaos)...

Nevertheless, certainly we cannot say that you don't need any purity of thought and yiras Hashem in learning torah. As it says 'if there's no yira, theres no torah' (mishna)...(see the text for an explanation of the purpose of Yira as a 'warehourse' for the torah learned)

Thus the true path, which He chose... (Rabbi Normal Lamm wrote a book devoted to this subject. 

With this in mind, one could have predicted that the nascent American Yeshiva World would strongly react and it did. It was surely not meant to provoke it, but it did.

This poorly thought out piece in the Lubavitch flagship publication brought on a firestorm of criticism in the Yeshiva World, since it attacked its raison d'etre and its bedrock of legitimacy - Talmudic study for its own sake. R. Kaminetsky informs us about how much it upset R. A. Kotler and others and how R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik was recruited to write a response, which he did.

I believe that this was the incident which set the unfortunate pattern of animosity and suspicion between the two groups. In the highly tradition centered environment of the yeshivos, in which the mesorah was paramount, students absorbed a certain view of this incident from their teachers and it became invested with the authenticity and holiness of mesorah, and so it expanded and grew to our own day. Chabad messianism came later and was another icing on the cake. May Hashem soon bring peace, respect and reconciliation between all Jews. 

LIghting the Menorah -once and forever

Said R. Chanina the Segan (Kohen-in-Charge) of Kohanim: I was serving in the Beis Hamikdash and a miracle took place with the Menorah. When they lit it from Rosh Hashana it did not become extinguished until the next year. Once olives did not produce oil. The Kohanim began to cry[1] and R. Chanina Segan of Kohanim said: "I was in the Beis Hamikdash and found Menorah burning more than what it was burning all the days of the year (Tanchuma, Tetsavah, 3)".

From standpoint of Halacha this midrash is quite difficult for it appears to state that the Menorah in the Temple was lit only once a year. This contradicts the account in Bavli (Shabbos 22b-23a) that all lamps were cleaned every day and if any candle was still burning, it was extinguished, cleaned and relit with new oil. In addition, how is the daily mitsva of lighting the menorah fulfilled, if it is lit but once a year?

Several possible answers suggest themselves. Ultimately, one faces a method question of when to allegorize difficult midrashim, such as this one. One must resist the temptation to jump to derush for by resorting to homiletics too quickly it is easy to overlook much simpler and better answers. That not only shortchanges the learner and the passage but opens one to charges of insufficient respect for sacred texts and can even expose one to ridicule.

1. This midrash disagrees with the Bavli and represents an alternative Tannaitic opinion. In other words, it holds an opinion that there is no daily mitsva to light the menorah lamps and that some lamps, at the very least the western one, burned for a prolonged periods of time without refilling the oil or relighting. There are other Midrashic passages that support this supposition, such as this one.

Before Hashem forever. You may think that they burn forever? It teaches, "from evening to morning". You may think that the lamps burn forever- It teaches, "from evening to morning". If "from evening till morning, you may think that one should extinguish them (if they are still burning in the morning)? It teaches: "there should burn seven lamps - from morning to evening. Before Hashem always - this is the western light, that the western light burned would burn so that the other lights were lit from it (Sifri beginning of B'Ha'laoscha[2]).

This is understood by the commentary Zeis Ra'anan[3] as saying that there exists a prohibition to extinguish lamps as long as they are still burning. This implies that there is no mitzvah of daily lighting[4] for as long as a lamp is still burning, it must be allowed to continue to burn. These midrashim also appear to say that the western lamp burned forever, both of these points in contradiction to the Bavli. The difficulty with these suggestion is that it postulates a "new" disagreement among Tannaim that was not noted or commented on by any Rishon, to my knowledge.

2. Torah Shelema # 93, Tetsave cites two suggestions from a manuscript by R. Yudel Hatsarfati
1. Only the Western lamp never went out.
2. They fulfilled the mitsva of daily lighting by daily exchanging the wick.

In the same vein, Mikraei Kodesh (Chanuka 7 and 8) by R. Tsvi Pesach Frank attempts to resolve these problems through bringing to bear Talmudic brilliance upon the problem. It tells that R. Chaim Soloveitchik asked of this midrash to the Gerer Rebbe: "How did they fulfill the daily mitsva of lighting the menorah"? The Gerer Rebbe answered: "They added a drop of oil every day, as the Bavli states in Betsah 22 - "One who adds oil to a lamp on Shabbos is culpable". This suggestions suffers from a number of logical and textual difficulties which R. Frank's discusses in length.[5]

3. Certainly, the gates of interpretation are not locked. One may understand R. Chanina's statement as a parable that contains a moral lesson, not a literal description of what took place in the Temple. It is not uncommon for aggadic statements to take the form of personal testimony and still be a parable - witness the fantastic stories of Rabbah Bar Channa (Bava Basra 73a -75), that open with "One time I was.... Perhaps, the teaching contained within our midrash uses the Chinuch (lighting) of Menorah as a symbol of Chinuch (education) of a child, in the spirit, "everything follows the foundation, whether in regard to good or to evil (Midrash Shmuel 3, 24).[6]"

We often tend to think that it is the later years, adolescence and young manhood, that are formative. It is in these years after all, that a man acquires most of his knowledge and approach to life and forms his individual personality and character. "It is, however, an error, to think so", says R. Chanina. On the contrary, it is that initial lighting, the warmth and the fire with which love of Torah and Judaism was lit - the education in early childhood, that lasts forever. There occur in life times and periods when the olives do not produce oil, when impure fuels promise a brighter and happier light. At such times, says R. Chanina, it is that that initial fire that will sustain you.

Not infrequently the keepers of the flame are reduced to tears and despair, when the olives fail to produce pure oil. "Fear not", says R. Chanina, to the keepers of the flame, " do not weep for the initial lighting is the one that determines. It will continue to keep burning our inner light, even when the oil runs out."

Is R. Chanina's statement a parable rather than a straightforward description of what took place in the Temple? It is hard for us to know; presumably the Tannaim and Amoraim recognized conventions of their time and place and would have had no difficulty in knowing how to approach statements such as these. Whenever possible literal explanations should be sought. Nevertheless, homiletic interpretation should not be easily abandoned when we are faced with a Midrashic passage that directly contradicts factual statements found in the Talmud - for that may truly be its intent.

---

1 Other variants have "began to extinguish", in other words, they started to put out the menorah lamps as they would do every Rosh Hashana in order to relight it again.

2 Our Sifri appears to have a truncated version of this beraisa, which is, however, brought whole in Ramban and Rashbo, see Netsiv's commentary to Sifri.

3 Quoted by Mikraei Kodesh, see later. Unfortunately I had not been able to find where this commentary says this.

4 See Meiri and Ritva to Shabbos 22b and R. Gershom to Menachos 86b for a discussion whether lamps must be extinguished and re-lit daily.

5 One distinction from the Sabbath laws that he does not present (although he does discuss a similar objection) is that on Sabbath adding oil prolongs or improves the process of burning while in the case of the Menorah in which the oil burns miraculously anyway, the additional oil does not add anything to the process of burning.

6 See Tosafos Chagiga 15a for a story how Acher's early education lead to his embracing heresy later in life.

Why do we need to blow three different sounds?

Why are there disagreements about routine religious rituals?

 Would these not naturally tend to be preserved with unanimity over time?  R. Nieto, represented by the scholar, answers that some such disagreements are about how to apply Rabbinic enactments and others arose because the High Court was not able to decide certain laws.

Does R. Nieto's logic work for laws that are not Rabbinic in origin?  Can it, for example, explain why, until R. Abbahu enacted a combination of long and short sounds, blew the Shofar on Rosh Hashana as short, broken sound and others as a wailing, longer sound ? How could the disagreement about  the order in which parchments are arranged within the phylacteries have come to arise, a matter of dispute between Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam ? 

R. Reuven Margolios in his edition of 'Sheilot and Teshuvot min Hashemaim' discusses these questions with his customary thoroughness and erudition and concludes that these commandments were from start to be fulfilled in two different ways (1). In other words, two distinct manners of observance were prescribed from Sinai; one for the common folk and another for mystics(2). The mystics could be trusted with this knowledge for they are  aware of spiritual power that can be invoked by performing these commandments in an alternate fashion . According to the Zohar , both phylactery arrangements are correct but Rashi's version is for periods of suffering and dispersion while R. Tam's arrangement befits the time of redemption (3). The Zohar also says something very similar about the two modes of Shofar blowing.

There is archeological evidence for the idea that more than one mode of observance coexisted historically.  Aruch Hashulchan(4)  cites a number of sources that reveal that two different arrangements of phylacteries existed already in the times of the Geonim, much before the times of Rashi and Tosafot. The earliest pair of tefillin that has been examined in regard to this question is the one discovered in the burial place of prophet Ezekiel and it was written according to Rashi(5) . How far back in history can the disagreement between Rashi and R. Tam be traced? Interestingly, excavations in Massada have unearthed many pairs of tefillin; some of them follow the view of Rashi and others of R. Tam(6) . Is it possible that some followers of Messianic pretender Bar Kochba rearranged their tefillin in accordance with the view later reported by R. tam because they believed that Redemption has already arrived (7)? We do not know. This example, however, demonstrates that R. Nieto's explanation is widely applicable and capable of satisfactorily resolving these types of questions.

It is likely that other observances were also from the beginning given with a variety and latitude to how they could be fulfilled. Great many commandments are fulfilled through an experience and "in the heart". Any of a number of observances that awakened necessary feelings and emotions could be acceptable to fulfill these commandments. Among them are such common rituals as prayer, mourning, enjoyment of festivals, remembering the Sabbath, Exodus, Miriam, and the incident of Golden Calf as well as certain required declarations.  Much later, the Rabbis formalized these observances and standardized their rituals because the times have changed and they were at risk of not being properly kept and preserved if left to the discretion of each individual . It is at that point that disputes arose about how best to accomplish the purpose of the commandment or as to details of what the original enactment had been(8). 

____________________________Tefillin of Rashi and R. Tam.

 

[1] The idea that there may be more than one way of fulfilling these commandments was first offered by no lesser figure thatn R, Hai Gaon as cited in Ritba R"H 33b.

[2] R. Margolies cites a number of passages that explicitly state this regarding both tefillin and Shofar blasts.

[3] Divrei Shaul (Megila 16b) suggests that this is why the tefillin that were discovered in the grave of prophet Ezekiel were written according to Rashi, for Ezekiel lived in exile and tefillin of R. Tam are not appropriate outside the Land of  Israel. See Be'er Heitev (38,5) in the name of Ari.

[4] O"CH 34

[5] Piskei Tosafot to Menachot 34b write that in Nehardea and Jerusalem two pairs of ancient phylacteries were found, one in accordance with Rashi and one in accordance with R. Tam.

[6] S.  Goren, Torat Hamoadim, pp.496-510 and Machanaim 62, 5-14, 1961. Pairs that are arranged in a way not brought down by any Rishonim were also found Massada; these contain a number of other serious deviations from the Halacha and may be tefillin of various sectarians who joined the Zealots in Massada. Such pairs of tefillin were also discovered in Qumran - in a community that clearly did not follow the traditions of the Sages.

[7] In Sefer Emunat Chachamim as quoted by R. Margolios, R. Abiad Sar Shalom suggests that tefillin of Rashi are used after the destruction of the

Temple and of R. Tam while it was still standing. See Gittin 58 a where it is said that forty baskets of tefillin were found on the heads of those who were killed in Betar,

[8] For a more detailed discussion of this point see M. Levin, With all your heart: The Shema in Jewish worship, practice and life, Targum/Feldheim, 2002, pp.175-178.

Woe is to him who has daughters!

אי אפשר לעולם בלא בסם (מוכר בשמים) ובלא בורסקי: אשרי מי שאומנותו בסם, ואוי לו מי שאומנותו בורסקי [שעבודתו מלוכלכת ויש שם ריח רע];

אי אפשר לעולם בלא זכרים ובלא נקבות; אשרי מי שבניו זכרים ואוי לו למי שבניו נקיבות;

It is impossible for the world to be without perfumers or tanners (1). Happy is he whose occupation is  perfumery! Woe to him whose occupation is tannery!

It is impossible for the world to be without males or withoutt females. Happy is he whose children are sons! Woe to him whose children are daughters (Kiddushin 82b)? (2)

The statement that having daughters are "woe", is inconsistent with our experience and requires an explanation. After all, the birth of a daughter is a happy occasion. We wish each other "mazal tov" and make a kiddush to share our happiness with others. The text of the mishaberach indicates that this is an occasion for a blessing, not a "woe". How does one then explain this "difficult" Chazal.

We start with a passage from Genesis Rabba 63:10, which says: "The boys grew up.. (Gen. 25:27): R. Elazar says, "A man must take care (lehitapel) of his son until age thirteen. From then on, he must say: "Blessed be He who exempted me from the punishment of this one".

Three explanations are possible:

1.The father has to take care of the physical needs of his son: food, clothing, education etc. till age thirteen. After that: "And Eisav was a man who knew to hunt, a man of the field and Yaakov was an ish tam, sitting in tents". Eisav went on to make a living as a hunter and Yakov sat and learned.

The disadvantage of this explanation is that it makes the meaning of the "punishment " from which the father is released somewhat unclear. Its advantage is that it translates the word "lehitapel" in its the simplest sense of "taking care of".

2. The father must be mechanech, educate the child in the way of the Torah and Mitzvos, so that the child keeps and studies the Torah, and this obligation only devolves on the father until the son reaches the age of thirteen.

The difficulty with this explanation is twofold. First, a father who does is miserable job of bringing up his son, should not stop being responsible at age thirteen for having done so. If a son goes on to not keep the mitzvos at age thirteen and two days, is the father completely blameless and free of all responsibility for what he mishandled for thirteen years?

Furthermore, it is quite clear that the obligation of chinuch never stops (see here, p. 149). We know this from Avrohom, who busied himself in arranging a match for his son Yitshak, when Yitshal was already thirty-seven years old.

3. Until thirteen, a child can suffer for the sins of the father. Henceforth, it is wholly his own fate. For this reason, the father thanks Hashem for being freed of the responsibility of maybe causing his son harm through the father's sins(3).

There are several difficulties with this explanation as well.

1. Why is it the father and not the son, who is the main beneficiary, who says the blessing?

2.The principle of "Poked avos al banim", that children can be visisted for the sins of the fathers does not stop at age thirteen (4). We see this from Nadav V'Avihu who died on the account of their father Aharon's sin of the Golden Calf ( Rashi to Devarim 9:20):

And at Aharon, Ad--noy grew very angry.

To destroy him.

This refers to the death of children. Similarly, it is said, "I shall destroy his fruit from above."

I also prayed for Aharon.

My prayer was effective in atoning for half. Two died, and two were spared.

The second and third explanations are offered by Mogen Avrohom to Orach Chaim 225.

A question that comes out of this is: Why then do we not say when a girl reaches the age of 12 (bas mitzvah), "Blessed be He who freed me from the punishment of this one (5)? Both reasons of Mogen Avrohom would seem to apply also to a girl.

Kaf Hachaim to Orach CHaim 225 asks this question and suggests two answers:

The obligation to take care of a boy lasts only until his Bar-Mitsvah. As we said before, at thirteen a boy must go out to pursue his own sustenance.  It is not so for a girl. A daughter must be supported until her marraige - however long that takes. Sometimes it might be only a few months past bas mitsvah, sometimes a few years, sometimes many years. In addition, a daughter may not be punished for her father's sins because her destiny is tied to her future husband (6).

If so, we can  explain the Chazal with which we started in a simple and novel manner. Woe is to one whose children are daughters" - because his financial obligations are open ended. Whereas with a boy, the father knows how much he msut spend every year for thirteen years, for a daughter, the obligation is not temporally defined. One cannot take out an annuity to pay for a daughter's maintenance. This is why having a daughter can be called "woe", not because we have a bias against daughters or because a birth of a daughter is not a happy occasion.

_______________________________________________________________

1. Tanners smell bad and perfumers smell good.

2. One may be tempted to explain in a humorous vein that this passage speaks not at all of daughter but all about sons. Happy is he whose sons are MEN; Woe to him whose sons are girls! In fact, I hears that this is how the Kotsker explained it - if it is true. However, this explantion must be rejected ons everal grounds, including the hashkafic ones. Children are given to us in stewartship, to bring up and chersih, whatever their inclinations may be. Some children as smart and socially adept, others have special needs; some are manly and other are more feminine. In all cases, they have been placed into the parent's custody to cherish and support - so it is not possible to call this situation "Woe".

3. See Shabbos 149b: "He who causes that his neighbor is punished is not admitted to Hashem's presence".

4. Sources for farther consideration: Levush 225, Divrei Chamudos to Rosh Brochos 9:30. Yalkut Shimoni Ruth (247): Until thirteen a son is punsihed for father's sins. See Hokhmat Shlomo 225 for an ingenious answer and response that also has bearing on the Mosaic origin of the Torah. Rambam Teshuva 6:1 seems to have a different understanding of the entire subject.

One can suggest that children can be punished for the sins of the fathers even past age thirteen - if they hold on to the father's actions (maase avoseihem byadeihem). Until age thirteen, children can suffer on the account of the parents even though the children themselves are blameless.

5.Others who ask this question are Pri Megadim and Aishel Avrohom O"C 225

6. Moed Katan 18, Nidah 31b

Rules of Derash

Rules of Drash

We have discussed the midrashic rules of exegesis several times in these posts in the past. It is important to realize that these rules are no less rigorous than the rules of pshat exegesis but they are different and proceed from different assumptions. A great deal of difficulty is occasioned when pshat questions are asked on a drash passage.

These rules are usually implied and not clearly stated but in the Sifri (Pinchas 2) in this week's parsha we find an explicit statement of one such rule. To discuss it fully we will first need to read and discuss the entire passage.

Tzelafchad's Daughters (R. A. Kaplan's translation)
27:1	A petition was presented by the daughters of Tzelafchad, son of Chefer, son of Gilead, son of Makhir, son of Manasseh, of the family of Joseph's son Manasseh. The names of these daughters were Machlah, No'ah, Chaglah, Milkah and Tirtzah.
27:2	They now stood before Moses, Eleazar the priest, the princes, and the entire community at the Communion Tent entrance with the following petition:
27:3	'Our father died in the desert. He was not among the members of Korach's party who protested against God, but he died because of his own sin without leaving any sons.
27:4	Why should our father's name be disadvantaged in his family merely because he did not have a son? Give us a portion of land along with our father's brothers.'
27:5	Moses brought their case before God.

...the son of Chefer, son of Gilead, son of Makhir, son of Menashe (Bamidbar 21:7). The verse teaches us that as Tselaphchad was a first born so all of them (in feminine, meaning the daughters of Tselaphchad) were firstborns. And to teach you that they (daughters of Tselaphchad) were virtuous the daughters of the virtuous.

This passage is quite difficult for why should we care that daughters of Tsalaphchad were all firstborns? What difference does that make? Some commentators suggest that despite the feminine form of the words, it refers to Chefer, Gilead, Makhir, Menashe, revealing that they were all firstborns and each received a double portion and that their daughters were therefore in line to receive a very large inheritance. The commentator who suggests this explanation, Sifra D'Bei Rav, himself rejects it, basing himself on the earlier verses that indicate that Chefer was the sixth son of Machir, not his first. R. Prado, the author of this commentary concludes:" ...and the matter remains confusing and I do not understand it."

I venture to suggest that the intent of this passage is the same as in the following midrash a bit earlier in the Sifri, only in different words:

And these are daughters of Tsalaphchad: Machla, Noah, Chagla, and Milka and Tirzah. You may think that the ones first in the verse also acted first, therefore it states (Bamidbar 36): and was Machla, Tirzah, Chagla, and Milka and Noah, the daughters of Tsalaphchad - this teaches us that all were equally worthy.

The difficulty that the midrash faces is that all five daughters presented their claim together. Since they asked to be treated as if they were sons, the oldest daughter should have been the one to approach Moshe, for she would be the one to receive a double portion. In addition, it is derech eretz for the oldest one to speak first.  Sifri resolves this problem by saying that all of the daughters were "bechorot", all were equally worhty and all spoke together.

We see from this, by the way, that even when women ask (and receive) equal treatment, it does not have to be exactly the same. The daughter of Tsalaphchad did receive the inheritance but the law of the first-born was not applied to them.

To understand this passage let's remember that, lists are a favorite for midrashic analysis. In addition, the situation of 5 daughters who are presented in different order in the two passages cries out for a midrashic comment. The resolution, that all five were firstborns explains why all five involved themselves equally in the matter of inheritance.

Now we take up the rule that follows next in the passage.
All whose deeds are not specified and his ancestor's deeds are not specified and the verse attributes lineage as praise, he is a tsadik son of tsadik. All whose deeds and those of his ancestors are not specified and his lineage is attributed for a demerit, he is wicked the son of wicked.

At first glance one would explain this as follows. Attribution of lineage must serve to define and tell us something crucial about the individual who is being presented. If he or she is righteous and are being introduced as such, their ancestor must also be right house, for otherwise this positive aspect of identification will be diluted. It is confusing to have a character introduces as a good guy while at the same time pointing out his shortcomings by bringing in an ancestor who is not righteous. A modern novel might do that in order to foreshadow a conflict or development but the Torah, at least according to the midrashist, does not. Since parents to a great extent define an individual, invoking the lineage must be a reinforcement to the general thrust of the introduction, not at cross purpose or against it.

(This reminds me of R. Wolf Heidenheims' explanation of Rashi to Bareishis 11, 29, where Haran is introduced as the father of Milka and the father of Iska. Rashi cites that Iska refers to Sarah "shesakah bruach hakodesh v'shehakol sakin b'yofia" - for she is anointed with Holy Spirit and all are anointed by her beauty.

R. Heidenheim points out that the purpose of citing a lineage should be to identify an individual by connecting him or her to a better known individual. Since we do not encounter Iska again anywhere in the Torah, she does not help us learn anything about the better known Haran. It must be that she is Sara who is even better known than Haran. The identification with Iska-Sarah tells us something about him that we did not know before.)

This explanation of this rule is offered by the Netsiv[1] in his commentary to the Sifri. He himself points out, however, that the version of this rule cited in Megilah 15 does not bear out this approach. It reads: "All whose deeds and deeds of his parents are specified and the verse specified one of them (either the father or the son) for praise, he is a tsadik ben tsadik. All whose deeds and deeds of his parents are not specified and a verse specifies one of them for demerit, he is a wicked one, the son of a wicked one." Here the rule seems to function technically, more as a hekesh; in other words, proximity of two individuals allows us to assume similarity between the two in either direction, from son to father or from father to son. This is unlike the way we previously explaned the rule which would function unidirectionally, only from father to so.

Continuing in the Sifri: R. Nasan says: The verse came to inform you how great is a righthouse person who grows up in the lap of a wicked one and does not do like his deeds. He goes on to contrast Eisav who grew up with Itshak and Rivkah but became wicked and Ovadiah who lived between Achav and Izevel but remained righthouse.[2]

R. Nasan appears to disagree with the rule or, at the very least, with its application in our case. He may hold that Tsalaphchad was the "gatherer" and therefore a sinner  and that his daughters were the rightheuss ones, products of the wicked one. Listing their lineage praises them in another way - it emphasizes their independent pursuit of goodness and their rejection of the legacy of wickedness that their father had left them.

This passage is important because it is one a very few Midrashic sources that explicitly discuss methodology; consequently, it is seminal for our exploration of Midrashic Method.[3]

---

1 After making this point the Netsiv goes into a discussion of the many exceptions to this rule.2 The text according to the Gro, disconnects R. Nasan's statement from the matter of Tsalaphchad's daughters. I follow the standard version of the Sifri.3 I subsequently realized that the discussion on this topic cited in Maharits Chajes Mevo Hatalmud is taken almost verbatim from Ramchal's introduction to Aggada but without attribution. For the English translation of this important essay, see R. Aharon Feldman, Juggler and the King, Philipp Feldheim Inc; (June 1, 1991), Appendix.

Rules of Drash

We have discussed the midrashic rules of exegesis several times in these posts in the past. It is important to realize that these rules are no less rigorous than the rules of pshat exegesis but they are different and proceed from different assumptions. A great deal of difficulty is occasioned when pshat questions are asked on a drash passage.

These rules are usually implied and not clearly stated but in the Sifri (Pinchas 2) in this week's parsha we find an explicit statement of one such rule. To discuss it fully we will first need to read and discuss the entire passage.

Tzelafchad's Daughters (R. A. Kaplan's translation)
27:1	A petition was presented by the daughters of Tzelafchad, son of Chefer, son of Gilead, son of Makhir, son of Manasseh, of the family of Joseph's son Manasseh. The names of these daughters were Machlah, No'ah, Chaglah, Milkah and Tirtzah.
27:2	They now stood before Moses, Eleazar the priest, the princes, and the entire community at the Communion Tent entrance with the following petition:
27:3	'Our father died in the desert. He was not among the members of Korach's party who protested against God, but he died because of his own sin without leaving any sons.
27:4	Why should our father's name be disadvantaged in his family merely because he did not have a son? Give us a portion of land along with our father's brothers.'
27:5	Moses brought their case before God.

...the son of Chefer, son of Gilead, son of Makhir, son of Menashe (Bamidbar 21:7). The verse teaches us that as Tselaphchad was a first born so all of them (in feminine, meaning the daughters of Tselaphchad) were firstborns. And to teach you that they (daughters of Tselaphchad) were virtuous the daughters of the virtuous.

This passage is quite difficult for why should we care that daughters of Tsalaphchad were all firstborns? What difference does that make? Some commentators suggest that despite the feminine form of the words, it refers to Chefer, Gilead, Makhir, Menashe, revealing that they were all firstborns and each received a double portion and that their daughters were therefore in line to receive a very large inheritance. The commentator who suggests this explanation, Sifra D'Bei Rav, himself rejects it, basing himself on the earlier verses that indicate that Chefer was the sixth son of Machir, not his first. R. Prado, the author of this commentary concludes:" ...and the matter remains confusing and I do not understand it."

I venture to suggest that the intent of this passage is the same as in the following midrash a bit earlier in the Sifri, only in different words:

And these are daughters of Tsalaphchad: Machla, Noah, Chagla, and Milka and Tirzah. You may think that the ones first in the verse also acted first, therefore it states (Bamidbar 36): and was Machla, Tirzah, Chagla, and Milka and Noah, the daughters of Tsalaphchad - this teaches us that all were equally worthy.

The difficulty that the midrash faces is that all five daughters presented their claim together. Since they asked to be treated as if they were sons, the oldest daughter should have been the one to approach Moshe, for she would be the one to receive a double portion. In addition, it is derech eretz for the oldest one to speak first.  Sifri resolves this problem by saying that all of the daughters were "bechorot", all were equally worhty and all spoke together.

We see from this, by the way, that even when women ask (and receive) equal treatment, it does not have to be exactly the same. The daughter of Tsalaphchad did receive the inheritance but the law of the first-born was not applied to them.

To understand this passage let's remember that, lists are a favorite for midrashic analysis. In addition, the situation of 5 daughters who are presented in different order in the two passages cries out for a midrashic comment. The resolution, that all five were firstborns explains why all five involved themselves equally in the matter of inheritance.

Now we take up the rule that follows next in the passage.
All whose deeds are not specified and his ancestor's deeds are not specified and the verse attributes lineage as praise, he is a tsadik son of tsadik. All whose deeds and those of his ancestors are not specified and his lineage is attributed for a demerit, he is wicked the son of wicked.

At first glance one would explain this as follows. Attribution of lineage must serve to define and tell us something crucial about the individual who is being presented. If he or she is righteous and are being introduced as such, their ancestor must also be right house, for otherwise this positive aspect of identification will be diluted. It is confusing to have a character introduces as a good guy while at the same time pointing out his shortcomings by bringing in an ancestor who is not righteous. A modern novel might do that in order to foreshadow a conflict or development but the Torah, at least according to the midrashist, does not. Since parents to a great extent define an individual, invoking the lineage must be a reinforcement to the general thrust of the introduction, not at cross purpose or against it.

(This reminds me of R. Wolf Heidenheims' explanation of Rashi to Bareishis 11, 29, where Haran is introduced as the father of Milka and the father of Iska. Rashi cites that Iska refers to Sarah "shesakah bruach hakodesh v'shehakol sakin b'yofia" - for she is anointed with Holy Spirit and all are anointed by her beauty.

R. Heidenheim points out that the purpose of citing a lineage should be to identify an individual by connecting him or her to a better known individual. Since we do not encounter Iska again anywhere in the Torah, she does not help us learn anything about the better known Haran. It must be that she is Sara who is even better known than Haran. The identification with Iska-Sarah tells us something about him that we did not know before.)

This explanation of this rule is offered by the Netsiv[1] in his commentary to the Sifri. He himself points out, however, that the version of this rule cited in Megilah 15 does not bear out this approach. It reads: "All whose deeds and deeds of his parents are specified and the verse specified one of them (either the father or the son) for praise, he is a tsadik ben tsadik. All whose deeds and deeds of his parents are not specified and a verse specifies one of them for demerit, he is a wicked one, the son of a wicked one." Here the rule seems to function technically, more as a hekesh; in other words, proximity of two individuals allows us to assume similarity between the two in either direction, from son to father or from father to son. This is unlike the way we previously explaned the rule which would function unidirectionally, only from father to so.

Continuing in the Sifri: R. Nasan says: The verse came to inform you how great is a righthouse person who grows up in the lap of a wicked one and does not do like his deeds. He goes on to contrast Eisav who grew up with Itshak and Rivkah but became wicked and Ovadiah who lived between Achav and Izevel but remained righthouse.[2]

R. Nasan appears to disagree with the rule or, at the very least, with its application in our case. He may hold that Tsalaphchad was the "gatherer" and therefore a sinner  and that his daughters were the rightheuss ones, products of the wicked one. Listing their lineage praises them in another way - it emphasizes their independent pursuit of goodness and their rejection of the legacy of wickedness that their father had left them.

This passage is important because it is one a very few Midrashic sources that explicitly discuss methodology; consequently, it is seminal for our exploration of Midrashic Method.[3]

---

1 After making this point the Netsiv goes into a discussion of the many exceptions to this rule.2 The text according to the Gro, disconnects R. Nasan's statement from the matter of Tsalaphchad's daughters. I follow the standard version of the Sifri.3 I subsequently realized that the discussion on this topic cited in Maharits Chajes Mevo Hatalmud is taken almost verbatim from Ramchal's introduction to Aggada but without attribution. For the English translation of this important essay, see R. Aharon Feldman, Juggler and the King, Philipp Feldheim Inc; (June 1, 1991), Appendix.

Lists and exceptions.

As we discussed in the past, making lists of similar cases in both Written and Oral Torah appears to have been an activity that engaged the generations before Tannaim. These teachers were called Sofrim because they made lists that "counted" and organized received laws into categories. They received many laws but they were not organized into categories. These lists became the basic backbone of both the Mishna and Midrash. We have also seen that subsequent generations labored to understand and explain the omissions of one or two examples from some of these lists. Additional layers of interpretations were overlaid over the original lists in order to clarify, limit or particularize in an attempt to explain these omissions.

This introduction has methodologic significance for it guides us to take no list as final without looking for such omissions. If we find that there are really, say, five examples and the passage cites only three, understanding the passage requires addressing the similarities of the examples included in the list and how they are different from the examples not included. This work was compelted by the Massoretes centuries later. We now have a powerful tool to uncover the original intent of the passage. Let us look at an example of how this may work.

Three set out for ground and profaned themselves. These are Cain, Noah and Uziah.

Cain, as it says, "and Cain worked the earth (Gen. 4)". What does it state afterwards? "A stranger and sojourner shall you be in the land".

Noah, as it says, "And Noah, the man of the earth started and planted a vineyard…..

Uziah, as it says, ""for a lover of earth was he (Chronicles II, 26)". He was a monarch and he gave himself over to earth and did not connect to Torah. Once he happened to be at a Torah gathering and he asked them, "Where are you holding?" They said: "The stranger who approaches to sacrifice, he shall die (Num. 1)". He said: "He is a King and I am a king; it is fitting that a king serves before Him and sacrifices to the King." Right away he went in to offer incense…."and leprosy shined from his forehead". At that moment the Heichal cracked apart 12 by 12 mil and they rushed him from there… What caused this? That he did not study Torah and joined himself to the earth (Tanchuma Noah 13; see Gen. Rabba 36, 5 for a more concise version).

The passage lists three individuals who "lusted after the ground and there was nothing good that came of them".[1] At first glance this appears to be a simple and complete list of three cases in which an individual was identified with ground to his detriment. This is not the case, however, for there are other examples. While these examples do not identify specific individuals, it is wholly within the midrashic style to use such passages in midrashic exposition, as long as the actual words are similar.

Zecharia 13, 5

And it shall come to pass in that day, that the prophets shall be brought to shame every one through his vision, when he prophesieth; neither shall they wear a hairy mantle to deceive;

but he shall say: 'I am no prophet, I am a man of earth ; for I have been made a bondman from my youth.'

Why does the Midrash not say something like this: and the false prophets, as it says "I am no prophet: I am a man of the earth"?

Isaiah 24, 21

And it shall come to pass in that day, that HaShem will punish the host of the high heaven on high, and the kings of the earth upon the earth.

This passage uses an unusual expression "kings of the earth" rather than "kings of nations"' yet, our passage does not cite it.

How are Cain, Noah and Uziah different from these other cases? Careful consideration of the local context of these three cases reveals an unexpected similarity - all three have descriptions of their earthiness juxtaposed to offering of sacrifices and the other two cases do not. This is most prominently and explicitly stated in case of Uziah; however, it is also the case with Cain and Noah as well.

Cain - but Cain worked the earth.

And in process of time it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto HaShem (Gen. 2-3).

Noah - And Noah builded an altar unto HaShem; and took of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, and offered burnt-offerings on the altar (Gen. 8, 20). And Noah the man of teh earth began, and planted a vineyard (Gen. 9,20).

Uziah - And be built towers in the wilderness, and hewed out many cisterns, for he had much cattle; in the Lowland also, and in the table-land; and he had husbandmen and vinedressers in the mountains and in the fruitful fields; for he loved the earth. 

But when he was strong, his heart was lifted up so that he did corruptly, and he trespassed against HaShem his G-d; for he went into the temple of HaShem to burn incense upon the altar of incense (Chronicles II, 26:10-16).

The similar context of these three cases and not of the others, must of resonated with the audience who were undoubtedly intimately acquainted with their Scripture. These three were pulled down by their earthiness and crushed to the ground at the very pinnacle of their spirituality, as they sacrificed to Hashem. The unstated lesson of the Midrash may be exactly that earthiness is an impediment that pulls an individual down even as they soar to the heights of Divine Service. One cannot fly while wedded to earthiness. It must inexorably pull him down and subvert all spiritual progress. This idea is expressed in the following Midrash about Noah, one of the three who "of the earth"..

Once he joined to the ground he became profaned. R. Yehuda Bar Shalom said: In the beginning "righteous men in his generations" and now "man of the earth" (Tanchuma ibid)".

R. Berachia said: Moses is more precious than Noah. Noah after he was called "righteous man "was called "man of the earth". Moses after he was called "Egyptian man" was called "man of G-d) (Gen. Rabbah ibid, 6)[2]".

The technique of finding similar expressions in Tanach and then looking for similarities of situations to derive therein insight has recently become common among certain circles of Tanach students in Israel and United States . It may be that once again the Sages were there first.

---

1 Language of Gen. Rabbah

2 For an interesting explanation of this midrash in mussar vein see the section on R. Dovid Bliacher in, M. Levin (1996). Novarodok: The Movement that Lived in Struggle and its Unique Approach to the Problem of Man, Jason Aronson, Northvale , NJ .

The father's child or the mother's child?

In the Yizkor Prayer whenever the name of the deceased is mentioned, it is given in the following form: The deceased's Hebrew name followed by "ben", "son of", or "bat", "daughter of;" then, in the Ahskenazi siddurim, the deceased's father's Hebrew name; in the sefardic and Chabad rite, the deceased's mother's Hebrew name. To expand: Ruven and Shlomit were the parents of Yehoshua, who was the father of Levy and Dinah. Yehoshua, unfortunately, passes away. In the Ashkenazic Tradition, they would refer to him as "Yehoshua ben Reuven;" in the Sefardic Tradition, they would refer to him as "Yehoshua ben Shlomit." For inscription on the matzeiva, everyone agrees that the father's name is used.

This last Pesach, a family member asked me whay this is so. She used to say Yizkor from the ArtScroll SIddur, which uses the Ashkenazi formula but this year she davened out of Nusach Ari siddur and noticed this difference. This led me to investigate and I learned some interesting things.

First, in my experience the kvittlach are usually writen with the father's name except by Chabad, where they are written with the mother's name, consistent with the practice in the yizkor. Many years ago I saw a reason in the name of R. Levi Yitzhak of Berditchev. He explained that in tefilla we generally have a principle that it is important to be as specific as possible. Since the mother's name identifies a person more specifically than the father's name (i.e. it is possible that the father was someone else but the mother is more securely known), the mother's name is used.

The same argument is turned around by Mikdash Melech (p.84) to support the implication of the Zohar in Lech Lecha (1:84,1) that the mother's name is used. This, he explains is because this principle only applies to mortal human beings who don't really know who the father might have been. However, after a person's death, in Heaven they know. As such in memorial prayers the father's name is used.

See also Kaf Hachaim 284:37.

It is interesting then that in the notes to Alter Rebbe's Siddur, he is quoted as wondering why the custom is this way because usually we use the father's name...

The source to this is in Sefer Chassidim. "He who gets benefit from money that the departed left over within the year of the demise should say, 'and He is merciful, will atone for the sin that I derive benefit from the money of peloni the son of peloni...(using the father's name)". In his notes, R. Reuven Margolius brings a proof that the father's name should be used in a cemetery from the following passage in Brochos 18b.

The father of Samuel had some money belonging to orphans deposited with him. When he died, Samuel was not with him, and they called him, 'The son who consumes the money of orphans'. So he went after his father to the cemetery, and said to them [the dead]. I am looking for Abba.  They said to him: There are many Abbas here. I want Abba b. Abba, he said. They replied: There are also several Abbas b. Abba here. He then said to them: I Want Abba b. Abba the father of Samuel; where is he?

He also suggests that, as Ramban explains in the beginning of Tazria, since the "form"  ( identified by Rambam as the soul) comes from the father (and the "matter" from the mother), a person should be identified by the father (see Panim Yafos at the end of Bahaaloscha).

We, therefore have many sources suggesting that the father's name should be used but the custom of Sefardic Jews and Chabad is to use the mother's name. It is interesting that among the Ashkenazim, it was common in the 17-9th century to identify people by the mother's name, for example, R. Yair Bacharach, who wrote Chavas Yair, literally Chaya's Yair, calling himself by his gradmother's name, Chaya (but he also wrote the unpublished Makor Chaim), or the Noda B'Yehuda, who names one of his works, Tsiun L'Nefesh Chaya, after his mother, also named Chaya.