avakesh

Misplaced Grammatical Plague By Chaim Gershon

 

Vaera 8:17

 

17. For if you do not let My people go, behold, I will incite against you and against your servants and against your people and in your houses a mixture of noxious creatures, and the houses of Egypt will be filled with the mixture of noxious creatures, as well as the land upon which they are.

יז. כִּי אִם אֵינְךָ מְשַׁלֵּחַ אֶת עַמִּי הִנְנִי מַשְׁלִיחַ בְּךָ וּבַעֲבָדֶיךָ וּבְעַמְּךָ וּבְבָתֶּיךָ אֶת הֶעָרֹב וּמָלְאוּ בָּתֵּי מִצְרַיִם אֶת הֶעָרֹב וְגַם הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר הֵם עָלֶיהָ:

 

The following is a quote.

 

“ומלאו בתי מצרים את הערב וגם

האדמה אשר הם עליה”

“The houses of the Egyptians shall be full of the mixture of animals and also the ground upon which they are.” (8:17)

QUESTION: The words “and also the ground upon which they are” seem superfluous?

ANSWER: Among the animals of the world there is an extremely rare one found in the wild jungles of Africa and known as the “adnei hasadeh.” It has the face of a person, long hands that reach to its knees, and a very unusual relationship to its habitat. It is always connected to the ground through a string that comes out of its navel. Although it is very dangerous and kills anyone who comes within its reach, there is one way to capture it: Shooting arrows at the string which connects it to the ground. As soon as it becomes detached, it screams bitterly and dies immediately. Hashem brought upon the Egyptians a mixture of all the animals from the entire world, including the strange and vicious “adnei hasadeh.” In order that they not die before arriving in Egypt, they were brought together with the earth to which they were connected. Therefore, Moshe told Pharaoh, “The homes of the Egyptians shall be filled with the mixture of wild animals and also ‘adnei hasadeh’ will come, together with the ground (earth) upon which they are [attached]."

See:

     פנים יפות, ועי’ כלאים פ”ח מ”ה ברע”ב ותפארת  ישראל

 

Sforno reads this passuk that the noxious creatures will be fill the houses and also the earth.

There are a number of mefarshim who notice that this extraneous descriptive phrase. "The earth on which they are",  should modify the closer object and not the overall passuk and they suggest various answers.

 See

http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=38977&pgnum=22

 

http://www.ou.org/ou/print_this/34577

 

http://www.neryaakov.org/torah.php?id=149&action=show_article&article_type=2&page=2

(quoting the GR”A which is also summarized in Pardes Yosef)

(Avakesh adds: Netsiv explains that the plague of Arov starting from the Pharaoh's house and then involved his servants' houses and the houses of the other Egyptians. From there it spread into the land of Egypr - hence, "also the land on which they (the servants) live upon".)

 

This exotic animal, "Adnes Hasadeh", whose existence is not observed today is also contended historically:

 

http://books.google.com/books?id=_1fdxxS26RYC&pg=PA307&dq=adnei+hasadeh&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GoQUT6SfD8KK0QGzhom2Aw&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=adnei%20hasadeh&f=false

 

http://www.rationalistjudaism.com/2012/01/parenting-dilemmas-of-rationalist.html

 

http://mytorahthoughts.wordpress.com/2010/12/21/the-mysterious-adnei-hasadeh/

 

http://parsha.blogspot.com/2011/10/adnei-hasadeh-and-earth-mouse-in.html

 

http://www.torahscience.org/natsci/animal.htm

 

However still other mefarshim (Midrash Yonason [Eibeshitz], Maharil Diskin, Panim Yafos http://www.dafyomi.co.il/bechoros/insites/be-dt-009.htm and  http://www.dafyomi.co.il/parsha/vaera2.htm)  offer the answer that the dirt from these animals’ homelands accompanied them so that they would be comfortable and confident why carrying out the plague according to HaShem’s will.

 The Rogachover http://www.hebrewbooks.org/22177 p15 ( p.124 in pdf)  (translated in Torah Tavlin 5765) concurs and also states that not only animals but also plants yield better produce when in their own earth. Also quoted online is a similar proposal to clarify the odd language of the passuk. http://www.ladaat.net/siteimages/fl_4f1814661e8b5.pdf

 

One wonders why an animal that is attached to the ground had to be invoked to explain this possuk when so many simpler answers are possible. Indeed, even the explanation that the animals had to be in their comfort zone to best carry out their mission is itself is out of the comfort zone of many people who hear it. Sometimes the literal reality is not to be taken literally!

Avakesh comments: Tiferes Yisrael on Kelayim thinks that Adnei Hasadeh is Orangutan. A number of sources are collected in Nathan Slifkin's, "Mysterious Creatures, p. 134-138. In his introduction, he also discusses various approaches to aaggados about animals that do not exist in our times and for which there is no evidence that they ever existed.

 

 

Did God command Chanukkah?

 

 

From the Rabbis Advocate

 

93. The Khazar said: That good and fine. But what would you say when we say in the blessing that "Blessed be Though, Hashem, Ruler of the Universe who sanctified us with his commandments and commanded" -  to read the Megilah, to complete the Hallel, to light Chanukah candles, and God did not command these things. Do not answer me with what the Sages said, "And where did He command us? In the verse 'Do not turn away from the matter that they command   you' (Brachot 19b )", for this applies specifically to explanations of Biblical imperatives, such as that the "fruit of a beautiful tree" is a citron and not some other fruit. It does not mean that Sages should innovate a law and call it a commandment and compel us to say, "He commanded us" based on the prohibition of "Do not turn away".

94. The scholar said: Know my Master, the King that Sages did not enact to say "He commanded" on their own but by God's word and His command.  Not only here but in every matter that they enacted or decreed, their concern was to model it after the structure of Torah commandments; this is what they said in many places, "Whatever the Rabbis enacted they enacted in the manner of a Biblical law (Pesachim 30b)".

95. The Khazar said: Bring a proof to these words and you'll be done.

96. The scholar said: A man praises and thanks God for the good that He had done with him in one of two ways - by bringing a sacrifice or through speech. Noah thanked God through an offering when he had come out of the Ark as it says, "And Noah built an altar for God and he took of every clean animal and every clean bird and brought up offerings upon the altar (Genesis 8, 20)". When God told Abraham, "to your offspring will I give this  land" - "he built an altar there to God who appeared to him (Genesis 12, 7)". Regarding Jacob it writes, "And Jacob arrived whole… and he set up there an altar (Genesis 33, 18)". The Blessed Lord told Jacob explicitly: "Come go up to Bethel and dwell there and erect there an altar to God who appeared to you as you escaped from your brother Esau (Genesis 35,1)". Jacob said to his sons, "And let us arise and go up to Bethel and I will make there an altar for God who answered to me on the day of my trouble and was with me on the way that I walked (Genesis 35,3)". Here you have it explicitly that sacrifices are to give thanks and praise to the Blessed Lord.

We also find thanksgiving in words, as Malchizedek said, "Blessed is the High God who handed over your enemies into you hand (Genesis 14, 20)." When Isaac dug the third well he called it Rehoboth, "for now Lord has gave us space (rachav) and we will grow in the land (Genesis 26, 22)". Lea, when she gave birth to Judah said, "This time I will praise God (Genesis 29, 35). During the Exodus - "Then Moses and the children of Israel sang this song to the Lord (Exodus 15, 1)". Jethro said: "Blessed is the Lord who saved you from the hand of Egyptians and from the hand of Pharaoh (Exodus 18, 9)." David sated the Holy One Blessed Be He with songs and praises as is evident from the book of Psalms. David instructed is in Psalm 107 that four types of people must give praise: those who descend into the sea, those who travel in the deserts, a sick person who was healed and one who was imprisoned and then went free (Brachot 54b). There is really no difference if a man was in jail and went free or if he was saved from his enemies who sought to kill him. It matters not whether it is an individual or a community. In all cases, the Holy One Blessed Be He wants and commands that praise and thanks be given to Him for the good that He does as it says, " And you shall relate to your son on that day - because of this God has done for me when I went of out of Egypt ( Exodus 13, 8)".   It also says, "And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless God, your Lord for the good land that He had given you (Deuteronomy  8,10)." And it writes, "In tabernacles you shall sit seven days for in tabernacles I made children of Israel dwell (Leviticus 23, 43)."

All these events, verses and commandments clearly demonstrate that the Blessed Lord desired and decreed that we should praise His Great Name for all the miracles, wonders, goodness, and kindnesses that He had done to us. Therefore, we have to extol and praise him on holy days and feasts. It would really behoove us to compose and use original wording; however, since we possess songs and praises of King David that he spoke out through Divine Inspiration, is it not better that we praise and thank the Lord with songs that have already proven to be sweet to Him, by the virtue of the songs themselves as well as by the merit of their author?

It is following this sentiment that we read the Hallel on God's festivals and say, "which Thou commanded", for, although he did not literally command us to pronounce specifically these words, he did command us to praise and glorify His Holy and Great Name in general. The sages and leaders of Israel chose the songs of David for reasons that we already explained. Since it is a commandment of the Blessed Lord that we should thank and praise his name, it is fine to say in the blessing of Hallel "that You commanded us", even if we classify Hallel as a rabbinic commandment. We can likewise say "You commanded us" in regard to reading the Scroll of Esther and not worry, for since reading this story it is a form of thanksgiving[1], a commemoration of the miracle that He performed for us to save us form Haman. Though it may be that he did not command us to read specifically this scroll, He did command the general idea, as I proved from the passage of the four who must praise. We can also say "commanded" in the case of Chanuka candle since it is remembrance of the jug of pure oil that contained only enough oil to burn for one day but it burned for eight. Similarly, Sabbath and festival lights - for it writes of Sabbath "and you shall call Sabbath a pleasure (Isaiah 58, 13) " and it is no pleasure to sit in darkness of Sabbath, like poor souls who had never seen light. Of festivals it says, "you shall rejoice in your festival (Deuteronomy 16, 11)" - and there is no joy without light. Turns out, that although we weren't specifically commanded to light Sabbath and festival candles, since we were commanded to have pleasure on Sabbath and joy on festivals, we of ourselves became commanded to ensure that we have whatever leads to pleasure and joy, and there is no pleasure or joy without light[2].

The four fasts do not present a problem to begin with, for "Aneinu" is naught but a request and a prayer and we do not use "commanded" in it. Besides, the Holy One Blessed Be He agreed to the enactment of these fasts as it says, "So speaks the Lord of Hosts. The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth month and the fast of the seventh month and the fast of the tenth month shall be for the House of Judah a joy and elation and holidays (Zechariah 8, 19)". The seven days of mourning have no words "commanded"; so also the marriage canopy has only a blessing "who commanded us regarding forbidden relationships". The same is true of the marriage contract. Other blessings are blessings of praise and thanksgiving.

97. The Khazar said: It states in Eurubin 21b that Solomon enacted erubin and hand-washing before bread. Granted, I can accept washing hands, whether before eating or before prayer or after evacuating. Every reasoning person would agree to the Sages in what they said, "And you shall make yourself holy and you will be holy - this refers to washing hands (Chulin 106)", for it is necessary that bodies of the children of Israel be clean so that they can pronounce the great, holy and blessed Name. It is find to say "commanded" for this reason. Erub, however, whether it the one set up is for carrying from one Sabbath domain to another, or to cook on a festival for the needs of a subsequent Sabbath, is something about which deniers raise cry and tumult. They claim that Sages claimed the authority of Solomon so as to silence critics. Despite all your efforts they still dispute the phrasing "who commanded us" for an erub for and God has not commanded us to it[3]

98. The scholar said: Let's allow for a moment that they are right and that the erub was enacted a long time after Solomon. I now set out an argument that we can still say "commanded" and be right. Behold it says, "A person who makes a vow or swears and oath to prohibit a matter to himself, he shall do according to all that came out of his mouth (Numbers 30, 3). Consider well that a Jewish man can vow to give a certain sum to charity or to fast on a particular day, or something like that. Such a man can say, "he commanded me" about fulfilling his vow. If someone asks you how he can do that and based on what, you can tell him that it is based on the verse "he shall not profane his word (ibid)". Behold, all Jews, beginning from the time of King Solomon or whatever later High Court after him that has enacted erub, have accepted on themselves not to go more than 2000 cubits out of city limits in all directions. If a man, for some reason, needs to go four thousand cubits in one direction, he must travel up to two thousand cubits out before Sabbath and leave food there that suffices for two meals (and this is an erub). This is as if he says: "I set up my erub at a distance of two thousand cubits and that makes it as if my dwelling place is at that spot and from that point forward I am permitted to travel a distance of two thousand cubits in all directions.  This is called erub, for in a manner of speaking it joins two thousand cubits that I had toward the east with the two thousand cubits that I had toward the west[4]. Since we accepted on ourselves to honor the Sabbath and not to go beyond two thousand cubits in one direction unless through using an erub, it turns out to be an obligation in a manner of a vow, just as if it was an actual commandment. When we set up an erub we fulfill the commandment of "do not profane your word"; therefore it is fine to say "who has commanded us"[5]. If you counter, why doesn’t every individual make a blessing with phrasing "he commanded us" whenever he fulfills any vow, it is possible to respond that we have a principle that a blessing is not formulated for an activity which is completely optional - for it is possible that a man will never make a vow. (Erub, however, is an activity that is common and most people engage in it).

99. The Khazar said: Your words are pleasant and logically agreeable. It seems to me that the reason why we say "he commanded", whether for erub of distances, whether for erub of domains, is because the whole goal of the Sages was solely to increase the honor of the Sabbath and to preserve individuals from violating Sabbath, lest they may die by violating it. What would you say, however, regarding the erub that allows cooking on festival for Sabbath[6], of which there is not a hint in the Torah?   

100. The scholar said: No my Master for some say that it is of Biblical origin from the verse (regarding the manna), " on the sixth day you shall prepare of what you have brought (Exodus 16,5)"[7]. However, even if you say that is Rabbinic, it is possible to say "He commanded". The reason is that there is a verse that says, "But that alone which will be eaten by somebody, that alone will be prepared by you (Exodus 12, 16)".  Clearly, this is a permission to cook for what is needed on the festival itself but not for any need outside of a festival. No one disagrees that it is prohibited to cook on a holiday for the day after.. This is because a regular weekday can be preparation for a Sabbath and a regular weekday can be a preparation for a festival; also one can prepares for the Sabbath on a festival[8]. However the Sages prohibited to do so without setting up an erub, for perhaps people would cook dishes on a festival to be eaten on a subsequent weekday. Now with the enactment of erub, people will realize that there is a priori argument and say, "Just like on festival we cannot cook for the Sabbath (without an erub), so much more so from a festival for a weekday. The erub is to indicate, "I have already started to cook on a regular weekday for the Sabbath with the foods that constitute this erub". After that, even if he cooks on a festival that is Sabbath Eve for the Sabbath, it is as if he merely completes the dish that he already started from the eve of the festival. This was enacted tp preserve the honor of the holy festivals, so that people do not take its sanctity lightly. All of Israel accepted the prohibition not to cook without an erub as a vow. It turns out that one who transgresses this enactment has also transgressed "do not profane your word". With this correlation to vows, it makes sense to say, "He commanded us".   

101. The Khazar said: If so we do not require the source of "You shall not turn away from what they command you…(Deuteronomy 17, 11)".[9]

102. The scholar said: The verse "Do not turn away" is general; I, however, explained the specifics because I recognize that the deniers especially criticize Rabbinic commandments when there is an associated blessing containing" Which He commanded".

 

---

[1] Megila 14a

[2] The justification for saying 'commanded' on the second day of festivals that are kept outside of the Land of Israel are taken up in Fifth Dialogue.

[3] Even is we accept the assignment of erub enactments to Solomon himself, how can we say "commanded" when this enactments were made by a human being and not commanded by God?

[4] The word erub can be understood as mixing or joining two things together.

[5] Once the Sages enact a ritual and it becomes widely accepted, it attains the status of a personal vow. Since to fulfill a vow is fulfillment of commandment of not profaning one's word, it is legally perfectly right to refer to this ritual as having been commanded.

[6] There is generally a prohibition to cook on Festival for the purposes of the following day, even if that day is a Sabbath. The erub tavshilin allows one to begin preparing a meal by preparation on the eve of the festival of token articles of food as if for the festival itself. The remainder of the food preparation can then be carried out even if it is not necessarily consumed on that festival day itself.

[7] See beginning of tractate Beitsa.

[8] It is permitted to utilize a day as preparation for a day of greater sanctity - weekday of a festival or Sabbath and festival for the Holy Sabbath.

[9] If every enactment of the Sages can be subsumed under some God commanded rubric, why does one need a specific prohibition to not turn away from what they command?

Pshat and Drash: Working together.

Pshat and Drasha are those mysterious things that the more we speak of them, the less we understand. It is not that it is hard to "get" each one separately; that is pretty easy. What's baffling is to conceptualize how Chazal worked both of them side by side into their halachic methodology. 

It would seem that one ot the other must predominate. Either you believe that Halacha is encoded into the Torah for purposes of derivation, or at least of demonstration, in which case the Drash reigns and the Pashat, albeit also a part of Torah, is more of a curiosity for  those who like Tanach. Or, Pshat is the "real"meaning of the Torah, and Drash is but an expedient by which to connect Oral Tradition and Written Law.

This is why it is important to explore the interface of Pshat and Drash, by which I mean, how the too work together, so that neither overshadows the other . How does halacha arises out of the two working together?

Netsiv in his Chumash commentary offers several instructive example. He says that Pshat modifies and directs the Drash. I will begin with one that is the least technical.

When Yosef's brothers decide to kill him, they elect to bring his death about in an indirect way. Why, one may ask should it matter how Yosef dies; is it not the same "bad" whether he dies by their hand or through their handing him over to others to kill him. But apparently it matters! Yehuda says: " Do not spill blood...Let us sell him to Ishmaelites and our hand should not be upon him:(Gen 22-27). It seems that killing indirectly is better than killing directly( see Sanhedrin 77a-b about murder and grama)

Netsiv comments: "Prohibition(against spilling blood) that is expressed explicitly is more severe to transgress than one that is derived through reasoning( see Gen. 9:6). Sometimes, we find that Chazal emphasize the case in the verse over the cases learned by Drash from the same verse This is why the Court in Usha decreed that, "We do not excommunicate the head of Beis Din who behaved improperly (because of the verse, "The Prince in you people you shall not curse)". (In other words, even though we darshin this verse to refer to more than just the Prince), the simple meaning remains that we do not curse or excommunicate a Prince; the Drash does not obviate the Pshat).

In this manner, the Pshat works along side the Drash. Drash explains that the halacha is not as limited as stated in a verse and broadens it to other similar cases but the Pshat insists that the plain meaning of the verse still accrues added severity for that case that is the sole Pshat in the verse.

Netsiv talks about this in two other places in his commentary, Vayikra 13:45 and 19:27, and adduces as proof Tosafos in Kiddushin 24b. In Vaykra 13, the point is that even though the separation of a Metzorah, his wearing a cloak that covers his lips and calling "Tame Tame" is derived by Toras Kohanim to apply to all types of a Metzora, it is written in the section of a Tsaraas of the head. Therefore, it is particularly severe in the cases of the tsaraas of the head. Similarly, the prohibition to speak Lashon Hara applies everywhere but because it is written in the section on behavior during the war, it is particularly severe in the wartime(Kesuvos 46). Another example is the prohibition to remove the peyos of one's head (Vaykra 19:27). It applies to .both Kohen and Yisroel; but, because it is written about Kohanim, it is particularly severe for Kohanim.

It seems to me that Netziv would not subscribe to the notion that Drash is simply a sophisticated Pshat (Omek Hapshat). Rather they are two separate systems that generally co-operate, although sometimes one tor the other predominate in a particular case. Sometimes, the Drash even obviates the Pshat but usually it merely expands and broadens it. At other times, like the cases that we discussed above, Pshat amends and modifies the Drash. Sometimes Pshat loses to Drah out in one verse but returns in  different guise as the Drash explanation of another verse. They remain two concurrent and simultaneous systems that work together to define Halacha.

This leads me to an observation that I saw in Martin Lokshin's commentary to Rashbam al Hatorah. He notes that Chazal say that "a verse does not lose its plain sense (Ein Hamikra Yotse Midei Pshuto - Shabbos 63a); yet, this essential and overriding principle is barely mentioned in their literature. This leads to disagreemtns about what this statement really means. Perhaps, the meaning is exactly this - Drash broadens the meaning of verses but their Pshat is also not lost, for the cases which are the Pshat remain more severe than the cases added to the "coverage" of the verses by Drash.

 

Are interpersonal offenses really sins against G-d?

One of the many interesting features of the teshuva process before Yom Kippur is reconciling with those who we have offended. But what if we offended a friend or a relative and our relationship is such that they surely had already forgiven us? Do we still need to go through the uncomfortable process of confessing to them and asking for forgiveness, or is it sufficient to rely on that fact of having been forgiven and not need to ask?

At question is the very nature of the idea of asking forgiveness. Is it for the offender's sake or for the offended's benefit? Is it a technical requirement, without which forgiveness is not complete or a practical obligation because those who we think have forgiven us, perhaps have not? Or is it that asking forgiveness is a part of the teshuva process  of Yom Kippur, irrespective of whether it actually obtains forgiveness; in other words, is it something we must engage in as preparation for Yom KIppur (a halacha of Yom Kippur and not of teshuva) and not because we must go into the Yom KIppur free of interpersonal sins. Or, one may ask, is it that offending another human being is also an offense against G-d? May it be that it is not enough that the friend forgave us, we must still ask for forgiveness so that the sin to Heaven is also expiated?

The early sources seem to imply that one must always ask a friend for forgiveness, even if one knows that the friend had already put an incident or injury behind him.

Sefer Haminhogos writes: "A man must pacify his friend after he had forgiven him so that the friend prays to Hashem that He should (also) forgive, as our Father Abraham had done(for Avimelech), I heard that this is why the tribes fo Israel suffered a punishment - because they did not ask Yosef that he should pray on their behalf". This implies that it is not enough to rest in the security of the knowledge that one had been forgiven. Even if so, an active attempt to enroll the friend in praying on the offender's behalf is also necessary. It is quite clear that to Sefer Haminhogos every interpersonal offense is also a sin against G-d. Even if a human had forgiven, G-d may not. Similarly Birkei Yosef writes every interpersonal offense contains also a sin against Hashem. As long as the friend had not forgiven, the offense again Hashem cannot be forgiven.

"Sages said about the Shofar that if the mouth piece is covered with gold, it is posul. Rav Yakir Boruch explained that this hints to interpersonal offenses for there are matters that require that one go and verbally ask for forgiveness. If (instead) one is proud and wants to bribe the offended one with gold but does not go and humble himself before him, the sin is not forgiven(brought in S. Y. Agnon's "Days of Awe", see Shaloh 229:2)

On the other hand, there are indications that being sure that a friend had forgiven him is enough. Many people declare nightly in their version of bedtime Shema that they had forgiven all who wronged them, and it is a part of Tefila Zakah before Yom Kippur. If forgiving someone who had not asked for it does not work, why do it? There are poskim who say lechalacha that if know that a friend had forgiven him, he need not ask(Teshuvos D'var Yehoshua 5:20; Az Nidberu 7:65, 66). I am pretty sure that I saw In the name of Yosef Ometz in S. Y. Agnon's Days of Awe that if one knows that a friend had forgiven him, he does not need to ask for forgiveness. Unfortunately, I was not able to find it now, when I went to check the references(but I do recall that it was a parenthetical quote in a chapter that dealt with an unrelated topic).

There are several sources that appears to indicate otherwise. In Yoma 87a we are told that when someone wronged R. Zeira verbally, he would go and stand in front of him, to make it easy for him to ask him for forgiveness. We are also told a story about Rav. R. Huna told his Rebbe, Rav, that he was on his way to kill someone. Rav went to a butcher who had insulted him. Rav Huna knew that the butcher who had wronged Rav, would not respond in a positive way, thereby making his situation in Heaven worse. His prediction came true when the butcher, looking up and seeing Rav standing in front of him, slighted Rav and the butcher was killed right away by a bone chip. 

In Kochvei Ohr 5, R. Yitshak Blaser explains that R. Zeira and Rav imitated Hashem who always extends himself to his people to do teshuva. He also points out that apparently it is not enough to simply forgive someone, one also needs to persuade that person to ask for forgiveness, for if not, it would have been enough for Rav to simply verbally declare that he forgives the butcher.

An interesting proof for the idea that forgiving someone in one's heart is not enough comes from Rabbeinu Bachya to Bareishis 50:17. It tells us there that Yosef's brothers came to him and asked him to forgive them for selling Yosef to Egypt. In response Yosef cried and assured them that they should not feel bad and that it came from Hashem, "to sustain many people". Strikingly, he never responds to them with words, "I forgive you". This, says R. Bachye, is why the sin of the Tribes ultimately required expiation through the death of the The Ten Martyrs. Here we also see that it is not enough to forgive in thought; one must also verbally express it.

Until this year, I thought that there perhaps are two views on this question but now I think that they can be reconciled. The reconciliation comes from a distinction cited in Mishnah Berura to O"C 607:4. It says there that sins that one confessed in previous years should be again confessed this year. In sief koton 13, a Pri Megadim is quoted. He makes a distinction between sins such as stealing from another person, which one has to confess every year, because it is also a sin against G-d and "purely" interpersonal offenses. For sins such as verbally insulting another or "ani hamechapech b'charara(taking an opportunity away)", once a sin was confessed once and the friends had forgiven him, it need not be gain confessed in subsequent years. Shaar Tsion adds that perhaps it need not be confessed on Yom Kippur either, since the friend had already forgiven the sin.

Comes out that there are two types of interpersonal offenses: those that are both against Man and G-d, and those that are against Man alone. If so, we have here our distinction, although I don't currently know the parameters of how to define which sins are which. It would then stand to reason that purely interpersonal offenses do not  require that forgiveness be sought, only that the offended person forgives, even solely in one's heart. The sins that are both against Man and G-d require the asking of mechila.

This has many ramifications in halacha and hashkofa. The only problem that I have with it is that it argues against the concept that the reconciliation with the Divine is modeled after human relationships, which is what I used to think and of which I wrote here.

 

 

 

Full time Torah Study: Is it for everyone?

Full time Torah Study: Is it for everyone?

 

Torah study is unquestionably a pillar of Judaism. Can one engage in study of other disciplines that Torah? The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D 145 )says that the primary focus should be on Torah but one can study”wisdoms” “b’akrai(occasionally, or in a manner than is not fixed). However a closer look reveals that it is talking about priorities in Torah learning and the wisdoms are the Torah subjects of astronomy, calcucations and Kabbala.  One cannot draw conclusions about secular studies or studying to prepare for a career.  Let us look at a disagreement among Tannaim from which we can start a consideration of this complex and important hashkafic topic.

 

  “Why does the Torah tell us, “And You shall gather your grain?”. Because another verse says, “This scroll of the Torah shall not depart from you mouth and you shall meditate in it day and night”. We might understand it literally; therefore note that “You shall also gather your grain” – combine Torah study with the way of the world(Derech Eretz). These are the words of R. Ishmael.

 

R. Shimon Bar Yochai says, “If a person plows at the time of plowing, sows at the time of sowing, winnows when it blows, what will become of Torah However, when Jews do the will of Hashem, their work is done by others…when they do not do the will of Hashem, they not only do not accomplish their own work but do the work of others. ”

 

Abbaye says, “Many have followed the words of R. Shimon Bar Yochai and did not succeed”. Rava said to the scholars: “: Do not come to the academy at harvest and gathering time lest you become impoverished and will have to engage in making a living the rest of the year (Brochos 35b).

 

So it seems that R. Ishmael recommends combining Torah study and work while R. Shimon Bar Yochai urges Torah study to the exclusion of other pursuits [1].

 

Surprisingly, other sources ascribe diametrically opposite opinions to these two Tannaim.  R. Ishmael says only Torah should be studied whereas R. Shimon Bar Yochai accepts a very minimal obligation for daily Torah learning.

 

Ben Dama, the nephew of R. Ishmael asked him, “A person like me who has learned the entire Torah – can I go and study the wisdom of the Greeks””. He replied: ”Go and find time which is neither day nor night and study Greek wisdom then”.

 

“This scroll of the Torah shall not depart from you mouth and you shall meditate upon it day and night”. R. Yochanan said in the Name of R. Shimon Bar Yochai, ”Even if one reads the Shema morning and evening he has fulfilled this verse…

(Menachos 99b)

 

This contradiction did not escape the notice of Torah scholars and many reconciliations have been proposed [2].

 

Attention to the language used by these two sources suggests a reasonable explanation. It appears that R. Ishmael is speaking only of the active obligation to engage in earning a living and of combining Torah study with “the way of the world”, if one needs a parnosa (livelihood). One can sow and one reap and work for a living. However, for one who pursues secular studies for their own sake, he rules differently. Studying Greek wisdom, then as now, was unlikely to result in a good parnosa and should not be permitted. It may be that R. Shimon Bar Yochai, similarly, speaks of a utopian situation, when other nations materially support the Jews so they can freely study Torah. He will not necessarily apply it to the time in which he himself lived when such was not the case(3).

There were Tannaim who forsook paranosa to engage in full-time Torah study. On the verse in Mishle (5:19): “In her love (i.e. love of Torah) you shall be ravished always,” Rashi comments “For love (of Torah) you shall make yourself absent-minded and foolish, forsaking your own affairs and running to (hear) a word of halachah”  and in Eruvin 54b it is applied to R. Eleazar bar Pedas. In order to learn Torah, Rabbi Yohanan sold property which could have supported him in his old age (Shemot Rabba 47:5).

Rabbi Eliezer the Great, at the age of twenty-six, gave up a large inheritance and ran away from home to study Torah in Jerusalem at the yeshiva of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, where he rose to unprecedented greatness(Pirke D.Rabbi Eliezer, Ch.1).

The Gemara (in Ta’anit 21a) relates about Ilfa and Rabbi Yohanan who were suffering poverty and decided to leave the yeshiva and go out to work. After all, they said, earning one’s living is also a mitzva. They sat down to eat their lunch in a field, in the shade of a rickety wall. As they were eating Rabbi Yohanan heard two angels conversing. One said “Look at these two. They are leaving eternal life for the life of the moment. Let us push the wall over and do away with them.” The other replied, “No, leave them alone. One of them is destined for greatness.” Rabbi Yohanan said to himself, “Since I heard this and Ilfa didn’t, it must be meant for me.” Rabbi Yohanan went back to yeshiva, suffered, and eventually became Rosh Yeshiva and Gedol Hador. Ilfa went on to become a merchant, and unsuccesfully attempted to claim the position of Rosh Yeshiva.

Another example: Rabbi Meir in the last mishna in Kiddushin states that a father is obligated to teach his son a trade; otherwise it is as if he taught him banditry. Later in the mishna Rabbi Nehorai (who according to Rambam is Rabbi Meir by another name) declares: “I will leave all trades and teach my son only Torah.”

These examples establish that one is permitted to engage in parnosa, if he needs it, not that one must do so(5).

Some commentators pursue the solution along the lines of individualizing. They say that there are those who should engage solely in Torah study and those who should work. Pnei Yehoshua in Kiddushin answers that Rabbi Meir’s first statement is about ordinary people, who do not have the capacity to become great Torah scholars, while under the name of R. Nehorai he refers to one who possesses unusual alertness, intelligence and desire for Torah-learning, so that he would certainly merit having his physical needs looked after by others(4). Alternatively, it is about a person who showed at an early age the exceptional faith and trust in God needed to carry him through this type of life successfully (Sefer Hamakneh ad. loc.). The key is each one's nature and abilities(3).

Note the famous Rambam at the end of Hilchos Shemitta veYovel who also individualizes:

Not only the tribe of Levi but any person in the world whose spirit prompts him and whose mind convinces him to separate himself to stand before God in order to serve Him... and who casts off the yoke of the many calculations pursued by other people — he is sanctified, holy of holies, and God will be his portion in all eternity, and will also grant him a sufficiency for his needs in this world.

In summary: The most common approaches to explaining the various views of Tannaim regarding the nature of the obligation of constant Torah study is allow individualization and in making an allowance for paranasa, and, perhaps, study for parnasa(6).

 

 

1 The intensity of R. Shimon’s opposition to working is well described in the story of his years in the cave in Shabbos 33.

 

2 See twelve different reconciliations cited  by Y. Levy, Torah Study: A survey of Classiv Sources on Timely Issues (on the distinction between antural and peculative sciences see Part 7), Feldheeim, 1990, pp.58-63 and M. Levin,  With All Your Heart: The Shema in Jewish Worship, Practice and Life, Targum/ Feldheim, 2002, Ch. 13.

 

3. Shaagas Arye , Kuntrus Acharon, `1 s.v.Amnam

 

4 Others who make the distinction between different kinds of people: those who should engage in full time learning and those who should work, include: Nezer HakodeshGen, 68d, Keren Orah Menachos 99b, Maharam Schick Pirush on 613 mitzvos, 420; R. Chiya Pontremali in Toldos Adam to Sifri Eikev 42, n.5;Nefesh Hachaim 1:8, R. Shalom Rognoto in Darkey Sholom 124 (in the name of Divrey Nechamiah)

 

5 Regarding the mishna in Avo 6:5s that recommends combining Torah with Derech Eretz,  R Elchanan Wasserman in Chidushei Agados brings that based on the Midrash (Bamidbar Rabah 13:15) that "Derech Eretz" in the Mishnah does not refer to work but it refers to good deeds. This is an interesting but unique view.

 

6.Provided it does not involve study of heretical works (Shulchan Aruch, Y”D 145, 4 and in Shulchan Aruch O”C  307, 15-18

 

Difficult Aggada in Chullin 7b: Powers of witchraft

"A woman tried to dig up some earth from under R. Chanina's feet (to use for a spell against him). He said: "Take, it won't work, for it says: "there is no one but He(Devarim 4,6)".

(How can this be, do we not learn that witchcraft has power, did not) R. Yochanan said: 'Why is witchcraft called keshafim? Because they weaken(makchishim) the Family above". (Answer:) R. Chanina is different for he had great merit!".

This is very difficult to understand. Do witches have the power to overcome G-d's plan or do they not? If they do, they should be able to hurt a person with merits as wells as one without. If they don't have such powers, than they cannot bypass Hashem's plans in any way, even for an average person.

R. Chaim Volozhiner in Nefesh Hachaim 3:12 derives from here that concentrating on Hashem's uniqueness and power willl dispel the negative powers. In other words, R. Chanina was not unique. What he could do, unlike other people is that he was able to cleave to Hashem and concentrate on Hashem's Unity to the utmost. Others who can do the same will also be saved from dark powers. R. Chaim calls it ""a wonderful segula". The Brisker Rov followed this advice during WWII and was repeatedly saved by concentrating on Hashem's unity at dangerous times(see here, p. 31).

The story of R. Chanina is preceded by another statement of R. Chanina: "No man stubs his toe below unless it is decreed upon him in Heaven". This too appears to contradict the statement that witchraft can overcome the Supernal Family. Farthermore, who is this "Family"? Rashi to Zevachim Rashi (41b DH Famalia) says: "A king's Famalya is his company that agrees with him. If the majority soured, his Famalya does not endure. He partially leaves their company, and is not as informal with them as before. Likewise, if most of Yisrael sinned, it is as if there is no Kedushah." Famalya appears to refer to Israel as it exists even on earth and also in the higher spheres.

Sefer ha'Chinuch(28) draws a distinction between intermediate powers Above and Hashem himself. Witchraft can overcome the intermediate powers but not Hashem himself."Hashem created everything with a nature to do beneficial things in the world. Everything has a power above it forcing it to do its action, e.g. every grass has an angel above it telling it to grow. Hash-m commanded that we not mix seeds or animals to make a new species and Mevatel the species it came from. Chachamim say that Keshafim Machchishim Famalya Shel Ma'alah, i.e. it temporarily overpowers the power above it. It does not say that it overpowers the *decree* above, for Hash-m decreed that this action come from them."

R. Bechaye (Shmos 22:17) explains that kishuf is like chemistry (my analogy), "Kishuf is connecting separate things. When lower things are connected, the forces above join, and a wondrous strange act results. "

R. Chananel rejects a part of our passage. He explains that it "appears as if they are Machchishim Famalya Shel Ma'alah. Really, they cannot change Hashem's decree, like R. Chanina said. The Gemara said that he is different due to his merits, but we do not rely on this answer".

I suggest that the solution may come from what avakesh wrote about BIlaam. It is based on Recanti's commentary to the the following verses in Mishpatim.

It says in Shemos 22:18 that. "Yo shall not allow a witch to live". The next possuk is: "All who lie with an animal shall be put to death". Note that it also says: 'He who slaughters to gods shall be destroyed, except to Hashem alone". These last words echoe R. Chanina's words, "There is no One but He".

What's the connection between these verses?

Recanati in his commentary on this verse brings several Zohars, including one that speaks about Bilaam and implies that the connection is that a sorcerer brings his "bris" into the world of impurity in order to perform sorcery. Recanti goes on to say: "and understand this very well". He goes on the say something enigmatic about a human's "nefesh" descending into the world of animal "nefesh".

 I heard it explained that humans live on an intermediate plane of being; above them is the angelic sphere and below them is the world of animals and spirits. One can "shortcircuit" the intermediate plain by either rising above it and acting within it so that there are effects upon the world of humans below, or one can accomplish the same results by going under the human plane and working within it. Animals do not affect the world of humans because they do not have intelligence. But a human being with intelligence can descend into this lower world and cause effects there that will cause changes within the human world.

This what Chazal mean when they say that Bilaam was intimate with his donkey. They are saying that he used the most spiritual implement that a man has, his sexuality, to descend to and become a part of the animal world, to couple with a donkey and to become a great sorcerer.There is a hint to this in the Torah itself. Bilaam is introduced to us as "Ben Baor", which in Hebrew means,"the son of a "beheima".

Now we understand how witchcraft can overcome the family above. It means that a witch or a sorcerer can affect human levels and the worlds immediately adjacent to the one in which we live by descending ot lower levels. R. Chanina, however, lives in a world higher than these worlds. Kishuf cannot reach that high! R. Chanina was immune to witchraft because he lived, as we may say, in the world of Atzilus, on the levels not susceptible to the reach of sorcery.

On a deeper level, this is the meaning of the "talking donkey". There were two talking animals in the Torah: Bilaam's donkey and the snake in Genesis (see Ibn Ezra's comparison of the two). On a very basic level both are symbolic of human descent. When men and animals speak, they become equated. For Bilaams, the donkey represents his descent, not only below the level of a prophet but even below the level of a human, when he disregarded Divine Will and insisted on cursing Israel.

 

Are disagreements arbitrary?

A recent post about the distinct ways R. Akiva and R. Ishmael interpret verses merited this comment: "i am so confused. i choose to be a democrat or a republican. that is arbitrary. same with choosing a mode of interpretation. just one opinion or another. i like vanilla, you like chocolate. different theories, not! just he says, he says. am i missing something?".

I thought that it warranted a specific reply, and in depth.

The perception that all disagreements are arbitrary is prevalent in the modern world. Perhaps it is because so many disagreements that we encounter are quite arbitrary. People disagree with others because they don't like them  or the way in which they say what they say, or their groups; because they wish to belong to a popular group or party or because , at that moment, they are ornery and feels like disagreeing.

I particularly hear this sentiment from those who are exposed to Jewish thought in the Conservative venues. How does a typical Conservative adult education session works? The leader asks a member to read a (usually translated) statement from,  say R. Akiva. Then someone else reads a quote from R. Ishmael. Then the leader asks, "And how do you feel about it", and a discussion ensues, in which rank beginners pass judgments and share feelings about what was said by the greatest Tannaim.

The truth is that ALL disagreements among serious people are based on underlying assumptions. For example, the debate about raising or not raising the Federal debt ceiling is at the root a disagreement about the role of the government. Some believe that it should be constrained and, therefore, are against raising the debt ceiling. Others believe in expanidng governmental powers and want the ceiling raised so more money is available to the governmental agencies. In turn, that underlying dispute is also predicated on different views on the role of the individual in the society, on the nature and goals of the American Experiment and on many other equally weighty propositions.

The point is that even in the secular sphere, disagreements are based on something that is deeper than they.

For us as Jews looking at our tradition, disagreements are a fact of life. They are everywhere. Granted, what we agree on is much more than what we disagree about, the sheer number of disputes is a prominent fact.

Why do Tannaim disagree? Some believe that the personality of a Tanna determines his views. Conservative scholars, beginning with Zecharias Frankel in Darke ha-Mishnah" (Leipsic, 1859).   and many others claimed that it was because this Tanna was tacitun and withdrawn or gregarious or outgoing that he selected a certain view. Even R. Dovid Tsvi Hoffman allowed this approach to seep into his "Mar Samuel", for which R. Samson Raphael Hrisch vehemently denounced him. R. Hirsch (Selected Writings, vol. 5) consdered this a form of heresy but he did not himself provide an good explanation for the phenomena of machlokes. I am not talking about how disagreements are possible but why specific Tannaim select specific stands.

Many Conservative scholars, for example Professor FInkelstein (Pharisees and Sadduccees), explain this through a Marxist lens, Pharisees were a group of small shopkeepers and merchants and, therefore, they championed certain views whereas Saducess were aristocrats and warriors and they defended a different view. Neeedless  to say, I don't accept this facile and wholly inadequate explanation for it is too reductionist; neither is the Marxist perspective any longer popular.

To me, disagreements among Sages represent their differing grasps of spirituality. One Sage sees reality on a a certain spiritual plane, one in which the haalacha appears in one way, and another Sage, because his root of the soul is different, sees it in another way. The Lubavitcher Rebbe's approach is similar, for example, the disagreements between Hillel is due to Shammia representing Gevura and Hillel representing Chessed. Rebbe's view is solidly based on Zohar and has influenced several contemporary writers, such as R. Jonathan Sacks and R. Nachman Cohen, who published several books extending this concept to other pairs of Tannaim who disagree. When I discussed this once with R Cohen, he rolled off a number of other authorities throughout the ages who employed this approach.)

This is similar to what Ritva says in Eruvin 13b. He says that Moshe received every possible opinion but it was handed over to the Sages as to what opinions they would select according to what the generation needs. See an interesting article on this here.

At least, this is how I see this issue at this time. As I reach higher in the never ending climb to the root of my soul, perhaps my perception will change.

 

 

More on R. Ishmael and R. Akiva.

The disagreements between the school of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva [1] are not arbitrary but based on different approach to interpretation. In other words, they use different methodologies (an idea first suggested by R. Dovid Tzvi Hoffman).In general, R. Ishmael and his school used definite rules of interpretation and applied them only when there was a 'hermeneutical marker', an indication within the verse that the Torah intended a derash [2]. Thus, for example, a gezerah shavah (use of same words) can be used only if there exists a redundancy, an unneeded or 'extra' repetition of the term in one or both verses. This is called mufneh. R. Ishmael "hears" the intended, under the surface meaning of a verse and grasps its directions to the reader. He always uses the terminology "Shomea ani". You must hear when the verse hints to you that there is additioanl meaning hidden within it and you must comply. When the verse provides a marker, it is it and not a human interpreter that interprets. R. Ishmael calls such a situation 'maggid or omer lecha hakkasuv'- the verse tells you. When there is no such marker, R. Ishmael objected strongly to making a derash. R. Ishmael uses klal and perat, which are fairly close to a careful literal meaning [3]. R. Akiva uses ribbuy and miyut, which is more technical and less apparent. R. Eliezer and R. Akiva, on the other hand, used fairly arbitrary devices such as ribbuy and miyut and do not ask for a hermeneutical marker. R. Akiva would both "find" established halachos in verses that possess no difficulties and derive new halachos from such verses. Passages from R. Akiva's school use expressions that place the power to interpret in the hands of the human interpreter. They use terms such, "Yachol" - I might think to say so…but there is ground to say differently. In the following passage R. Eliezer uses a ribbuy and R. Ishmael objects. And a garment of wool or linen that contains tsaraas… I only know a garment of wool or linen, how do you know to include garment of kelaim? Talmud teaches "and garment'. I know only when one of the types is kelaim in a part of a garment; how do I know when it is throughout the garment or about when one kind is throughout and the other only in a part? Talmud teaches: 'And the garment'. I know only when it is a garment in which a kelaim of three by three cubits was woven, what about a garment in which there is less than three by three? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". I only know a garment that has space for the tsaraas to spread. What about when there is no additional space? Talmud teaches: "And the garment". These are words of R. Eliezer. R. Ishmael said to him: You are saying to the verse (hakkasuv): "Be silent until I interpret". R. Eliezer said to him: "Ishmael, you are a mountain palm (that does not bear fruits suitable for Bikkurim, see Bikkurim 1,3)". It may be suggested that R. Eliezer, viewed by his contemporaries as Sinai (Sukka 27a), as "a cistern that does not loose a drop (Avos,2)", as one who never taught anything that he did not hear from his teachers (Sukkah 27b), viewed Derash as something that merely backed up received traditions. As such, he did not need to be overtly restricted by literal meaning. R. Ishmael on the other hand, often utilized the principles of interpretation to derive new laws; as such, he would allow interpretation only when the verse itself commanded: "Darshen me!" R. Akiva went farther and imposed meanings onto verses even ehrn there were no difficulties within them. In support of this idea we may adduce a Sifri in Parshas Chukkas, which suggests that R. Ishmael also occasionally used ribbuy. The cow shall be burned as he watches - its hide, its blood on its intestines(Numbers 19,5). A ribbuy that follows another ribbuy is to exclude (lemaet) - these are words of R, Ishmael. Mishna Shevuos 2, 5 may contain another instance of R. Ishmael using a ribbuy. In addition, we find in Bechoros 51a that Rebbi, who usually uses 'klal and prat' occasionally uses ribbuy and miyut. In Bechoros, he uses it on the basis of its use by "tanna d'bei R. Ishmael". Might it be that R. Ishamel himself resorts to ribbuy when he possesses a tradition that for which no hermeneutical marker can be located? The distinction between methodology of different Tannaim allows as to bring a sharper focus into our study of Halachic midrash and to its citations within the Talmud. 1 R. Ishmael studied under R. Nechunia ben Hakone (Shevuos 26b) and his school includes R. Yonatan, while R. Akiva's method appears to have been inherited from R. Eliezer and carried forward by most of the enxt generation of the Tannaim, who were his students as well as R. Yoshia. 2 For a book length treatment of this point, seee Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos: R. Ishmael and the origins of Midrash,, Univ.Penn. Press, 2004. 3 When there is a general statement of principle followed by particular example, you allow the general to be defined by the particular. For example, "from animals , from cattle, from sheep you shall bring your offerings (Leviticus 1, 2)". Animal is a general category, for wild animals are also included under the rubric of 'animals', such as when says, "These are the animals that you shall eat - cow, sheep (domesticated)…ram and antelope (wild) (Deuteronomy 14, 4)". The verse proceeds with "from cattle, from sheep" - this is a particularization for it excludes wild animals. The overall meaning is that the general term "animals" that is used here includes only those animals that are similar to those in the particularizing clause - in other words, only domestic animals. Consequently we interpret the term "animals" in the beginning of this verse as if it excludes wild animals. Fifth rule: Specific followed by general, such as, "Do not just watch the donkey of your brother or his sheep when it was lost…return it to your brother…and so shall you do to his donkey and so shall you do to his raiment and so you shall do to all that your brother has lost…(Deuteronomy 22, 4)". Ox, sheep, donkey and raiment are specific and "all that your brother has lost" is general, broadening the category beyond the specific examples mentioned, to any kind of thing that is lost. Sixth rule: General, then specific, then general (again) - you first limit the original broad category and then expand it again. (In conclusion, the general is somewhat limited but it is broader than the specific examples found in the verse). For example, "If a man gives to his fellow silver or vessels to watch and it is stolen from that man's house… if the thief was not discovered, the man in whose house it was shall approach the judges (to swear) that he did not send his hand out (to use) his fellow's property (Exodus 22, 8). It continues, "For any matter of negligence" - this is a general category. "For ox, for donkey, for sheep, for raiment" - this is specific. "For any matter that is lost" - general (again). The verse enunciated specific examples to show us that just like the specific examples are in a class of movable entities that have a monetary value, so also the general category include only what is movable and had monetary value (but not restricted to only those examples specified by the verse).

Talmud, Oedipus, and Cannes

This film took a prize in Cannes.

The story of a great rivalry between a father and son, both eccentric professors in the Talmud department of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The father's lifetime of painstaking work was made superfluous by the discovery of the manuscript he was reconstructing. The son is a publicity seeking, recognition craving academic-celebrity. The Israel Prize, Israel's most prestigious national award, is the jewel that brings these two to a final, bitter confrontation.

Hearat Shulayim is a traditional film in more sense than one (at Cannes, the crew refused limousines and walked to the evening screening in the rain to observe the Shabbos)

 

But, really, a mainstream film about professors of Talmud! You can't make this stuff up.

Which is larger: Oral or Written Law?

Here is a passage in Yerushalmi Peah 2:4 which is not particularly striking but it will bring us to important "yesodos" in understanding the unfolding of Torah She Baal Peh.

E. Zeiri in the name of R. Elazar says: "I will write for him most of my Torah (Hoshea 8:12)". Was the majority or the Torah written? Rather, more numerous are things that are derived orally from what is derived from text. Is it really so? Rather, more precious are things derived orally from things derived from a text.

There is a simlar passage in Bavli GIttin 60b, where R. Elazar and R. Yochanan disagree whether most of Torah was given orally or in writing. It is not surprising that Yerushalmi reports R. Elazar's position explicitly and R. Yochanan's position as stamma d'gemora; after all, Rambam writes in the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishan that the editor of Yerushalmi was R. Yochanan.

א"ר אלעזר תורה רוב בכתב ומיעוט על פה שנא' (הושע ח) אכתוב לו רובי תורתי כמו זר נחשבו ור' יוחנן אמר רוב על פה ומיעוט בכתב שנא' (שמות לד) כי על פי הדברים האלה ואידך נמי הכתיב אכתוב לו רובי תורתי ההוא אתמוהי קא מתמה אכתוב לו רובי תורתי הלא כמו זר נחשבו ואידך נמי הכתיב כי על פי הדברים האלה ההוא משום דתקיפי למיגמרינהו

What is more difficult to udnerstand is what this means. What does the question of whether most Torah is in writing or Oral signify and how is "most" defined.

There is a parallel Yerushalmi (Chagiga 1:8) that can throw some light on this question.

ר' זעירה בשם ר' לעזר (הושע ח) אכתוב לו רובי תורתי וכי רובה של תורה נכתבה אלא

 מרובין הדברים הנדרשין מן הכתב מן הדברים הנדרשין מן הפה וכיני אלא חביבין הדברים הסמוכין לכתב מן הדברים הסמוכין לפה

What this is saying is that there are laws. Some are connected to texts and some are connected to oral traditions. The argument is whether more are connected to a text or more are connected orally.

What does this mean?

To understand it, let me present the brief history of systemization of Oral Law as I understand it.

When Jews returned to Judea from Bavel, they brought with them a mass of unorganized traditions. There were numerous laws but they were not arranged in any kind of pattern that allowed systemization. There was just a mass or rules and precedents, each standing on its own. There were also the Pentateuch (the Law), Prophets and various other books. These books were presumably Kesuvim, since Kesuvim were not canonized  until Anshei Kneses Hagedola, as described in Bava Basra 15a. However, they could also be handbooks of laws.This is how Ben Sira (written in this period) explains it in his introduction: "My grandfather Jesu, after he had much given himself to a diligent reading of the law, and the prophets, and other books, that were delivered to us from our fathers...".

Josephus says this: "Antiquities XIII, 297, What I would now explain is this, that the Pharisees have passed on to the people a great many observances handed down by their fathers, which are not written down in the law of Moses. For this reason the Sadducees reject them and say that we are to consider to be obligatory only those observances which are in the written word, but need not observe those which are derived from the tradition of our forefathers."

Saducees apaprenlty did not disagree that there were received laws. However, they either maintained that these Laws did not any longer matter, because "times have changed", or they thought that only what was written was reliable. Both of these positions are known to us from later times.

One way to counter this was to organize Oral Law in close conjunction to Written Law.

The first to organize the traditions were the Sofrim. As stated in the Yerushalmi Shekalim 5 and quoted in Tosafos Kiddushin 30a, s.v Nikreu Sofrim, Sofrim is best translated as Enumerators and not Scribes. They arranged traditions into groups, such as: "A woman is bethrothed in 3 ways", "With 10 sayings the world was created", "FIve should not take teruma" etc etc. Essentially they made lists in order to organize the mass of traditions into some kind of a rudimentary structure. See a discussion here

Once this was accomplished, another question arose. Would it be better to now organize the traditions based on the verses of the Written Torah, which everyone knew by heart, or would it be better to organize them into a freeestanding work that has no connection of the verses. R. Ishmoel and R. Akiva chose the former and so they wrote Midrashei Halacha. Others, R. Meir, for example, composed the rudimentary Mishna, Mishna Rishona, which went on to evolve into Tosefta, Mishna and Beraysos.

The Yersushalmi and perhaps also the Bavli, want to understand which was the dominant process.

The disagreement in the Yerushalmi is whether at the intial point of systemization, most traditions were organized according to the verses (written) or in a freestanding rudimentary mishnaic type arrangement (oral).