Is there a value in serving Hashem with impure intention? In other words, is a mtisva worth anything if it is performed selfishly, not because it is a Divine commandment and for the sake of God alone? The Talmudic sources are contradictory and so are the resolutions of these contradictory sources.
There are passages that state that a commandment performed shelo lishma has not only no value but is considered a sin. In Berachos 17b a person who acts in this fashion is said to be "better off not having been born". Chovos Halevavos goes as far as to compare such a person to an idolater, for he serves himself instead of Hashem (Shaar Yichud Hamaase, Ch. 4).
There are, however, also sources that indicted the serving God for selfish reasons is a positive act. Such is the passage in Pesachim 50b that says," A person should always engage in (Torah - in some editions these words are not present) and commandments shelo lishma for from an insincere intention there comes a sincere intention". In other words, one should engage in Divine service even for insincere reasons for this will in due time lead him to sincere performance of the commandments. This may be for several reasons. One can explain that the very act of maimtanining religious discipline allows gradual transformation of the inner self, whereas one who abandons observance is unluikely to ever return to it.The Sefer HaChinuch in mitzvah fourteen offers a different explanation. He maintains that even one who studies Torah shelo lishmo will be affected by his Torah study and he ultimately will attain the level of studying Torah leshmo. The Chinuch posits that this is analogous to one who collects taxes illegally on behalf of the king. Eventually, such a person will transform into a thief, as his actions will influence him negatively. Conversely, if one performs positive actions, albeit for the wrong reasons, he will ultimately be influenced to perform those actions altruistically.
There are two main ways in the Rishonim to resolve this contradiction between Talmudic sources. These two approaches disagree percisely about the value of insincere service. Tosafos in Pesachim 50b and a number of other places suggests that the statement in Brochos refers to someone who uses his learning solely to put down others and has no intention at all to apply what he learns. Such a person is better off not having been born. However, one who has no evil intent but has simply not yet risen to the level of lishma, should continue to perform the commandments as best as he can.
However, R. Avrohom ben Harambam writes in his Hamaspik Leovdei Hashem (Ch. 3) that even though the Sages felt that it is better to perform mitzvos insincerely than to completely neglect them, the truth is that superficial service is unworthy before God, the Master of Truth. In fact, the defective group who serve God thusly are called " the group of hyppocrites (Sotah 42b), who are among those who do not merit to greet Divine Presence. Similarly, R. Hai Gaon wrties in Teshuvos that there is no reward for shelo lishma. One must ask: "If so, how could the Sages recommend continuing insincere performance of commandments, if it carries with it such dire consequences". The answer seems to be that this dispensation is restricted only to those who in any case are not capable (yet) of serving lishmo, such as minors and the ignorant.
Anyone who occupies himself with Torah in order to receive reward or to prevent any troubles is not doing so for the sake of it, whereas anyone who does so out of love for the Master of this world, and not with any ulterior motives, is doing so for the sake of it. The Sages said that one should always occupy oneself with Torah even if not for the sake of it, for out of doing so not for the sake of it one will come to doing so for the sake of it. Therefore, when one is teaching children, women and ignoramuses one should teach them to serve God out of fear and in order to be rewarded. As their knowledge increases and they become more wise, we reveal this `secret' to them bit by bit and accustom them to this concept in repose until they totally understand it, and will serve out of love (Rambam Teshuva 10:5).
I find it interesting that these rishonim do not offer the suggestion that serving God with mixed emotions is acceptable and should be done, for all human beings have mixed motivations and act for many intertwined and complex reasons. Serving him completely insincerely, without "good" motivations at all, should be eschewed. Such an answer is offered by Mesillas Yeshorim (Ch.16). Ramchal says that motivations can be complex but it is the main intention that is determinative.
It must be borne in mind, however, that just as the concept of purity of thought is applicable to bodily deeds - which by their nature border on the realm of the evil inclination - in the sense of one's withdrawing them from it so that they do not come to appertain to it, so is this concept applicable to worthy deeds, close to the realm of the Creator, may His Name be blessed, in the sense of one's not setting them far from Him and not permitting them to enter the province of the evil inclination. This is what underlies the idea of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself" which is often mentioned by our Teachers of blessed memory. However, it is clear from their words that there are various kinds of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself," the worst being the type in which one serves not for the purpose of Divine service at all, but in order to deceive people or to gain honor or wealth. About such a one it is said (Yerushalmi Berachoth 1.2), "It were better had he been smothered in his placenta." And the Prophet says about him (Isaiah 64:5), "We have all become as one unclean, and all our righteousness as a soiled garment." Another type of "not for the sake of the mitzvah itself" is serving for the sake of reward, about which it is said (Pesachim 506), "A person should always occupy himself with Torah and mitzvoth, even if not for the sake of the mitzvah itself, for doing so will lead him to serve for the the sake of the mitzvah itself." There is no question, though, that one who has not yet attained to the latter mode of service is far from attaining his perfection.
This understanding is strongly supported by several several Talmudic passages. In fact, there are passages that go even farther and suggest that there is value even to a mitsva that is performed entirely for unworthy reasons. The Gemara in Pesachim 50a quotes a Beraisa that teaches that one who works on Erev Shabbos after Minchah time will see no blessing from his labor. The Gemara quotes a second Beraisa that teaches a similar lesson. "There is one who toils and gains, one who toils and loses, one who is lazy and gains, and one who is lazy and loses. The one who toils and gains is the one who works all week except for Erev Shabbos. The one who toils and loses is the one who works all week and on Erev Shabbos. The one who is lazy and gains is the one who does not work all week, and he does not work on Erev Shabbos either. The one who is lazy and loses is the one who does not work all week but he works on Erev Shabbos." The RIF explains that the Beraisa teaches that even a Mitzvah she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah. That is why one who refrains from work on Erev Shabbos because of his laziness, and not because of the Mitzvah to refrain from work at that time, is considered to have "gained" the Mitzvah nonetheless. Not only that, Rava adds that even the women of Mechuza, who refrain from work because they like to indulge in pleasure, are still credited with the Mitzvah. Rava teaches that when the Beraisa says that a Mitzvah done she'Lo Lishmah is considered a Mitzvah, that is true not only when one does the act of the Mitzvah without intention to fulfill the Mitzvah, but even when one does the act of the Mitzvah with specific intention to accomplish something else with the act.
Other sources that imply a similar understanding are in Pesachim 9b and the sources collected in the Tosafos ibid.
It may be that the Rishonim take the position that, yes, there are mixed motivations to most actions, but only one of them is primary and the others are rationalizations. Thus, were a man to only know himself, he could isolate that "real" motivations and everything else is secondary and only obscures the true and sole motivation. Interestingly, the approach of Mesillas Yesharim is expressed in halacha. Shulchan Oruch O"C 38: 8 codifies the law that "scribes who write tefllin and mezuzos, and sellers and resellers of these items, ... are exempt from putting on tefillin, except at the time of Shema and Tefillah". Magen Avrom comments: "Only if their main intent is to makes these items available but if their main intent is to gain financially, they would not be called "engaged in the mitsva" and would not be exempt". It appears then that one with mixed motivatons is still considered to act lishma as long as his MAIN intention is for the sake of Heaven, exactly what Mesillas Yesharim says. Beiur Halacha argues that even if the two intentions are equally prominent, it is still called lishma (Beiur Halacha clearly considers the issue of "lishma" and of "osek bamitsva" to be the same). Thus, from the standpoint of halacha, when sincere and insincere motivations are equally matached, one is still considered to be acting lishma. Only when the insincerity predominates can one be said to act truly insincerely. In this example we can see how a question that might be considered to be purely within the discipline of Mussar, has ramifications for understanding Talmud, Rishonim and halacha.
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