avakesh

Avos 1:1, Fences

The last teaching of the Men of the Great Assembly was: "Make a fence for Torah". It is not surprising that after reformatting Judaism in terms of law and propagating a new ethos of master-student relationship, they would address the means to how this Law will be preserved. The institution of "fences", Rabbinic enactments that prevented inadvertent transgression of precious Law, was the single most effective factor in preserving the Jewish nation as the people apart and in enabling it to survive antagonistic cultures and enticing  external philosophies. It was the apartness that these fences enforced, the gravity it communicated about transgressing even an iota of the Divine legislation that forced Jews to isolate themselves and come together in communities built around religious observances.

Rabbeinu Yonah (to Pirkei Avos 1:1) writes:

It is very great and praiseworthy to make a fence to the Torah's mitzvos so that one who fears and respects God's word will not stumble into transgressing the mitzvah. One who observes the rabbinic laws that form the fences around the Torah shows more fear of God than one who fulfills the mitzvah itself. Performance of the mitzvah does not imply fear and respect as much as observance of the fences by one who is careful not to even come close to inadvertent transgression.

Take, for example, what keeping Kosher would have meant prior to Rabbinic legislation. One would be able to eat almost in a treif restaurant without nary a concern. Assuming that "taam k'ikkar' is rabbinic in origin and without getting into the extended consideration of the concepts of "zeah" and "reicha", the only prohibition would be consuming actual non-kosher meat; there would be nary a prohibition that would survive the application of the laws of sofek,  bittul and rov in their Biblical form. The same would be true of most other areas of life. Kashrus would resemble (lehavdil) Muslim dietary proscriptions, which in the Western world in no serious way interfere with the ability of most Moslems to  participate in the surrounding culture. Judaism, instead of being a way of life would become a handful of mildly restrictive rules, that neither logically hang together, nor force a creation of a distinctive Jewish civilization, nor cause Jews to segregate together. Ultimately, they would assimilate and the Torah would be forgotten except where Jews not constitute a  majority. Instead, these laws forced Jews to live and dream together,creating distinctive Jewish culture and communities in every land of their dispersion.

What was the mechanism that accomplished this? Surely it is not the institution of fences themselves for we find rabbinic enactments already prior to the Great Assembly. "David and his Court enacted Yichud with a single woman (Sanhedrin 21a), Shlomo and his Court enacted eruvin and washing of hands for Teruma and secondaries to prohibited relationships ( Shabbos 14b). The need for individual enactments is implied in the Biblical institution of Nazirite, who must refrain from eating grapes because he must not drink wine (see A"Z 17a, see also Yevamos 20a).) If so, what is it that the Men of Great Assembly innovated?

The answer seems to be that whereas before rabbinic legislation was an occasional and exceptional occurrence, during the second Temple era it became an operative principle of law - so much so that legal scholars did not need  To demonstrate that an enactment actually took place. Now they could assume that there is an enactment without an iota of historical evidence to that effect. From historical events, fences became legal concepts. In other words, necessity and force of rabbinic enactments became a legal principle on par with the laws of logic or the power of the precedent.

To illustrate this, let us look at a Talmudic passage found in Gittin 73a. There is a law that a dying person (shekhiv mera) can command to give a gift to someone and that this verbal declaration has all the power of a written and delivered document. However, we understand that this declaration was made in expectation of dying and that if the dying person recovers, it is no longer valid. Rav Huna assumes that the same is the case by a get. If a dying person commands to write a get but neglects to also command that it be delivered and given to his wife, his declaration is legally valid. What happens if he recovers? Rav Huna assumes that it is automatically voided as is the case in the situation of a gift. Rovo, however, disagrees on the basis that there is a rabbinic enactments -  "people will think that a get can be given after death". This invocation of a hypothetical enactment is sufficient to establish halakhah. Notice that Rovo does not have to prove that there was ever a legislative session in which such an enactment was promulgated; neither does he have to bring evidence of it ever having been actually enacted. It is sufficient to invoke the legal principle of rabbinic enactment to reject Rav Huna's analogy, so much so that the final halakha follows him and not Rav Huna. This is what I mean by saying that rabbinic enactment now functions as a legal principle on par with other halachic principles. This is how a teaching of the Men of the Great Assembly became an operative principle of law.

Majesty of Creation

Image from NASA - like something out of Ari's Writings.

 

Learning to love others

We have an obligation of " You shall love your friend like yourself", which is a great principle of the Torah. How can it be fulfilled? It is against nature to love someone who is to you a stranger. However by joining to tsaddikim, all those who joined them are like one family. Slowly they learn to love one another. First to love the tsaddik, then members of his household, then all who joined him... and the commandment is fulfilled through this.

Ginzei Yisroel (Tshortkov), 2:206

Making lists

Lists and list making

Hashem GOD, thou hast begun to show thy servant thy greatness, and thy mighty hand... (Devarim 3,24)

This week we will try our hand in explaining how Tannaim make lists. Anyone who had ever studied the Mishna recognizes that list-making is at the core of the Tannaitic method. Many if not most mishnayos are based on lists. Yet, paradoxically, so often these lists are not complete. At times, the missing elements or examples can be located in the Tosefta, at other times, it is the Gemara that points out what is not there. This puzzling feature of the mishnaic arrangement has been called "tanna v'shiar - he taught but left out[1]." It is noted by the Rishonim is the realization that this feature is deliberate and not a consequence of forgetting or skipping certain examples. In fact, the very wording "he taught but left out" presupposes leaving out with intent. Why would the Tannaim regularly leave out information and what may explain this strange feature of their method?

Let us begin with the supposition[2] that much of the activity of forming lists took place in the early Second Temple period. Let's propose for a moment that at that time, a group of scholars titled sofrim, or scribes, was active in collecting and systemizing the laws and customs that they received by tradition. "Why were they called sofrim? Because they arranged the Torah by numbers: the chiefs of (Shabbos) labors are forty minus one, four chief categories of damages, etc (Yerushalmi Shekalim 5 quoted by Tosafos to Kiddushin 30a).

An interesting list is found in the beginning of the Sifri (2,5) to our parsha, V'Eschanan. It classifies and categorizes the term "eved", slave or servant and can serve as a point of departure for our investigation.

Israel called themselves servants and the Holy One Blessed be He (HKBH) called them servants.
There are those who call themselves servants and HKBH did not call them servant and there are those who did not call themselves servants but HKBH did call them servants.
Avraham called himself servant as it says (Bareishis 18) "do not pass from Thy servant". HKBH called him servant as it says: "for the sake of Avraham, My servant (Bareishis 26). Yakov called himself servant as it says "I became small from all the kindness and all the good which you had done with your servant (Bar. 22) and HKBH called him servant, as it says, "...and you My servant Yakov (Ishaia 41)." Moshe called himself servant (in our passage ) and HKBH called him servant as in, "Moshe, My servant died) (Yehoshua 1)." Dovid called himself servant- "I am Your servant, the son of Your maid (Psalms 116)" and HKBH called him servant, as it says "for the sake of My servant, Dovid" (Kings I, 11."
Ishaiah called himself servant, as it says "He made me from the womb to be His servant" (Ishaiah 49) and HKBH called him "My servant Ishaiahu (ibid 20). "
Shimshon called himself servant (Judges 16) and Shmuel called himself servant. Shlomo called himself servant "and you will give to your servant an ear to hear (Kings I, 3)" but HKBH did not called him servant but attributed it to his father Dovid - "for the sake of my servant Dovid ( ibid 11)."
Iyov did not call himself servant but HKBH called him servant, as it says " have you considered My servant Yiov (Yiov 1)"...
The passage goes on to include Yehoshua, Kalev, Elyakim, Zerubabel, Daniel in this group and ends:
'The early prophets (neviim harishonim" did not call themselves servants but HKBH called them servants, as it says, "except that he revealed His secret to his servants the prophets".

Thus we have here a list that includes the following members:
1. Those who called themselves and also were called servants by G-d. The first example of that is Israel as a people.
2. Those who called themselves servants but HKBH did not call them so.
3. Those who did not call themselves servants but HKBH did so call them

There is an important exception to this list that the list does not include. Nebuchadnetzar is also called "My servant" but his name is not on this list (see Yirmiahu 25,9, 27,6, 43,10).

I would propose that, as in the formation of the Masorah, the original activity consisted in forming all-inclusive lists. Once accomplished, subsequent scholars attempted to explain or find a rationale to explain why certain examples were included in one group and others in other. After various explanations were sifted and considered, one was selected and the list was reconfigured. Particulars that did not "fit" with the preferred explanations were then omitted.

In this case, the original list may have well contained Nebuchadnezzar's name. However, the subsequent Tannaim realized that this exalted term should only be applied to characters who in some way actually served G-d. "Eved" can mean either servant or slave. They thought that the term can be applied to an individual who privately aspired to farther G-d's purpose for humanity but did not fully succeed in realizing this goal. Such an individual would call himself a servant but it would not be confirmed by G-d. There are others who thought of themselves as private individuals but willingly ended up playing an important role in the Divine plan. A person like is more a slave than a servant. He could still be called "eved" by G-d.

Nebuchadnezzar may have ultimately fulfilled Divine intent but he certainly never saw himself as subservient to His purpose. He was a slave, not a servant. There is no reason to suppose that he was fully cognizant of himself as G-d's agent[3]. It is also unseemly to apply such an elevated term to the one who destroyed Hashem's Temple and exiled His children from their land. Consequently, at the last stage of the reduction of this beraisa, he was omitted from the list.

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1 A related principle is "ein lomdin min haklalos". We don't generalize from rules, even when exceptions are listed.

2 There are different opinions about how exactly the Oral Law was transmitted. This is a very large and important topic that we cannot take up here. See Meiri Kiddushin 24a and notes there for some support to what is proposed above.

3 There are midrashic passages that suggest that he was aware of his destiny and others that indicate that he was led unawares to it.

Tsimtsum

Tsimtsum, as we learn in the first chapter of Eits Chaim, is how the world came into being.

"In the beginning of everything, all of existence was  unitary light called Ein Sof. There was no vacated or "empty" space. ... He contracted Himself from the midpoint of His light - to the sides and surroundings and empty space resulted between them".

Here, Tsimtsum is defined as withdrawal. God had, so to speak, withdraw so that a space for independent creatures could come into being.  Whether this withdrawal was actual, potential, or located solely within human perception is a question that we will not currently discuss. I would just caution that Tsimtsum can be conceived of in terms of human perception or in terms of philosophic concepts or as Hashgacha vis Ramchal. It is clear, however, that Tsimtsum is defined here as withdrawal. It cannot be otherwise, for at this first step in Creation (or rather Emanation), nothing could have changed if not for  a withdrawal.

However, it is incorrect to think of Tsimtusm as a one time event. In truth, tsimtsum is a basic mechanism of all stations of emanation. At every step of descent, the light must be lessened, for, coming from a higher level, it by definition is something that the lower level cannot perceive.

"All contractions lead to a decrease of the light so that the lower levels can receive it (Eits Chaim, Nekuddim, CH.2)."

What we have here is quite different, not a concept of withdrawal that creates "space", but a filtering, a lessening of light, so that it can "fit" and interact on a lower level of existence. It is concealed enough so that it does not overwhelm or swallow the lower level.

It follows then that the same word "Tsimtsum" describes two very different phenomena. One is an actual withdrawal, to open up a "space", and the other is merely a diminishing of light, so us not to overwhelm.

The disadvantage of this approach is that it commingles terminology, using the same word to describe two very different things. However, this is common in the Oral Torah as a whole - the meaning is paramount, not the wording.

This understanding is made explicit in the following letter of the Last Lubavitcher Rebbe (from  http://www.sichosinenglish.org/books/letters-rebbe-1/91.htm:)

"As is well known, the manner in which the creation [began] is that, "at the outset, there was a sublime and simple light which filled all existence.... When it arose in His simple will to create the worlds, He contracted this light. There remained a space and an empty cavity. And afterwords, He extended one vector ..." as stated and explained in Torah Or, in the maamar entitled Pasach Eliyahu, and in Likkutei Torah, in the maamar entitled Lehavin MasheKasuv BiOtzaros Chayim, and other sources.

There is a difference between this contraction (tzimtzum) and the subsequent tzimtzumim. For this [first] tzimtzum is characterized by withdrawal and not [merely] limitation. This makes it possible for the vector (kav) to be drawn down afterwords, i.e., light to be enclothed in vessels. This allows for the worlds to exist. "

However, even within Chabad there is another view. Basing himself on another unique principle of Chabad, that tsimtsum took place only in terms of human perception but not in the Ein Sof Himself ( Ohr, not Maor or Atsmus), Rabbi Yossi Ives explains Tsimtsum in the recently published Seder Hishtalshelus (London 2004). (For more on this see, http://www.sichosinenglish.org/books/letters-rebbe-1/04.htm). In it on pp.35-45 he argues that all of tsimtsum is of the second type, that of concealment of light, never a withdrawal. There are others who hold this view, for example Maor V'Shemesh in the beginning of Genesis and Ramchal (KLCH, 24). It is made explicit in Nefesh Hachaim 3:7.

Finally, there is an opinion that all tsimtsumim are withdrawals. There is radical corollary to this; since withdrawal leaves an empty space, there must be innumerable empty spaces in the fabric of emanation. The concentric spheres must not touch, for if they do, light from the higher level will flow in and overwhelm the light from a lower level. R. Arye Kaplan, basing himself on LIkkuttei Moharan 64:3 and a citation from Etiz Chaim (which, however, talks specifically of the initial tsimtsum), writes in Inner Space, p. 125:

"Immediately light extended from all directions and created a round concentric sphere that filled the entire vacated space... and the concentric sphere vacated... The process of constriction and expansion continued until the Kav reached the center point and the entire Vacated Space was filled with luminous universes, one within the other.. We might conjecture, however, that in between each of these concentric spheres there is a kind of no man's land, where God is completely hidden, and where one who does not know how to look would say that God is not there".

See also TRSVav by Rebbe Rashab, beginning of Vayecholu Hashemaim.

To restate, there are 3 views on Tsimtsum:

1.It is all concealment from human perception or, alternatively, diminishing of the brightness of Divine light as it falls from level to level - never a withdrawal.

2.It is always a withdrawal; consequently the world is full of dark spaces where God cannot be found.

3.The initial Tsimtsum was a withdrawal; all the subsequent ones were concealment.

There is much more to say on this topic but.. it is time to withdraw... and conceal.

Tisha B'Av

"A little slideshow, (made in three days) to give some meaning for your Tisha B'Av fast. (Note: the music is accapella in honor of the nine days.) The message of the video is to show that even though there are many different 'types' of ways to be Jewish, to the root of it all, we are all the Jewish people, and as brothers and sisters we should love each other, no matter what we look like, how we do different things. Next time you look at another Jew, try not to be so judgemental. "Love your neighbor like you love yourself."

Sceptics, go away!

The Web is full of sceptics. Blogs debunking religion are ever present, intrusive and often clever. All shades of opinion and rhetorical ability can be found - from angry revert BT's to sophisticated orthoprax practitioners of self delusion. All share one characteristic. They all are stuck in mid 19th century.

Why do I say this?

I think that the septics ask the wrong question. It is wrong because it is predicated on the assumptions of the enlightenment, on the axioms of the era that passed, on the descriptions of human self and human decision making that is mechanistic, inaccurate and passe. These Internet septics think, or rather delude themselves in thinking, that rational reflection  can discover the truth, even that Truth exists and that is discoverable by rational processes of the mind. This model of reality is predicated on the thought of the Greeks and subsequently of most philosophers until 20th century. The past 60-80 years have brought with them a different perception. The reigning sensibility now is that truth is personal, that it is subject to interpretation more than discovery, that reflection is false because it bypasses feeling and emotion that are, perhaps, more "real", certainly more capable of grasping reality, more "true". Postmodernists deny that human mind is a unity; instead, they view it as  a collection of inter-relating, distinct parts, and they see human decision making as being hopelessly eccentric, undeniably personal and not at all rational.

What does this mean?

Well, first of all it means that truth is personal and varies with each individual. It does not mean that there is no truth - that is a misinterpretation. Rather it can be stated that only conditional truth can be grasped by human beings, only as it is refracted through our personal mechanisms of perception, our bias, our limited experience and capacity. Reflection is farther subverted by "bad faith", the tendency of human minds to select evidence that favors their deeper desires. Consequently, rationality cannot establish binding truth. It can only serve as rhetoric - to defend, or promote positions reached previously by faith. That means that I cannot convince anyone rationally, and neither can they convince me; however, I can convince others by drawing them into my inner world, through poetry of faith, commitment of expression, song, prayer and communal way of life that impacts on their entire being. I can bring in others through uplifting them so that they can also be disinhibited to make faith decisions, limited neither by reason nor by lack of inner depth.

Is this consistent with the Torah?

Yes, I believe that it is. It is perfectly reflective of the the Kabbalistic sensibility, that, on a deeper level, sees all reality as shifting interacting phenomena on various levels of expression of higher processes. It is perfectly compatible with mystical Judaism, although less so with rational streams within it. For those who are comfortable with feeling their way in religion, to God, to higher (and deeper) expressions of faith, who accept feeling and emotion as keys to unlocking secrets of Redemption, postmodernism offers a philosophical language which they would readily embrace. For others, well, go and learn!

What is the real question?

The real question is not: "Is what Torah teaches compatible with the sciences?"'. Rather it is :"What is the way forward that will develop me and enable me to grasp higher realities that my religion has promised  to those who seek Him!" Once freed of the need to defend, there are no positions, no bulwarks, no walls, only irritants to bypass .

Nine Days: Rembrandt's Jeremiah

Ibn Ezra and non-Mosaic authorship of certain verses

I repost a section from a wider discussion of Torah from Sinai, posted originally as http://www.avakesh.com/2006/11/torah_from_sina.html

This topic begins with the Ibn Ezra to Deuteronomy 1,1.

The Ibn Ezra was a great exegete whose works continue to be studied in our own day. While a great Bible commentator, he was not considered by later generations to be an expert in Talmud, philosophy or Halakha. He also wrote, as it appears on commission and in great hurry, which  accounts for many unclear expressions and frequent difficulties in ascertaining his intended meaning. Such is the case for the remarks under discussion which are very unclear.

Ibn Ezra writes there:” If you understand the meaning of (princes) ”twelve” and “Moshe wrote[1]”, “and the Canaanite was then in the land(Gen12,6)”, “on the mountain of G-d he will appear (Gen 22,6)”, “behold his bed was  a bed of iron( Deut 3,11)”, then you will know the truth.”

These remarks clearly allow of a variety of interpretations. While at least one early commentator, Tsafnat Pa’aneach did understand them to refer to the idea that these verses were inserted subsequently (just as the last twelve verses of the Torah that describe events subsequent to Moshe’s death were not written by him but by Joshua) under the influence of Ruach Hakodesh), many others understood them very differently[2]. Among them is Shmuel Dovid Luzzatto, M. Friedlander and standard super-commentaries to Ibn Ezra.

In fact, there is good internal evidence that their understanding of the Ibn Ezra is correct. Among them is the statement in his introduction to Psalms where he supports Davidic authorship of the Psalms with the following statement:” There is not doubt among the Jews that Moses wrote the Book of Genesis as out forefathers were taught by tradition, although it (Genesis) does not begin with the words: ”And the L-rd spoke to Moses”. You see that he considered all of Genesis to be of Mosaic origin. Similarly, he sharply criticized Yitshaki (a Karaite commentator) for saying that Genesis 36, 31 was inserted at the time. of the later Israelite kings; Ibn Ezra writes of that claim:” His book ought to be burned[3]”.

Michael Friedlander[4], for example, offers the following explanation of Ibn Ezra's cryptic words:” Ibn Ezra disitinctly stated in the 2^nd chapter of Yesod Mora that with regard to our duty to mentally approach G-d, very little could be gained from the study of Geography, Archeology and the like; he is therefore surprised to find in the Law, in which every word is believed, seemingly superfluous geographical and archeological remarks, such as in the beginning of Deuteronomy, the circumstantial description of the place where Moses addressed Israelites, of the bed of Og, King of Bashan or the remark, “and the Canaanites were then in the land” which seems to be in no way connected with the journey of Abraham”. Friedlander goes on to suggest that the”twelve”refers to the sacrifices of the 12 Princes, the difficulty being the need for exact repetition of the constiutents of the sacrifice of each prince in minute detail and that “Moses wrote” refers to Numbers3 3, an exhaustive and seemingly unnecessary listing of the itinerary of the Jews in the desert. I in other words, the Ibn Ezra is simply stating a problem,that there are many passages in Chumash that seem to have no relevance to the real purpose of Scripture, but not offering an answer to it.

As is apparent, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Ibn Ezra would agree to anything remotely like contemporary Biblical criticism. It is unlikely that he would even allow a possibility that a very limited number of verses have been inserted later, under the influence of Ruach Hakodesh; in fact, as we had seen there exist many authorities and formidable internal evidence even against such a supposition.

I cannot possibly say it better than the following quote: “ Although Spinoza exaggerated the import of Ibn Ezra’s apparenty “heretical” words, his interpretation of Ibn Ezra was crucial in defining the latter’s “modern” image among biblical critics and 17^th century deists alike. Such approaches to Ibn Ezra may be seen as heavily ironic, when we recall that his actual aim was to effect the harmonisation of Written and Oral Torah… to safeguard the Jewish tradition and  thence the Jewish community from internal and external inroads…It could therefore be argued that Ibn Ezra was being used in a way which was antithetical to Jewish tradition, and one that denied the authority of the traditional community to define itself[5]”. In other words, Ibn Ezra was deliberately misconstrued and misread out of the contex of his own life, writing and life mission, which was to support and defend traditional understanding of the Torah and used for completely opposite means – to attack and subvert it.

Loose construction

That Semitic jurisprudence differs radically in its methodology from contemporary law systems that derive out of Roman legal tradition is now a truism. The former arranges and presents itself in specific examples that leave the jurist with the duty of generalizing principles and applying them to other real world cases. The question then becomes: "How similar are these two cases and do the principles implicit in one apply to the other?" Because the focus is on similarity, less precision of definition is required.[1] Western law, on the other hand, is constituted via statements of general principles and rules that then need to be applied to concrete cases. The question for this system is: "How are the principles defined and do they apply to this particular case?" The former strives for clarity and concrete application; the latter for accuracy of definition and comprehensiveness - how the principle is defined and what it includes and excludes.[2]To a large part, this divergence is predicated on the linguistic resources available to the respective crafters of the two systems, a topic that we explored in http://www.avakesh.com/2007/02/the_holy_tongue.html and other posts in that series.

Frequently those trained in Western languages and epistemology tend to read Talmudic derivations narrowly because they are used to words and syntactic structures that carry predictable, reproducible and defined meaning. Instead what is needed is a looser reading, one that aims to extract the kernel of an idea and then apply it to other instances. I suppose that the best analogy is poetry. No one reads poetry and its associated metaphors and allusions literally; they are supposed to portray an idea that then is translated by the reader to its intended goal.[2] Insisting on reading in the Western mode can lead to misunderstanding. Let us take the passage that derives rabbinic prohibition of bishul akum, the prohibition of eating the cooked food of a Gentile, from a Torah verse.

"Cooked foods prepared by a non-Jew are prohibited. What is the source for this? The Torah states, "Food you will sell for me for money, and I shall eat; and you will give me water for money and I shall drink (Devarim 2:28)"...just as the water they wished to drink was unchanged at the point of sale through heating, so were the dishes (purchased form gentiles) unprocessed. But does this verse say anything about cooking? Rather, the law is Rabbinic and the source offered is but an asmakhta (Avodah Zara 37a).

The Maharal in Be'er 1 of his Be'er Hagolah analyzes this passage and defends it from the attacks of Azariah De Rossi, a contemporary Italian rationalist and thinker who criticizes it on several grounds. De Rossi pointed out that the law of bishul akum is rabbinic; how could the Sages be justified in deriving it from an event that antedated their law by many centuries. For Azariah De Rossi this passage was but one of many that showed Chazal as manipulators of the text rather than its true interpreters.

The Maharal counters that all nations take pride in their unique habits, customs and way of life. A proud nation will therefore take great pains to not culturally depend on others. It would wish to maintain its own culture according to its particular national characteristics and identity. When forced to import cultural building blocks, it would accept only the raw and unchanged material that it can subsequently rework and fashion according to its own determinants and inheritance. That idea is expressed in the verses under discussion. The Jews were not willing to accept the prepared food of other nations but only the raw materials that they could form into something that carries their own unique stamp. It is this understanding of national pride and identity that many years later led to the Rabbinic prohibition of gentiles' cooking and for the same reasons.

What we have here is the concept of Rabbinic exegesis read loosely and not concretely. Maharal asked the question: "What is the kernel of the drasha?". Once it was isolated, he was able to discard the particular circumstances and the narrow expression of this central idea and focus on its core. This leads him to a much more profound and significantly more general understanding of the passage.

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1 See Rashi to 22:23 for a slightly different version of the same midrash which is found in Tanchuma to that verse and also in Midrash Hagodol in our parsha.

2 One simple explanation of this usage is that a gentile uses his sword indiscriminantly and without serious consideration of the grave moral issues involved. A Jew, on the other hand, uses only the appropriate blade or side, only as much force as is required.